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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 2001, its 
effects on workers and implications for trade unions in Ireland.  The 
legislation provides a means of resolving the substantive issues in dispute 
between workers and employers when employers refuse to recognise the 
trade union articulating those issues.  It may also deal with procedural 
issues but may not provide for collective bargaining.  In abeyance since 
2007 due to legal challenges, and amid Government commitments to return 
the Act to its original intent, this thesis seeks to provide an evidence based 
response to the various calls for the Act’s amendment or replacement. 
A mixed methods approach contributed to an extensive examination of the 
cases taken under the Act: - 
 Documentary analysis of all Labour Court Recommendations issued  
 A tracing of each workplace back to the union which referred the 
case 
 A survey of union officials currently or potentially responsible for the 
members at workplaces where cases had previously been taken 
 Interviews with union members, activists and staff in ten selected 
cases 
The Labour Court Recommendations, in complying with the terms of the 
Act, must and do accept non-union fora for the resolution of collective 
issues and effectively corral trade unions into individual representation, 
managing misbehaviour and exit.  Focussing also on the aftermath of the 
Labour Court Recommendations afforded a unique understanding of the 
effects on workers and their trade unions; the effects of the process in 
addition to the effects of the written outcome. 
The research found that the majority of workplaces no longer have union 
members.  Those still in membership display low levels of density and of 
activism and a distinct link is demonstrated between the union organising 
approach and such outcomes in each case.  Those campaigns conducted 
with a greater emphasis on mobilisation or organising model techniques, 
where the referral under the 2001 Act was just one element in a broad 
campaign were more successful in achieving collective bargaining and 
better membership density and activism levels. The study recommends 
caution regarding sole reliance on the procedures provided by the Act. 
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Chapter 1                                                                                                      
Centenary Commemorations 1913 - 2013 
 
This thesis is the culmination of a four year period of study, reflection and 
data collection with the bulk of the writing taking place during 2013, a year 
of multiple events in Ireland arranged to: - 
 
…remember, commemorate and reaffirm the ideals of the men and 
women who fought for the rights of ordinary people as workers, as 
parents and as citizens of a modern Irish state committed to 
upholding the highest standards of democracy and social justice 
(1913 Committee)  
 
The event being commemorated is the Dublin Lockout of 1913, a long and 
bloody chapter in Irish labour history “when perhaps a third of … [Dublin] 
city’s population starved in a fight over trade union recognition” (Yeates, 
2001, p. ix).  A key element in the commemorative events was Irish trade 
union reiteration that there is still some “unfinished business” in relation to 
1913 which “includes the legal recognition of trade unions in all 
employments and negotiating rights for all members” (ICTU, 2013a).  That 
“unfinished business” has a particular resonance for me.  I have worked in 
the trade union movement for almost 30 years, starting in a clerical 
capacity before moving on to work as a union official and latterly as a union 
researcher. Trade union recognition, or the fight for it, has been a daily 
concern in this career and has become an academic focus also.  The 
struggle for union recognition which is “still a struggle” is likened to the 100 
Years War between England and France (Turner et al, 2013), though, as in 
the original 100 Years War the conflict over union recognition is “not a 
single war that lasted for a hundred years, but a sporadic succession of 
wars on the same theme” (Cavendish, 2003).  The most recent skirmish in 
the union recognition war surrounds the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Act 2001, (the 2001 Act); a piece of legislation which provides for third party 
arbitration at the Irish Labour Court on terms and conditions of 
employment for workers whose employer refuses to negotiate with their 
union.  It is important to stress at this point that the legislation does not 
provide for union recognition; there is no statutory union recognition 
procedure in Ireland.  Unions may nonetheless refer to the Labour Court 
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the issues in dispute between them and the employer, and have the Labour 
Court recommend a solution, ultimately legally enforceable.  This thesis is 
concerned with the aftermath of those Recommendations and with just how 
the 2001 Act impacts on the trade union movement and in particular on the 
workers who must live with its consequences.  Of concern is the possibility 
that having the substantive issues in dispute such as pay and conditions of 
employment resolved by the Labour Court would reduce workers’ 
inclination to mobilise, to be active in their union.  The hypothesis to be 
tested is that participation in the procedures provided for under the 2001 
Act militates against worker activism. 
 
Chapter 2 expands on this brief introduction and sets the scene by 
describing industrial relations in Ireland from its roots in UK traditions to 
post-independence neo-corporatism and includes detail on another of this 
war’s skirmishes, one involving the anti-union airline, Ryanair. Chapter 3 
explains the institutions: - the legislation and the Irish State’s industrial 
dispute resolution mechanisms, that is the Labour Relations Commission 
(LRC) and the Labour Court, and how cases proceed through these 
institutions.  A concern with both dimension and agency is the focus of 
Chapter 4; dimension includes an exploration of the literature regarding 
freedom of association, industrial relations perspectives and where the Irish 
experience locates, while agency refers to how trade unions function in this 
dimension, forms of renewal both institutional and mobilising in nature.  
Here too the main research question is defined: – What effect does 
participation in the procedures provided under the 2001 Act have on workers 
and their trade unions in Ireland?  The ancillary questions concern potential 
conflicts between participation in such procedures and current union 
renewal themes, the 2001 Act’s propensity to facilitate employer hostility, 
and whether or not it can ever lead to union recognition. 
  
Chapter 5 debates the possible methodological approaches and explains the 
decisions taken: - to conduct documentary analysis of the 
Recommendations issued by the Labour Court at the end of the procedures 
in each case; a tracing of all the workplaces involved to determine if they are 
still in membership of the trade union which originally took the cases; a 
survey of union officials with current or potential responsibility for each 
case and finally a series of interviews with the main players, the union 
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officials, activists and members involved in ten diverse workplaces 
previously the subject of cases under the 2001 Act. 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 outline and analyse the data collected. Chapter 6 pays 
particular attention to the workplaces where cases were taken; economic 
sector, socio-economic groups, employer type as well as the nature of issues 
dealt with at the Labour Court, and discusses their impact.  Chapter 7 
traces those workplaces back to the trade unions which took the cases and 
finds low levels of membership before detailing the results of the survey of 
union officials which also finds low levels, in this instance low levels of 
collective bargaining and of activism. Reasons for such low levels are put 
forward and discussed.  Chapter 8 focuses on interviews conducted with 
union officials and members, on their experiences of the union campaign 
and its aftermath in each of ten cases.  It finds patterns common to 
successful organising campaigns and other patterns common to 
unsuccessful campaigns and discusses the implications of these for future 
use of the 2001 Act procedures.   Chapter 9 discusses the findings in the 
context of the original research questions posed. Chapter 10 concludes by 
reflecting on the lessons learnt during the undertaking of the thesis; by 
discussing both its limitations and its contributions to the literature; its 
contribution to current debates on the future of the legislation and to 
professional practice.  
  
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 2                                                                                                                  
An Irish Solution To An Irish Problem 
 
The above expression has often been used by Irish Government 
spokespersons when describing or justifying perhaps unique decisions on a 
range of issues from unemployment in the 1930s to contraception in the 
1970s and just as frequently by opponents of the same, sometimes 
politically expedient pieces of legislation.1  An Irish solution to an Irish 
problem might well also describe the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 
2001.  That piece of legislation marks a distinct divergence from the British 
system of industrial relations which was generally practised in Ireland post-
independence, albeit with some quasi-corporatist twists and some 
concessions towards different economic needs along the way.   
 
This chapter seeks to place the forthcoming research in context by 
outlining:-  
 
• the tradition of industrial relations in Ireland including an 
explanation of the ‘social partnership’ system; 
• a section providing background on Ryanair explaining its 
relevance to the topic of trade union recognition in Ireland; 
• the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 (hereafter 
referred to as the 2001 Act, see copy in Appendix A), its 
introduction and usage; 
• the effect of the ‘Ryanair judgments’ on the provisions of the 
2001 Act, and finally,  
• reflections on the position of the main players, where they now 
stand on the question of trade union recognition against the 
background of the demise of social partnership and a change 
in Government. 
 
1 See Dáil Éireann Reports on for example the Unemployment Relief Bill, 1931 or 
the Family Planning Act, 1979 at:- http://www.oireachtas-debates.gov.ie/plweb-
cgi/fastweb?query=%27Irish%20solution%20to%20an%20irish%20problem%27&T
emplateName=prehit.tmpl&view=oho-view&dbname=Debates&numresults=100 last 
viewed 29/09/2012 
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There is a separate explanation in the next Chapter of all the relevant 
legislation and the procedures arising there from. 
 
2.1                                                                                                                                    
“I regard law as a secondary force … in labour relations” 
(Kahn-Freund, 1977, p.2) 
 
Traditionally a ‘hands-off’ approach in terms of statutory regulation was a 
fundamental feature of the ‘voluntarist’ nature of industrial relations as 
practised in these islands.  Certainly until the latter decades of the 20th 
century, the ‘two sides of industry’, employers and unions, were allowed, 
indeed expected to bargain and to reach “voluntary agreements honourably 
observed” (Phelps Brown, 1959, p.183). The state’s role was something akin 
to umpire, merely “holding the ring in order that bargaining should take 
place” (Wedderburn, 1986, p.8) and only intervening “to address the 
pathological situation, i.e., when the employer – employee relationship goes 
drastically wrong” (Fennell & Lynch, 1993, p.30).  While the legacy of 
British rule in Ireland is an important contributor to this voluntarist 
approach, there are some essential differences in the Irish system partly 
attributable to the influence of Catholic social teaching on the Irish 
Constitution and on successive Governments (Dundon & Collings, 2011), 
but also the requirements of a very open economy with exceptional reliance 
on, mostly US, foreign direct investment (FDI) (Collings et al, 2005).  The 
extent to which the Irish system may still be described as voluntarist is 
debatable and is explored later in this work (See Chapter 4, Section 4.5). 
 
Thus the industrial relations institutions such as the Labour Court and 
Labour Relations Commission (LRC) in Ireland closely mirror (although 
some pre-date) the UK’s Employment Tribunals; the Advisory, Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service (ACAS) and Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).  
While the neo-liberal turn in the UK during the Thatcher years was not 
evident in Ireland, at least until much later (McDonough & Dundon, 2010), 
Irish legislation often mimicked that of the UK – the effect on strike ballots 
for example in the Trade Union Act 1984 in the UK was followed shortly 
thereafter by some similarities in the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 in 
Ireland.  Both jurisdictions delayed and minimally transposed the EU 
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Information & Consultation of Employees Directive (Directive 2002/14/EC) 
and have had similar levels of compliance subsequently (Dobbins, 2008).  
Trade union structures are similar in both jurisdictions, such that British 
unions organise in the Republic of Ireland and Irish unions work effectively 
cross-border. 
 
As the focus of this thesis is trade union recognition, it is apt here to 
digress a little in order to define recognition and also to note the exceptional 
nature, at least in European terms, of the UK and Irish situations.  Trade 
union recognition is defined by Salamon as “the process by which 
management formally accepts one or more trade unions as the 
representative(s) of all, or a group, of its employees for the purpose of jointly 
determining terms and conditions of employment on a collective basis” 
(1987, p.408).  The emphasis is added, deliberately so, for it is this 
workplace level which is the distinguishing feature of the UK and Irish 
systems.  By comparison, in many continental European systems, it is a 
works council which is the representative body at workplace level 
(Germany, Austria) and the concept of recognition is replaced by that of 
representativeness, which trade unions mostly attain at national level often 
by means of elections (Belgium, France).  Even in Denmark where the 
system can be described as voluntarist in nature, collective agreements are 
legally binding on those employers in membership of the body negotiating 
the agreements (and employers tend to be in such membership), regardless 
of union membership. 
 
2.2                                                                                                                                
“Common origins, different paths” 
(Daly & Yeates, 2003, p.85) 
 
Despite the similarities however, even before the Thatcher years, trade 
unions in Ireland had an easier existence than those in the UK; their role 
and strength accepted by Government and employer alike as “immutable 
features of the fabric of industrial relations practice” (Roche, 1997, p.67).  
In the early years of attracting foreign direct investment, development 
agencies were seen as “progressively helpful” (ibid.) and openly encouraged 
investors to “recognise the industrial relations of this country and the 
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inevitability of union recognition” even to the extent of encouraging pre-
production agreements with trade unions (McGovern, 1989, p.63).  
Although such ‘sweetheart deals’ as they came to be known, applied only to 
blue collar workers at these establishments, the effects of which will be 
discussed later (See Chapter 4, 4.6), they did ensure a trouble-free ‘foot in 
the door’ for some trade unions.  Trade unions were an integral part of Irish 
society “actively encouraged by successive governments” (Horgan, 1989, 
p.193) with representatives on a wide range of boards and committees 
involved in economic and social issues such that historically their wider, 
national role was seen as part of their “responsibilities” (Boyd, 1972, p.111).  
Union density grew through much of the 20th century culminating in a high 
of 62% by 1980 (McDonough & Dundon, 2010).  By comparison rates at the 
same time in the UK were 50.7% with an EU average of 39.7% (Visser, 
2006). 
 
None of the above is to suggest that Ireland was without its share of 
industrial strife.  While labour historians point to the three successive 
stages of Irish trade union history in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries as, 
“oppression, toleration and privilege” (Lynch, 1994, p.159) such privilege at 
national level did not necessarily translate into industrial peace at 
workplace level. Sapsford’s 1979 examination of strike statistics post-war 
illustrate the point.  The average number of strikes per annum between 
1950 and 1977 was 107 involving over 24,000 workers losing a third of a 
million work days each year (Sapsford, 1979, p.30).  Although figures are 
not directly comparable and only refer to manufacturing industries, a 
comparison of Ireland’s strike statistics with those of the then EEC 
countries from 1968 to 1977 shows Ireland in second place only to Italy in 
terms of average working days lost per 1,000 employees; Italy at 1,914; 
Ireland at 919 and the UK at 850 (Sapsford, 1979, p.39).  If all industries 
and services are counted, Ireland again surpasses the UK with 703 to the 
latter’s 452 working days lost per 1,000 employees for the same period 
(Sapsford, 1979, p.40).  Strikes being but a “part of a continuum of 
practices and relationships” (Hyman, 1989, p.184) it is interesting to note 
the results of one 1984 survey, also only in manufacturing, which found 
that “the incidence of non-strike forms of industrial action was triple the 
incidence of strikes” (Roche, 1997).  In addition there has been heavy usage 
of the dispute resolution mechanisms in place:- the Labour Court, the 
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Equality Tribunal and the Rights Commissioners, the latter used initially to 
resolve disputes regarding individual cases but displaying in more recent 
years “a more encompassing quasi-judicial role in respect of employment 
rights” (Hann & Teague, 2012). 
 
One other striking difference between Ireland and the UK is the durability 
(at least until recently) of Ireland’s tendency to take a more centralised 
approach to wage bargaining, in particular its so-called social partnership 
system.  Although a far cry from the corporatist models of Scandinavia or 
mainland Europe and without any erga omnes2 arrangements, nonetheless 
between 1946 and 1979 the Labour Court facilitated 20 consecutive 
National Pay Rounds or National Wage Agreements negotiated by employers 
and trade unions and with the State represented at negotiations in later 
years, at least as employer.  Since 1987 these wage rounds have expanded 
into tri-partite social pacts covering a broad range of economic and social 
issues including taxation, welfare and housing.  Those at the negotiating 
table have also changed, expanded to include civil society groups such as 
those representing farmers, the unemployed, the aged and several agencies 
from the community and voluntary sectors.  Lengthy negotiations 
culminated generally in three-year programmes which were then put to 
trade union members to accept or reject by ballot.  While some unions from 
time to time rejected the proposals, the over-all result was always in favour 
albeit with varying levels of enthusiasm. 
   
Coverage of the wage element of pacts, referred to colloquially as the 
national wage agreement, was estimated to be quite high; Kerr (2004, p.27) 
cites a European Commission figure of 66% (European Commission, 2002) 
though the terms in their entirety, were generally confined to union 
members or at least to workplaces where unions had bargaining rights 
ensuring universal coverage in the public sector and consequently lower in 
the private sector.  Employers in non-union workplaces also often ensured 
to match or better at least the pay terms, possibly as part of a union 
avoidance strategy (Collings et al, 2005).  In addition the Labour Court also 
2 Any legal arrangements for the extension of the agreements to other workers or 
workplaces not directly involved in the negotiations. 
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oversaw some sector agreements in traditionally low-paid non-union sectors 
such as contract cleaning and catering, negotiated between employer and 
union representatives on Joint Labour Committees (JLC).3  
 
2.3                                                                                                                    
“Entering the ice-age” 
(Wallace, 2003) 
 
Whether because of or in spite of such cooperation, trade union fortunes 
declined towards the end of the 20th century, sufficiently so as to be 
described as “entering the ice-age” (Wallace, 2003).  Trade union density 
started to decline in the 1980s for the first time since World War II, 
reaching 57% in 1990 and down to 44.5% by the millennium (Dobbins, 
2001) despite ever increasing numbers actually in membership of unions; 
unions were failing to keep up with an expanding workforce.  There was an 
increasing dichotomy between union influence at the workplace and “the 
rhetoric of partnership and involvement” at national level (Kelly, 2001, p.iv); 
employers were less inclined to deal with unions and there were some bitter 
strikes regarding trade union recognition.  Traditional unionised industries 
closed while new/replacement industries, often US owned multi-nationals, 
became even more hostile to trade unions a trend that spread to indigenous 
employers who also developed “a quite different robust anti-union position” 
(Sheehan, 2008, p.107).  Development agencies started to signal to 
incoming investors that “unionisation was no longer an essential 
requirement” (ibid.) thus the locus of trade union recognition disputes 
expanded from small, local, often family owned enterprises (Pat the Baker, 
etc.) to include larger, well-resourced organisations (O2, Ryanair) and with 
that move came political change too in the shape of a “strong anti-union 
agenda” hitherto hidden if not absent (Collings et al, 2008, p.244).  
 
The public brawl became a means of resolving a recognition row: - mutual 
slanging matches; dismissals; disruptions to productivity and sometimes, a 
3 See 
(http://www.labourcourt.ie/labour/labour.nsf/LookupPageLink/HomeRatesOfPay 
for a full list of sectors covered and links to the agreements. 
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strike.  Although recognition strikes accounted for only 5% of an already 
low strike level and just 2% of days lost (Roche, 2001), public opinion and 
media attention focussed on them, particularly three of those in the 1990s:- 
Pat-the-Baker; Nolan Transport and Ryanair baggage handlers.4  In the Pat-
the-Baker dispute, the employer closed a facility in Dublin and kept open a 
non-union plant in Longford, rather than recognise the union that the 
workers in the former had joined.  In Nolan Transport, a transport company 
in County Wexford, the employer accused the union of ‘rigging’ the strike 
ballot5.  Both disputes were also the subject of court cases; employer 
recourse to the law a relatively new phenomenon at the time.  "All of these 
concentrated peoples' minds. They illustrated the inadequacy of the existing 
legal arrangements” (Wall, 2003). While commentators frequently point to 
the “propensity of US firms to remain union-free” (Gunnigle et al., 1994, 
p.18), disputes, or at least those which made the headlines such as the 
three mentioned above, all concerned Irish-owned enterprises.   
 
2.4                                                                                                                                     
“a non-conventional row … a non-conventional company” 
(Sheehan, 1998b, p.3) 
 
There will be numerous references in this dissertation to Ryanair, a low cost 
airline with Irish headquarters, and although it is not the focus of this 
work, it has had sufficient influence on trade union recognition in Ireland to 
warrant a separate section.  Ryanair was founded in Ireland in 1985 and 
after a poor start remodelled itself in the 1990s on the no-frills model of the 
US Southwest Airlines.  The company is now a major player in the aviation 
industry thanks to a combination of its corporate culture; use of secondary 
airports; reduced services; high staff productivity and outsourcing (Barrett, 
2004).  Said corporate culture is characterised by an outspoken criticism of 
airport managements; other airlines; the European Commission; customer 
complaints and trade unions alike, with “casual abuse” delivered in a 
4 There are two separate Ryanair disputes; this one involving SIPTU members 
working as baggage handlers in the 1990s and also a dispute involving Ryanair 
pilots represented by IALPA/IMPACT involved in more recent conflict. 
 
5 Technically the strike ballot was due to the dismissal of union members allegedly 
for union activity but the underlying difficulty was trade union recognition. 
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“hectoring style” mostly by its Chief Executive, Michael O’Leary (Clark, 
2005).  Public apologies have sometimes also been necessary (Milmo, 2010).  
On the subject of trade unions, the company is quite direct; “hell will freeze 
over before we recognise a union” according to the Chief Executive 
(Oireachtas Debates6, 2010). 
 
Employees working as baggage handlers were the first to challenge the 
company when 39 of them sought to be represented by the trade union 
SIPTU7 in 1997.  When the company refused, the union held a number of 
work stoppages which Ryanair countered by removing the air-side security 
clearances of the members effectively preventing them from working after 
the stoppages.  Even in the face of An Taoiseach8 Bertie Ahern’s request to 
Ryanair to recognise the union (Sheehan, 1998b) the dispute continued 
“and escalated into a major national crisis over the weekend of 7-8 March 
1998” (Sheehan & Geary, 1998b) when other airport staff refused to pass 
the baggage handlers’ picket and they and other trade unionists, thousands 
in all, congregated at the airport shutting down many services and flights, 
but not ironically those of Ryanair.  An enquiry team formed by the 
Government brokered a deal to re-open the airport next day and also went 
on to compile a report on the situation. The report was based on interviews 
with employees selected by Ryanair and held mostly in the presence of the 
company’s legal advisor or other management figure.  Its conclusion that 
the majority of Ryanair workers “have a negative attitude to trade union 
recognition” and are proud and supportive of the company’s culture and 
management, needs to be seen in that context (Flynn & McAuley, 1998, 
p.4).  The report also disproved Ryanair’s contention that its baggage 
handlers were paid better than their counterparts in other airlines; agreed 
with SIPTU that participation in the strike was likely a consideration in the 
subsequent failure of three probationary workers to be made permanent, 
though criticised SIPTU’s handling of the dispute while nonetheless 
encouraging the company to negotiate.  The company never conceded 
recognition and in some circles it is considered that SIPTU “picked the 
6 Record of parliamentary proceedings similar to Hansard in the UK 
7 Services Industrial Professional Technical Union – Ireland’s largest trade union 
8 The Irish Prime Minister 
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wrong company to do battle with” (Sheehan, 1998b, n.p.) and subsequently 
disengaged (O’Sullivan & Gunnigle, 2009). 
 
Not surprisingly, such “a non-conventional row to begin with, involving a 
non-conventional company with a non-conventional sequence of semi-
anarchic events” (Sheehan, 1998b, n.p.) had effect beyond the individuals 
or employment concerned and coloured trade union views at a later stage. 
 
2.5                                                                                                            
“...preserving the voluntarist tradition...” 
(O’Sullivan & Gunnigle, 2009, p.255)   
 
Prior to this Ryanair dispute, the social partners had agreed in a social pact 
– Partnership 2000 - to deal with the issue of trade union recognition by 
means of “a High-Level Group” involving Government departments and the 
social partners specifically set up “to consider detailed proposals submitted 
by ICTU9 on the Recognition of Unions and the Right to Bargain” 
(Partnership 2000, 1996, p.65).  As the peak federation of Irish trade 
unions, ICTU’s position at the time was that “neither mandatory recognition 
nor mechanisms for binding arbitration were being sought as objectives in 
themselves” (ICTU, 1996). Rather ICTU sought to encourage employers to 
bargain by advocating a system whereby the Labour Court could decide on 
terms and conditions in situations where conditions were “out of line with 
industry norms” and where a certain threshold of membership levels had 
been met.  In this way it was hoped employers would rather negotiate with a 
union than have conditions imposed on it by a third party (Sheehan, & 
Geary, 1998c).  Employers for their part, and Government too, were 
resistant to the idea of mandatory recognition or any restrictions that would 
drive outside investors away, an opinion that has become something of a 
mantra in the intervening years. 
 
The High Level Group first reported in December of 1997 insisting on 
continuing the voluntarist approach to industrial relations; proposing that 
the state’s dispute resolution machinery, the LRC and Labour Court would 
9 Irish Congress of Trade Unions – the peak federation of Irish trade unions 
equivalent to the UK’s TUC 
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have expanded arbitration roles in the matter; that employers would be 
invited to participate voluntarily; that there would be a “cooling-off” period 
for intractable disputes and that at the end of the process the Labour Court 
would issue a recommendation, non-binding as was the norm (High Level 
Group on Trade Union Recognition, 1997).  Though they were part of the 
High Level Group, nonetheless the trade unions subsequently rejected the 
report because of the Ryanair dispute believing its proposals would have 
done nothing to avoid or resolve that situation (Dobbins & Sheehan, 1998). 
There was still no obligation on an employer to participate and quite clearly 
Ryanair would never have done so voluntarily.   
 
In February 1998, the Labour Party introduced to Dáil Éireann10 the Trade 
Union Recognition Bill, 1998, which encompassed the ICTU position and 
was similar to that being discussed in the UK at the time and later 
introduced.  The Bill provided that the Labour Court could summon 
employers to appear before it; could recommend that an employer recognise 
a trade union so long as that union was representative of the workers; could 
order a ballot to determine such representativeness; and could make an 
employment regulation order if such Recommendation was not 
implemented. Apart from the Labour Party itself, there was little support for 
the bill.  The main Government party, Fianna Fáil responded that:-  
 
A strong legislative remedy, which this Bill represents, is really not 
the answer to the union recognition problem. It flies in the face of our 
voluntarist approach to industrial relations and could have untoward 
consequences for the whole of our industrial relations and social 
partnership system 
(Jacob, 1998, p.18) 
 
A member of the then main opposition party, Fine Gael, opined that 
“Mandatory recognition will not help and could drive away possible 
investment, lose jobs and bring resentment to the fore. Suspicion would 
replace partnership” (Burke, 1998, p.16) “Modest and balanced” (Rabbitte, 
1998, p.18) it may have been in the eyes of the Labour Party but the bill 
was in any event defeated by 63 votes to 23 and the subsequent social pact 
10 The Irish Parliament 
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(Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, 2000) merely provides that a code 
of good practice be introduced.  
 
By the turn of the century, the issue had become even more contentious 
with the unions threatening not to enter into any social partnership 
agreement unless the matter was resolved (Sheehan, 1999).  The High Level 
Group re-considered the situation and issued a second report (High Level 
Group on Trade Union Recognition, 1999).  This time the original proposal 
regarding a ‘voluntary’ process was re-stated: – the involvement of the 
Labour Relations Commission (LRC); invitations to employers to participate; 
a ‘cooling-off’ period in really contentious cases and a non-binding Labour 
Court Recommendation.  The Report also however included a special ‘fall-
back’ provision where if the above voluntary process failed, then the Labour 
Court could “summon the parties to attend before it, examine witnesses and 
seek any documents considered relevant to the dispute in question”, 
provided any appropriate internal procedures and mechanisms had failed to 
resolve the matter, and that trade unions had no recourse to industrial 
action during the process (Sheehan, 1999).  It also provided a means of 
having the Recommendation legally enforced should the employer fail to 
implement it.  Crucially however, the Labour Court could not “provide for 
arrangements for collective bargaining” (Section 5(2)) meaning it could not 
recommend, much less oblige an employer to recognise a trade union.  The 
‘voluntary’ element of the provisions was included in a Code of Practice 
drawn up by the Labour Court (S.I. 145 of 2000) while the ‘fall-back’ 
provisions necessitated legislative changes later provided for in the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 2001.  
 
While sometimes described as such, these provisions do not constitute a 
statutory union recognition procedure as understood in the UK (Gall, 
2010a), but a dispute resolution mechanism for those substantive issues in 
dispute in situations where the employer refuses to negotiate with the union 
articulating the workers’ position on those issues. Its introduction however 
satisfied many initially on the basis of according “with the aim of preserving 
the voluntarist tradition” (O’Sullivan & Gunnigle, 2009, p.255).   Cross-
party support for the Act during the Oireachtas debates which preceded its 
promulgation persistently remarked on the Bill having the support of both 
employers and unions.  The more conservative senators believed it was 
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“unlikely any employer will ignore the voluntary code of conduct” (Mooney, 
2000) and did not expect that it would be “invoked with great frequency” 
(Naughten, 2000).  Those from trade union backgrounds were more likely to 
question some aspects: - why for instance the Act did not “force employers 
to sit down with trade unions” (O’Toole, 2000, p.7) and whether those 
working for multi-nationals would be able to access the procedures 
(Costello, 2000, p.5).  In the Dáil, Tommy Broughan, the Labour TD, who 
had proposed the defeated Trade Union Recognition Bill in 1998 described 
it as “flimsy” (Brougham, 2000, p.19), a “watered down mish-mash” 
according to Joe Higgins of the Socialist Party who also predicted that it 
would “sink ignominiously” (Higgins, 2001, p.17). Another Labour TD, now 
Tánaiste11 described internal dispute procedures as likely to be populated 
by “a crowd of licks who are in the employer’s pocket” (Gilmore, 2001, p.6) 
while Pat Rabbitte, now also a Labour Party Government Minister, 
unwittingly offered another hostage to fortune with the opinion that the 
2001 Act was “unlikely to leave any perceptible mark on the industrial 
relations landscape” (Rabbitte, 2000, 19). 
 
2.6                                                                                                                                 
“12 months of a frustrating process” 
(Industrial Relations News, 2001) 
 
Trade union reactions were muted partly because the operation of the 
‘voluntary’ leg for some 18 months prior to the 2001 Act was not 
encouraging.  By October 2001 for example, 28 cases had been referred to 
the LRC under the ‘voluntary’ process.  Almost half of these were “stillborn, 
with no engagement taking place, let alone successful engagement” 
(Higgins, 2001, n.p.) as employers simply turned down the ‘invitation’ to 
participate.  By October of the following year, 2002, when trade unions had 
referred a total of 65 cases, in 21 of those cases the employer refused to 
participate or simply did not respond to the invitation. In only four of the 
original 65 cases referred had the process been completed and the issues in 
dispute resolved at LRC. The LRC acknowledged in their own review of the 
11 Deputy Prime Minister 
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‘voluntary leg’ that “the experience of the trade unions involved in the 
process has been generally unsatisfactory” (Morrin, 2002, p.5).  
  
Although the 2001 Act and its ‘fall-back provisions’ together go some way 
towards addressing union concerns about the voluntary process by allowing 
for some enforcement of the Labour Court’s recommendations, they still 
gave it but a cautious welcome.  Right from the start SIPTU, the largest 
union and most likely to become the heaviest user of the process, conceded 
that there were “undoubtedly reservations on the union side” and only 
welcomed it from the point of view that using the procedures provided 
meant “the Union can offer more to its members than a long and 
unsuccessful dispute” (SIPTU, 2001, p.1).  By the time of SIPTU’s Biennial 
Delegate Conference the following October, the then Vice-President 
described it as a “minimalist measure” while union officials were already 
concerned at taking members through “12 months of a frustrating process” 
(Industrial Relations News, 2001, n.p.).  An internal SIPTU report the 
following year confirmed their fears (Devine & Halpenny, 2002).  It 
examined 23 cases referred under the ‘voluntary leg’ by SIPTU officials; two 
reached agreement at LRC stage; six were at the Labour Court or were so 
subsequently. Two-thirds they reported were “going nowhere”; they were in 
abeyance or officials were frustrated and had withdrawn altogether. They 
concluded bluntly that:  - “the whole experience has been an entirely 
negative one for our officials and their members”; “a ‘time-wasting’ or 
‘delaying’ tactic by the employer/IBEC12” described by officials with 
“universal negativity on a continuum from ‘difficult’ to ‘disaster’” (Devine & 
Halpenny, 2002, p.1).  They report high density levels of between 70% and 
100% but in a few cases the membership collapsed during the process.  
Officials sought at least “some teeth” in the process if not “full recognition” 
(p.3). 
   
It is not therefore surprising given their cautious welcome for the 2001 Act 
that trade unions initially made little use of the procedures provided.  
Within a year an ICTU Working Group concluded that the ‘voluntary leg’ 
had “completely failed to achieve its aim of voluntarily resolving disputes 
about union recognition” and called for the procedures to be “streamlined to 
12 Irish Business & Employers’ Confederation – the main Irish employer body 
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ensure expeditious processing of referrals” (ICTU, 2002, p.2) and to guard 
against “pretence co-operation” by employers (ibid. p.3).  They successfully 
lobbied for an amendment and the Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 2004 does shorten the timescale involved in resolving 
disputes to 26 weeks from referral to the issuing of a binding determination 
by the Labour Court (34 weeks in exception). This resulted in “a major 
growth in the referrals” (Labour Relations Commission, 2006, p.8) as “the 
key difference … is the introduction … of a specific time-frame for the 
processing of disputes (six weeks)” (Labour Relations Commission, 2004a, 
p.4).  The increased usage can be seen in Table 2.1 below. 
   
Table 2.1 – Labour Relations Commission – ‘Voluntary leg’ Referrals 2001 - 2012 
Y
ear 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
R
eferrals 
30 41 26 79 78 82 25 8 10 7 7  
Source: www.lrc.ie 
 
After a slow start in 2001/2002, 30 and 41 referrals under the ‘voluntary 
leg’ respectively, referrals more than doubled by 2004 (n=79) and remained 
at that level for the following two years before plummeting from 2007 
onwards.  Such referrals represent a small proportion of the total numbers 
of cases referred to the LRC on industrial relations matters such as pay and 
conditions in unionised employments, estimated at between 1,000 and 
1,500 every year since inception.  
 
Table 2.2 - Labour Court Recommendations under the 2001 Act 2002 - 2011 
Y
ear 
 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
No. of 
LCRs 
2 9 21 31 31 9 0 2 2 2 
Source: www.labourcourt.ie 
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On average, Labour Court Recommendations constitute 30-40% of the 
‘voluntary leg’ referrals so a similar pattern is evident in Table 2.2 above; a 
slow start in 2002 with just two cases, increasing ten-fold by 2004 to 21 
cases; 31 in the two subsequent years before reducing drastically, to no 
Recommendations in 2008.  
 
2.7                                                                                                                                     
“… the lesson is clear … diplomacy does not work” 
(O’Connor, 2007, n.p.) 
 
The dramatic reductions in the number of cases being processed from 2007 
was according to the LRC: - 
 
... a reflection of the fall-out arising from the judgment of the 
Supreme Court in the Ryanair/Labour Court / IMPACT case.  
Essentially there is a perception from trade unions that the judgment 
has diluted and rendered void the effectiveness of the process  
(Labour Relations Commission, 2007, p.26).  
 
For the second time in recent industrial relations history, Ryanair, an 
openly anti-union employer, has had direct effect on the course of trade 
union recognition in Ireland.  This time it involved those employed by 
Ryanair as pilots and represented by the Irish Air Line Pilots’ Association 
(IALPA) affiliated to the public sector union IMPACT.  That union referred a 
case to the Labour Court under the provisions of the 2001 Act involving the 
pilots, the issues in dispute centring on training; contracts of employment 
and redundancies.  Ryanair argued there was no trade dispute within the 
meaning of the Act because they did engage in collective bargaining and 
there did exist internal dispute resolution procedures which had not (yet) 
failed to resolve the dispute (Industrial Relations News, 2005).  The Labour 
Court did not agree and at its preliminary hearing on the 14th November 
2004 found that it was not Ryanair’s practice “to engage in collective 
bargaining negotiations as the Court understands that expression” (Labour 
Court Recommendation No. DECP051); that there was a trade dispute; that 
there were no dispute resolution procedures at the company, and therefore 
found in favour of the applicants, IMPACT.  
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Ryanair sought and was granted permission by the High Court to challenge 
the Labour Court findings.  The High Court rejected Ryanair’s arguments 
(Ryanair vs. the Labour Court [2005] IEHC 330 15th October 2005) and 
upheld the Labour Court Recommendation.  Ryanair appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which overturned the High Court decision and quashed the 
Labour Court Recommendation (in Ryanair Ltd v Labour Court [2007] IESC 
6 1st February 2007).  Crucially however, for the 2001/2004 Acts, the 
Supreme Court was also “sharply critical of the approach and procedures of 
the Labour Court” (Gilvarry & Hunt, 2008, p.174).  The Labour Court 
subsequently identified seven legal issues arising from the judgment which 
impinged on how future cases would proceed, including disclosing the 
identity of union members and relying on legal rules of evidence and 
witness testimony (Sheehan, 2007a). As a result, new guidelines were 
issued on how cases should now proceed (Labour Court, 2007, n.p.).  
 
The effects were far-reaching with a drastic reduction in the number of 
cases referred under the ‘voluntary leg’ and in the numbers being referred 
and recommended upon by the Labour Court.  While many expressed 
concern at this “forcing the Labour Court to assume many of the 
characteristics of a more formalised court setting” (Gilvarry & Hunt, 2008, 
p.168) unions have in any event voted with their feet and have almost 
entirely ceased to use the process they now say was “annulled” by the 
Supreme Court decision; “it is now redundant … the lesson is clear – 
diplomacy does not work” (O’Connor, 2007). 
 
2.8                                                                                                                                     
“…to enable the mechanisms…to operate as they had been 
intended”  
(Towards 2016: Review, 2008, p.28) 
 
Nonetheless when all this outrage had died down, the social partners, in 
what was almost their last partnership approach, agreed:- 
 
…to the establishment of a review process which will consider the 
legal and other steps which are required to enable the mechanisms 
which were established under previous agreements to operate as they 
had been intended 
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(Towards 2016: Review, 2008, p. 28) 
 
In other words, to get the 2001 Act back on track.  Before any of this could 
happen, however, both the partnership arrangements and the populist 
Fianna Fáil Government which upheld them had collapsed.  The social 
partners had concluded an agreement in 2006, Towards 2016, which as its 
name implies was a 10 year agreement though its pay terms ran only to 
2008 (Towards 2016, 2006).  In September of 2008 negotiations on 
renewing those pay terms were under way while at the same time the 
property bubble had burst and the extent of the forthcoming financial 
collapse was beginning to reveal itself.  Pay terms were agreed but without 
the support of one of the employer organisations, the Construction Industry 
Federation (CIF), who withdrew citing the decline in the construction 
industry, while another employer body, the Irish Hotels Federation (IHF) 
lodged a constitutional challenge to the Joint Labour Committee (JLC) wage 
setting mechanism in the hotels sector (Dobbins, 2010a).  By 2009 the 
financial crisis had worsened and the Government sought to re-negotiate 
the pay terms, at least for its own employees, the public sector.  The 
negotiations failed in March and the Government unilaterally cut public 
sector pay and increased personal taxation for all.   
 
Trade unions fought back with their “Get up, Stand up” campaign and 
proposed “A Better, Fairer Way” (ICTU, 2009).  A one-day strike with 
upwards of 300,000 trade unionists on the streets of the capital promising 
more disruption prompted the Government to re-convene talks.  For a while 
it looked like agreement might be reached with unpaid leave being used in 
lieu of pay cuts, but in mid-December the Government announced its 
withdrawal from the talks leaving “shell-shocked” trade unions in its wake 
(O’Kelly, 2010, p.427).  Further pay cuts were announced by the 
Government in its 2010 budget and although some patching up was 
achieved in the Croke Park Agreement on public sector pay (Public Service 
Agreement 2010 - 2014, 2010) and in a separate private sector ‘protocol’, 
(IBEC-ICTU, 2010) effectively social partnership was finished.  The 
Government fell the same year and was replaced by a coalition of right-of-
centre Fine Gael with the Labour Party as junior partner. 
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 The new Fine Gael/Labour Coalition’s Programme for National Government 
2011 states:-  
 
We will reform the current law on employees’ right to engage in 
collective bargaining 
(Government for National Recovery, 2011, p.24) 
 
Significantly it is ‘employees’ and not trade unions which are mentioned 
and the current Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation believes that 
the procedures  
 
can be improved and secured without introducing a mandatory 
requirement upon employers to recognise trade unions for collective 
bargaining purposes 
(Sheehan, 2011, n.p.) 
 
or anything else which might “upset potential investors” (Sheehan, 2011).  If 
trade unions had hoped for any support for their agenda from the Labour 
Party it seems it may not now be forthcoming.  One Labour Minister, Pat 
Rabbitte, TD, a former trade union official has already stated that: - “trade 
union recognition is a different issue to the right to collective bargaining” 
and believes that “the right to collective bargaining is well established in 
this country” (Millar, 2012).  The employer position is quite clear.  Brendan 
McGinty, Director of the main employer body IBEC considers that:-  
  
…a legal right to collective bargaining would not create a single job in 
this economy and would instead threaten many thousands of jobs by 
damaging our capacity to attract and retain inward investment... 
 (McGinty, 2010, n.p.)  
 
While continuing to lobby the incoming Government, the ICTU also 
meanwhile lodged a complaint with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) citing Ryanair and the Irish Government, stating that Ryanair’s 
“capacity to operate in this way is enhanced by the failings of Irish labour 
law” (Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 2010, p.10), by the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act, 2001.  The ILO response to the complaint, in 
addition to calling for an enquiry into the events at Ryanair, calls on the 
Irish Government to:-  
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 review the existing framework and consider any appropriate 
measures, including legislative measures, so as to ensure respect for 
the freedom of association and collective bargaining principles set out 
in its conclusions, including through the review of the mechanisms 
available with a view to promoting machinery for voluntary 
negotiation between employers’ and workers’ organizations for the 
determination of terms and conditions of employment. 
(International Labour Organization, 2012, p.815) 
 
Essentially, the ILO now also calls for a review of the legislation.  The ILO 
recommendations were welcomed by both unions and employers -though 
Ryanair itself seems unaccountably silent on the question - and are 
essentially “in tune” with the Government’s commitment in the Programme 
for Government (Sheehan, 2012a, n.p.) though the Government, as 
expected, has confirmed it will not hold any enquiry into Ryanair (Sheehan, 
2012b) and in any event such recommendations are non-binding.  Trade 
unions can hardly have expected any support for mandatory collective 
bargaining from any of these quarters and seem content also to push an 
agenda based on repairing or restoring the 2001 Act.  There appears to be 
no assessment of whether or not a legislative approach such as that 
provided for in the 2001 Act is the only or best approach for them.  That is 
one of the aims of this dissertation.  
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 3                                                                                        
Understanding The Institutions 
 
This thesis is concerned with the effect on workers and their unions of their 
participation in the procedures provided for under the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2001, the 2001 Act.  As these procedures are available at 
the Labour Court and at the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) this 
chapter will explain the workings of both of those institutions13.  The 
previous chapter described the events surrounding the promulgation of the 
2001 Act and here is detailed its main elements; its amendment by the 
Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (the 2004 Act) plus 
three related Statutory Instruments, SI145 of 2000; SI146 of 2000 and SI76 
of 2004.  The chapter concludes with an explanation of the only previously 
existing institutional means of resolving recognition disputes, Section 20 of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1969, and also of the strike ballot 
arrangements provided for under the Industrial Relations Act, 1990. 
 
 3.1                                                                                                                                         
The Labour Court and Labour Relations Commission 
 
The Labour Court (hereinafter the Court) was established under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1946, initially for the investigation of industrial 
disputes although it later acquired some determinant functions regarding 
statutory rights.  Its purpose, “having investigated a trade dispute” was to 
“make a recommendation setting forth its opinion on the merits of the 
dispute and the terms on which it should be settled” (Section 68).  The 
Court operates by Division each of which comprises an independent 
chairperson and one nominee each from “an organisation representative of 
trade unions of workers” and from “a trade union of employers” (Section 
10(4).  In practice the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the Irish 
Business and Employers’ Confederation (IBEC) now submit nominees.  The 
1946 Act intended that the Labour Court would be a court of last resort 
13In 2013 these procedures changed somewhat by the establishment of the 
Workplace Relations Service.  However as that body was not in situ during the 
processing of the cases in this study, it is not proposed to take any account of it 
and to deal with the original process as it stood until 2013. 
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providing that “no appeal shall lie from the decision of the Court on any 
matter within its jurisdiction to a court of law” (Section 17).  Otherwise 
recommendations were non-binding as befitted a voluntarist system and 
having made its recommendation the Court had no further responsibility 
“settlement rests with the parties themselves” (Fennell & Lynch, 1993, 
p.10).  The 1946 Act also provided that the Court would appoint 
Conciliation Officers which it did until that function was taken over by the 
newly founded Labour Relations Commission in 1990. 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 1990 (the 1990 Act) provided that the “Court 
shall not investigate a dispute” until it had first been referred to the LRC.   
The responsibilities of the LRC are inter alia to provide both a conciliation 
service and an “industrial relations advisory service” and to “prepare codes 
of practice relevant to industrial relations after consultation with unions 
and employer organisations” (Section 25).  The LRC having mediated 
between the parties, if no settlement could be reached the Court could 
investigate provided the LRC reports to it “that no further efforts on its part 
will advance the resolution of the dispute” (Section 26) and both parties had 
to agree to attend the Court. 
 
In practice, where trade unions and employers fail to agree on issues at 
local level, either side, usually the union refers the matter to the LRC 
seeking its intervention.  One or more Conciliation Conferences are 
arranged and by joint opening and closing sessions and separate side 
sessions, the Industrial Relations Officer of the LRC mediates, seeking to 
reach agreement by consensus. There have been between 1,000 and 1,500 
such referrals each year since the Commission was established. Observers 
are often surprised that “such a seemingly benign form of intervention 
should be so successful” with settlement rates believed to be in the order of 
three out of four cases (Murphy, 1997, pp. 327-328) and often over 80% 
from its early years to date (LRC, 1997).   
 
Those cases not settled are referred by the LRC to the Labour Court and as 
the Court cannot compel attendance under Industrial Relations 
 
24 
legislation14, both parties must consent to attend at this forum also.  Each 
side must prepare a written submission for the Court setting out their 
claim, its history and what solution they propose.  At the hearing each side 
must read their submission into the record of the Court and the Court must 
investigate the dispute by questioning the parties only using the 
information contained in those submissions and as advised on the day of 
the hearing.  A written recommendation setting out the cases made by each 
side, the Court’s view and a brief recommendation is usually issued within 
weeks. Murphy (1997) estimates that 75% of all recommendations are 
accepted by the parties, by the employer side more consistently than the 
union side, who must in any event ballot their members on the 
Recommendation.  
 
Despite its name, the Labour Court is generally not concerned with 
the determination of legal questions, except when it is exercising its 
appellate functions under employment rights legislation such as 
those on the organisation of working time and employment equality. 
Nor is it acting as an arbitrator, unless the parties so request. It is 
concerned rather with the responsibility of promoting good industrial 
relations and is thus best described as a court of reasonableness and 
fair dealing. It is enhanced with the spirit of co-operation not 
compulsion and, as such, its decisions are not binding on the 
parties. They are merely recommendations which may be accepted or 
rejected by either party. 
(Kerr, 2005, p.3) 
 
This is the normal course of events for disputes not resolved directly at local 
level and has proved itself a popular, free and useful means of dispute 
resolution in unionised employments. 
 
14 The Court has a more legalistic function under some legislation in terms of 
compelling attendance and binding determinations i.e., equality,, pensions, 
minimum wage, etc. 
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 3.2                                                                                                                               
Statutory Instrument No. 145 of 2000 – 
 the ‘voluntary leg’ 
 
According to its remit, the LRC may prepare codes of practice relevant to 
industrial relations.  Such codes detail best practice in a particular area 
and although breaching a code does not result in civil or criminal 
proceedings, the industrial relations institutions of the State will all take 
cognisance of any Code in their deliberations.  Taking on board the report of 
the High Level Group on union recognition and having consulted with the 
relevant Government Department, ICTU, IBEC and the Labour Court, the 
LRC drafted a Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution (see 
Appendix B).  This code was introduced in May 2000 under Statutory 
Instrument No. 145 of 2000.  It provides that matters in dispute “should be 
referred to the LRC who will appoint an officer from its Advisory Service”, 
not the Conciliation Service as is the norm in industrial relations as 
described above. This officer will “assess the issues in dispute” (Section 2.1) 
and “will work with the parties in an attempt to resolve the issues” and, in 
another new departure, if “not capable of early resolution … an agreed 
cooling-off period should be put in place” (Section 2.2). In the event that 
issues remained unresolved “the LRC shall make a written report to the 
Labour Court” who after consideration “shall issue recommendations on 
outstanding matters” (Section 2.5). 
 
3.3                                                                                                                                         
The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 
 
While a statutory instrument could deal with the ‘voluntary leg’ element of 
the proposals contained in the High Level Group Report, the ‘fall-back’ 
provisions regarding attendance at the Labour Court required legislative 
changes. The necessary legislative changes were achieved via the Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2001.  The 2001 Act (see Appendix A) expands 
on the procedures laid down in the Code above, firstly by providing that 
trade unions could directly request the Labour Court to investigate a 
dispute without first going through the ‘voluntary’ procedures in the LRC as 
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outlined above.  In order to investigate a dispute the Labour Court must 
first be satisfied that:- 
 
 (a) it is not the practice of the employer to engage in collective 
 bargaining negotiations and the internal dispute resolution 
 procedures  (if any) normally used by the parties concerned have 
 failed  to resolve the dispute 
  
(b) the employer has failed to observe a provision of the Code of 
 Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution [SI145] 
  
(c) the trade union … [has] not acted in a manner which … has 
 frustrated the employer in observing a provision of such code of 
 practice 
  
(d) the trade union … [has] not had recourse to industrial action after 
 the dispute in question was referred to the Commission 
(Section 2(1)). 
  
Section 3 provides that the Court “may hold a preliminary hearing to 
determine whether or not the requirements specified [above]… have been 
met”.  Recommendations shall “have regard to terms and conditions of 
employment, and to dispute resolution and disciplinary procedures in the 
employment concerned” (Section 5(1)) and “shall not provide for 
arrangements for collective bargaining” (Section 5(2)).  Where the dispute is 
still unresolved “the Court may, at the request of a trade union … make a 
determination” (Section 6(1)) and where that determination is not 
implemented by the employer within one year “on the application of a trade 
union … the Circuit Court shall, without hearing the employer or any 
evidence … make an order directing the employer to carry out the 
determination …” (Section 10).  Either party “may appeal to the High Court 
on a point of law” (Section 11).  There is also the option of seeking a review 
of the determination within three months though such review is in effect a 
re-affirmation of its terms, the main benefit being that it can fast track the 
route to the Circuit Court for implementation. 
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3.4                                                                                                                                          
The Industrial Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
2004 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, trade unions had some misgivings 
about the 2001 Act, in particular the length of time it took to process a 
case.  The 2004 Act goes some way towards addressing the trade union 
concerns by shortening the timescale involved in resolving disputes to 26 
weeks (34 weeks in exception) from referral to the issuing of a binding 
determination by the Labour Court.  “The key difference … is the 
introduction … of a specific time-frame for the processing of disputes (six 
weeks)” (LRC, 2004a, p.24).  In addition, the 2004 Act allows that the Court 
in determining if all necessary pre-conditions have been satisfied, that this 
“may … be determined by the Court either by way of a hearing preliminary 
to the Court’s investigation … or as part of that investigation” (Section 3), 
meaning the preliminary hearing regarding jurisdiction did not need to be 
separately held. 
 
There were also some changes regarding eligibility:- where the 2001 Act 
refers to workers or their union or excepted body, the 2004 Act now refers 
to any “grade, group or category of workers” (Section 2.1(a)).  There is also a 
lengthy amendment on victimisation which “swing[s] both ways” (Dobbins, 
2004) in that in addition to a prohibition on victimisation of union members 
it also provides that no victimisation of non-union members could occur 
(Section 8(2)) though there is no evidence that any such victimisation had 
ever occurred.  
 
3.5                                                                                                                              
Statutory Instrument No. 76 of 2004 
 
SI 76, the Enhanced Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution, gives 
effect to the changes introduced in the 2004 Act and replaces SI 145 of 
2000.  It sets out the relevant time frames as follows:-   
 
The new code … imposes a 6 week timeframe for completion of the 
LRC stage of the process. On receipt of an invitation to participate  in 
the process, respondents have 2 weeks to accept. If the invitation is 
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accepted, [by the employer] there are then a further 4 weeks for 
substantial engagement on the issues in dispute. This timeframe can 
only be extended by agreement and where progress is being made. 
(Labour Relations Commission, 2004b, p.2) 
 
If agreement is not reached the LRC may then advise the Labour Court that 
no further efforts on its part will resolve the dispute.  A full Labour Court 
hearing will then be set for four to six weeks after the referral has been 
received, from either the LRC or directly from the trade union.  A guide to 
the processing of cases is contained in the LRC’s own guide to SI76 and 
contained in Appendix C. 
 
3.6                                                                                                                                          
SI146 of 2000 – the Code on Grievance & Disciplinary 
Procedures 
 
The Report of the High Level Group on Trade Union Recognition made a 
number of recommendations regarding the representation of individuals at 
the workplace.  As is part of its remit the LRC consulted with those bodies 
and drafted a code on grievance and disciplinary procedures, SI 146 of 
2000.  The Code’s main purpose “is to provide guidance to employers, 
employees and their representatives on the general principles which apply 
in the operation of grievance and disciplinary procedures”.  Such general 
principles focussed on the importance of procedures, which should be fair 
and consistent; that the procedures should be in writing, easy to 
understand and should be given to all employees; that they should provide 
a mechanism where grievances can be raised by an employee or discipline 
taken by a manager and with a right of appeal.  For the purposes of this 
thesis an important point is that employees using the procedures should 
have the right to be accompanied by an “employee representative” who may 
be “a colleague of the employee's choice” or “a registered trade union but 
not any other person or body unconnected with the enterprise”.   
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3.7                                                                                                                                      
Labour Court Recommendations 
 
Labour Court Recommendations issued after each investigation, regardless 
of which Act, are numbered sequentially after the pre-fix “LCR” meaning 
Labour Court Recommendation, and will describe the legislation under 
which the case is taken; employer names; workers involved; date of hearing; 
the members of the Division in attendance; the trade union and employer 
representatives; the background to and nature of the dispute and the 
Court’s Recommendations on the matter. The “Subject”, apart from referrals 
under the 2001 Act, describes the issue in contention, pay or annual leave 
or shift arrangements, etc.  For example in LCR1657515 the subject is “Rate 
of Pay – Interpretation of Agreement”.  Recommendations issued under the 
2001 Act differ slightly and the subject will be described as either:- 
 
Referral from the Labour Relations Commission – where a trade union sought 
to engage via the voluntary procedure provided for in SI 145 of 2000 or its 
replacement SI 76 of 2004; where some engagement has taken place and 
the LRC having satisfied itself that it could do no more, sent a written 
report to the Labour Court, which then investigates the disputes and issues 
a recommendation. 
 
Preliminary hearing – Under the 2001 Act eligibility to be before the Labour 
Court was determined by a preliminary hearing.  Subsequent to the 2004 
Act, the Court could satisfy itself that all pre-conditions had been met 
concurrent with the investigation into the dispute itself though the earlier 
Recommendations are still listed as Preliminary hearings. 
 
Union application – where the employer has refused to engage or failed to 
respond a trade union can refer a case directly to the Court. 
 
Under Section 6 of the 2001 Act, where a dispute remains unresolved after 
the Labour Court Recommendation, the Court may issue a determination 
which, if not implemented by the employer may be referred by the union to 
15 http://www.employmentrights.ie/en/Cases/2000/July/LCR16575.html - last 
viewed 6th November 2013 
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the Circuit Court who will make an order directing the employer to 
implement the determination. Determinations are numbered differently, the 
pre-fix being DIR. 
 
There are key differences between a Labour Court Decision, 
Recommendation or Determination.  A Decision is usually just that, a 
decision by the Court often on a procedural matter and in this case simply 
involves a decision by the Court on whether or not to proceed under the 
2001 Act.  Labour Court Recommendations are the grist to the mill of Irish 
industrial relations.  All Court hearings and not just those heard under the 
2001 Act result in the issuing of a Recommendation by the Court.  In 
keeping with the Labour Court’s voluntary status these are non-binding 
except in some exceptional circumstances and may be accepted or rejected 
by the parties involved.  This contrasts with Determinations which the 
Court will issue if the Recommendation (under the 2001 Act) is not 
implemented and it is binding to the extent that if not implemented the 
Circuit Court will make an order directing the employer to implement.   
 
The dispute at Ashford Castle is a good example of one which involved all 
three of Decisions, Recommendations and Determinations.  DECP032 was 
issued by the Court on the 19th of November 2003 where it held that the 
requirements of Section 2(1) of the Act were met and the Court had 
jurisdiction to investigate the substantive dispute.  The following March 
2004 the Court ruled on the disciplinary & grievance procedure in its 
recommendation, LCR17760.  At that hearing the Court ruled that further 
information was required on the other issues in dispute and these were 
dealt with in July of 2004 in a hearing “arising from DECP032” and the 
Court’s recommendations on pay, sick pay, pensions and service charge 
contained in LCR17914.  In 2005 DIR051 was issued on foot of a union 
request for a determination to enforce LCR17914. A full list of all 
Recommendations, Decisions and Determinations issued under the 2001 
Act is attached in Appendix D.  
 
There are some key differences between Irish Labour Court 
Recommendations and the Decisions and Outcomes arrived at by the UK’s 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).  A UK reader may be surprised that 
the Irish Labour Court’s written outcomes have far less detail regarding the 
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parties and the dispute than would be the case in those of the CAC.  This 
may be explained by reference to each body’s raison d’être and main 
functions. The Central Arbitration Committee’s main function is to 
“adjudicate on applications relating to the statutory recognition and de-
recognition of trade unions for collective bargaining purposes” and while it 
may also provide “voluntary arbitration in collective disputes” it seldom 
does so now (Central Arbitration Committee, n.d.,).  By contrast the Labour 
Court was established to provide  
 
a free, comprehensive service for the resolution of disputes about 
industrial relations, equality, organisation of working time, national 
minimum wage, part-time work, fixed-term work, safety, health and 
welfare at work, information and consultation matters 
 (Labour Court, n.d.)   
 
It is an industrial relations tribunal heavily involved in the day-to-day 
interactions between employers and unions.  Its recommendations are 
usually not legally enforceable but for use by the parties involved to resolve 
a dispute which has reached an impasse and as such have “necessarily 
involved pursuing a less ritualistic and formalistic path” (Hanna J in 
Ryanair v Labour Court [2006] ELR 1 p.17).  Very detailed information 
about the employer or the workers is seldom included in the 
recommendations even if the parties may have included it in their written 
submissions or declared it at the hearing. 
 
3.8                                                                                                                                       
“Section 20” 
 
Prior to the introduction of the foregoing legislation, the 2001/2004 Acts, 
trade unions had one other institutional route at their disposal in situations 
where employers refused to negotiate, Section 20 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1969.  This Act provides that the Labour Court can accept a direct 
referral and investigate a dispute so long as the referring party agreed 
“before the investigation to accept the recommendation of the Court”.  This 
was in contrast to the usual referrals to the Labour Court which are 
effectively joint referrals subsequent to a failed attempt at conciliation at the 
LRC and the recommendations from which are non-binding.  The referral 
under Section 20 was thus binding but as the Labour Court almost 
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invariably recommended in favour of recognition in situations where no 
union was recognised, this was hardly a huge risk for trade unions (D’Art & 
Turner, 2005).  Equally it was no great coup either as despite a 93% 
success rate in recommending union recognition, Gunnigle et al (2002) 
found subsequent rates of compliance with the recommendations to be as 
low as 30% or in other research 27% (Gunnigle, 2000).  This was in 
contrast to compliance rates of over 75% for other Labour Court 
Recommendations (Gunnigle et al, 2002).  As a means of gaining recognition 
it was not exceptionally fruitful but trade unions used it particularly to 
attain the high moral ground in advance of a ballot on industrial action.  
While not the focus of this thesis there may be sufficient mention of 
“Section 20” cases to warrant an explanation at this point. 
 
3.9                                                                                                                                         
Strike Ballots 
 
While Martin (1992, p.67) notes the 1970s “expansion in the practice of 
referring agreements back to the membership” in the UK it has been 
practised more consistently in Ireland, though here also the practice has 
been “reinforced by legislation on ballots” (ibid.).  The Industrial Relations 
Act 1990 regulates the procedures to be followed prior to the taking of any 
industrial action which can include “overtime ban, work-to-rule, go-slow, 
blacking of machinery” as well as strike (Irish Trade Union Federation, 
2003, p.203).  The 1990 Act stipulates that such action may only be “in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute” and a union “shall not 
organise, participate in, sanction or support” such action “without a secret 
ballot, entitlement to vote on which shall be accorded equally to all 
members whom it is reasonable to believe will be called upon to engage in 
the strike or other industrial action”.  A vote in favour of industrial action 
“still requires sanction from a trade union’s” governing authority or 
executive and the employer must be given a minimum of seven days’ notice 
of the taking of action (Irish Trade Union Federation, 2003, p.205).  Unlike 
the UK there are no rules about the wording on the ballot paper; the secret 
ballot is held at a general meeting of the members convened with a 
minimum of a week’s notice and there is no time limit to the ballot’s 
effectiveness.  While the 1990 Act does not actually outlaw unofficial strikes 
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or action, doing so leaves the workers and their unions open to legal 
injunction (Kerr, 1997, p.372).   
  
3.10                                                                                                                           
Clarification of terms 
 
Given the topic of this thesis there will be constant references to all of those 
statutory instruments, acts of legislation and the various procedures 
provided under each.  In order to avoid confusion:- 
 
‘voluntary leg’ will refer to the referral of the dispute to the LRC 
under the 2001 Act and/or as amended under the 2004 Act (SI 145 
of 2000 and/or SI 76 of 2004); 
 
‘fall-back procedure’ refers to situations where the issues in dispute 
are not resolved and are now the subject of a Labour Court hearing 
under any of the sections of either the 2001 or 2004 Acts (which can 
result in a Recommendation, a Decision or a Determination) as 
detailed above. 
 
Where there is reference to ‘sanction’ for industrial action, it means 
the union’s ruling executive have sanctioned the action subsequent 
to a secret ballot of the members as provided for under the 1990 Act. 
 
A ‘Section 20’ refers to the procedure for direct referral to the 
Labour Court and subsequent recommendation binding on the 
referrer as provided under Section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1969. 
 
The ‘grievance and disciplinary code’ is that provided for under 
SI146 of 2000, the Code on Grievance & Disciplinary Procedures. 
 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 4                                                                                                                 
“...the complex interactions of agency and 
dimension…” 
(Willman & Kelly, 2004, p.5) 
 
This thesis is concerned with trade union organisation and activity in 
certain workplaces after the issuing of Labour Court Recommendations 
under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001/2004.  The very mention of 
legislation and third party procedures confirms that any such examination 
of trade union activity must also take note of other agents, the State and 
employers at least, and must also understand the role of what Willman and 
Kelly describe as the “dimensions” of these agents, their “resources”, 
“processes” and “outcomes” and how these all interact (2004, p.4).  At a 
minimum then, resources common to all three agents must include the 
constitution and the law while a common process is the allegedly 
‘voluntarist’ tradition in which industrial relations is conducted in Ireland 
as well as the now doubtful social partnership system; thus these concepts 
need to be explored here.  While reviewing the literature on these topics this 
chapter also explores the connections between: - interpretations of freedom 
of association and ideology, and the nature of collective bargaining before 
dealing with trade union responses, both institutional and mobilising in 
character. A final section deals with prior research and a statement of the 
gap which this work seeks to address and proceeds to develop the research 
questions. 
 
4.1                                                                                                                                    
“Freedom of association now looks like a frozen waif” 
(Christian & Ewing, 1988, p.73) 
 
Ireland’s “unique constitutional environment” (Howlin & Fitzpatrick, 2007, 
p.178) is, depending on one’s viewpoint, either blamed or credited with 
underpinning the development of the story of trade union recognition in 
Ireland albeit that the constitution dates only from 1937 and there was de 
facto if voluntary trade union recognition in Ireland prior to independence.  
Article 40.6.iii of Bunreacht na hÉireann provides inter alia that “The State 
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guarantees liberty for the exercise of … the right of the citizens to form 
associations and unions”.  While Whyte and others have suggested that this 
should provide “the potential to enhance the protection ... available for 
trade union rights and freedoms” in Ireland (1995, p.208), jurisprudence 
would suggest otherwise as demonstrated by the following opinions:- 
 
… that there is a constitutional right to be represented by a union in 
the conduct of negotiations with employers … could not be sustained 
(McWilliam, J in Abbott and Whelan v  
ITGWU and the Southern Health Board [1982] 1 JISLL 
and 
 
… the Constitution does not confirm on trade unionists any right to 
have their union recognised 
(Barron, J., in Nolan Transport (Oaklands) Ltd v  
Halligan & Ors, High Court, 22nd March 1994  
 
Notwithstanding the right to form an association, there is 
 
… no corresponding obligation … to recognise that association for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of employment of its 
members or for any other purpose …  
(Hamilton, J. in Dublin Colleges ASA v  
City of Dublin VEC [1982] 1 JISLL 73) 
 
None of these cases were direct challenges instigated by trade unions 
seeking to affirm rights, rather they “concerned the protection of individuals 
in their relations with trade unions” (Hogan & Whyte, 2003, p.1793) and in 
the latter case, protection of an employer.  Nonetheless it seems clear that 
“the traditional antipathy of trade unions to the courts” (Whyte, 1995, 
p.212) is well founded and that any direct challenge seeking to interpret 
freedom of association as meaning anything more that freedom to join a 
union would be risky.   
 
In addition to confirming that a right to associate is not necessarily a right 
to do anything in association the Courts have also issued other pertinent 
rulings.  The Constitution itself makes no mention of any right of 
disassociation, yet in the Courts “it has been readily implied” (Christian and 
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Ewing, 1988, p.75) for example Education Institute v Kennedy [1968] IR 69 
and in Meskell v CIE [1973] IR 121 notwithstanding arguments by Kerr & 
Whyte (1985) that while the right to form a trade union is a collective right, 
“it is difficult to see how its corollary can be a right not to join a union, 
which is an individual right” (Daly &  Doherty, 2010, p.318) (my emphasis).  
A further corollary advanced is that the right not to associate extends to 
employers who have the right not to associate with a trade union formed or 
joined by its employees. Any comfort to be gleaned from the proviso in the 
Constitution that “laws may be enacted for the regulation and control” of 
such right to association (Article 40.6.1iii) is soon dissipated by the 
contention of Geoghegan J in Ryanair v Labour Court [2007] 4 IR 199 that it 
is “not in dispute that as a matter of law Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to 
deal with trade unions” and furthermore that “neither could a law be 
passed compelling it to do so”.  It seems now inevitable that despite a 
constitutional right to freedom of association “employers have a right not to 
recognise” (Ewing & Hendy, 2010, p.31); a frozen waif indeed. 
 
Opportunities to amend the Constitution were presented in two separate 
reviews (Committee on the Constitution, 1967 and Constitution Review Group, 
1996).   The earlier concluded that drafting an amendment to deal with the 
issue would involve an “inappropriate” level of detail about trade union 
activities and that legislation was the best approach (Committee on the 
Constitution, 1967, p.43).  The later review considered “whether the right of 
freedom of association should be reformulated in order to ensure that an 
employer is bound to negotiate with a union” (Constitution Review Group 
1996, p.316).  Again it was felt that this should be dealt with via legislation 
and also that any such right should not have “horizontal effect” on others 
(Howlin & Fitzpatrick, 2007, p.181), in particular on employers as this 
would be contrary to the voluntary nature of industrial relations and might 
put off foreign investors.  
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 4.2                                                                                                                              
“Choosing an interpretation  
of the right to freedom of association” 
(Leader, 2002, p.128) 
 
Much depends on the manner in which the right to freedom of association 
is interpreted.   Consider Leader’s (2002) typology: - two contrasting views, 
static versus dynamic interpretations of the right to freedom of association.  
A static interpretation of the right to freedom of association, Leader defines 
“simply as a right to join a group such as a trade union” (p.128); being 
“satisfied with laws that remove obstacles to joining a union” (p.129) while 
being ever mindful of the property rights of the employer.  A dynamic 
interpretation on the other hand involves “enlarging the right so that the 
employee enjoys more than a bare right to join a union” and such that that 
same union “must be given some space for trying to achieve its objectives” 
(p.129).  In other words union membership “is about more than just 
carrying a union card”; “it also includes getting help from the union in 
dealing with your employer” (Davies, 2009, p.199).  Leader then 
distinguishes between two variants of a dynamic interpretation, 
institutional and prerogative, which “differ in the way they connect the right 
to take collective action with the will of the actors involved” (2002, p.130.)  
So, the institutional dynamic version of the right to freedom of association is 
satisfied if the workers “pass through a prior institutional requirement, 
such as holding a ballot”, while a prerogative version would support the 
action of a group regardless of its size once those involved “converge[d] to 
pursue a common purpose” (p.130). 
 
In the Irish case, a static interpretation seems clear.  Article 40 of the 
Constitution “guarantees liberty for the exercise of ... the right of the 
citizens to form associations and unions”.  All of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Constitution are “subject to public order and morality” 
(Article 40.6.1) but the subsection on the right to form associations and 
unions goes further and specifically provides that legislation “may be 
enacted for the regulation and control in the public interest” of such right 
(Article 40.6.1.iii).  There is here more than a hint of unwilling tolerance of 
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trade unions, that their formation might not always be in the public interest 
and thus much of the legislation enacted while not dealing with the direct 
question of trade union recognition are nonetheless “of a negative 
character” removing “some rule of the common law” (Kahn-Freund, 1944, 
p.193).  Contrast this with the property rights enshrined in the Constitution 
where such rights are as important as the life, the person and the good 
name of a citizen which the State “shall, in particular, by its laws protect as 
best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate” 
all of these, including property rights (Article 40.3).  This is interpreted to 
mean that the employer is entitled “to proscribe or restrict in whatever 
manner he chooses organisation and related activities at the workplace or 
during working hours” (Forde & Byrne, 2010, p.59).  Lord Wedderburn 
contends however that “all these attitudes to freedom of association involve 
not legal interpretations but ideological assertions” (1989, p.17).  What 
ideological assertions might inform the foregoing? 
 
4.3                                                                                                                                     
“… not legal interpretations but ideological assertions” 
(Lord Wedderburn, 1989, p.17) 
 
Leader describes the static interpretation as one of a choice of three distinct 
and equally valid legal ideas, without any ideological underpinning, merely 
seeking to establish “which conception satisfies human rights standards” 
(2002, p.132).  It is necessary here however to think beyond that point and 
to explore how such interpretations arise, what informs them, what 
ideological assertions.  In industrial relations such ideologies are referred to 
as the perspectives, Alan Fox being credited with the original depiction of 
two of these, unitary and pluralist (Fox, 1973, 1974).  
 
4.3.1 A unitary frame of reference 
Arising from pre-industrial master-servant relationships, a unitary 
approach to the workplace insists on “one source of authority and one focus 
of loyalty” (Fox, 1966, p. 3) embedded in the owner of the enterprise who 
may “do what he will with his own” (Thomason, 1984, p.113).  By extension, 
the owner’s representative or agent, the manager, is also entitled to this 
loyalty and thereby entitled to exert his ‘managerial prerogative’.  There are 
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“common objectives and … common values which unite and bind together 
all participants” in the workplace (Fox, 1973, p.186) and any conflict is the 
result of misfits and troublemakers.  A team analogy is often used, 
exhorting loyalty to the Captain in order to ensure the best result for all 
concerned.  While Fox opined that “those brave slogans about team spirit 
embody as forlorn a quest as the search for the Holy Grail” (1966, p.372), 
nonetheless the ideology has sustained its vitality in managerial and indeed 
academic thought through the decades.  It is expressed in different ways 
but always the chief concern of management is how to manage labour, this 
contrary element, whose “irrational behaviour is contrary to … [its] … own 
interests” (Fox, 1973, p.186).  Various means have been devised from 
scientific management to human relations approaches; human resource 
management; pay systems and reward schemes right thorough to modern 
day emphasis on employee voice and involvement, though critically in all of 
them, no trade union involvement.   
 
F.W. Taylor’s method of managing labour relies on his four “principles of 
scientific management” (1947, p.40) essentially being the acquisition by 
management of the “great mass of traditional knowledge” held by workers; 
the selection and training of suitable workers; the bringing together of both 
and the equal division of work between workers and management.  Thus a 
“one best way” of doing each task would be devised to encourage workers to 
work harder. Their reward would be a “fair day’s pay” meaning  
 
wages which are high only with relation to the average of the class to 
which the man belongs and which are paid only to those who do 
much more or better work than the average of their class  
(Taylor, 1947, p.27)   
 
The class structure is fair; it should not be undermined. 
 
Sometimes this sense of fairness needs to be spelt out for workers, so that 
they can see for themselves how this rate of ‘fair pay’ is calculated.  Pay 
structures and systems are designed then on a “fair and consistent basis for 
motivating and rewarding employees” (Armstrong & Murlis, 1998, p.157).  
From their proponents’ point of view such systems are useful in “achieving 
consistency and facilitating control” (ibid, p.161).  For this reason Flanders 
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considers that many such systems end up “in a state of decay” for 
“progressively failing to achieve … management objectives” (Flanders, 1973, 
p.373) (my emphasis).  The underlying belief is that “there is something 
sacrosanct about management goals and norms” (Lupton, 1963, p.8), but 
only management believes this to be so, labour has to be motivated.  It is 
just so with human resource management, the “new orthodoxy”, set to 
replace the pluralist or joint regulation approach (Guest, 1991, p.149).  
Apart from the various debates as to its ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ forms, its efficacy 
and legacy, its main concern is always “with nurturing a high level of 
psychological and social commitment towards the employing organisation 
on the behalf of the workforce” (Watson, 2008, p.155).  Why? It appears that 
workers do not always share this sense of fairness and they can, and do 
combine and join unions and become “industry’s opposition” (Clegg, 1951, 
p.22) seeking to have their separate interests represented.  How then can 
managers and others of a unitary bent deal with the emergence of trade 
unions in the workplace?  According to Fox (1973) “suppression is 
impracticable” so they “have to be tolerated” (p.190) in some way.   
 
In an Irish context this bare tolerance is reflected in the Constitution and in 
the Industrial Relations Act 2001.  Under the terms of that Act, where “it is 
not the practice of the employer to engage in collective bargaining 
negotiations” (Section 2(1)(a)) the matter can be referred to the Labour 
Court which may investigate only the issues in dispute.  The Court “shall 
not provide for arrangements for collective bargaining” (Section 4(2)) but 
may “have regard to terms and conditions of employment” (Section 6(2)).  In 
effect only issues around ‘fair pay’ can be addressed, and freedom of 
association becomes “no more than a right to associate together, not a right 
to do anything in association” (Lord Wedderburn, 1989, p.16) or “simply as 
a right to join a group such as a trade union” (Leader, 2002, p.129), a truly 
static interpretation. In addition, as the procedure is designed to address 
material issues, if employers can prove they are paying the ‘going rate’ for a 
particular job, then the case goes no further (D’Art & Turner, 2005; Labour 
Relations Commission, 2006).   Paying workers beyond “the average of their 
class” cannot be countenanced (Taylor, 1947, p.27).  Fox notes “a surviving 
attachment to master-servant relations” (1973, p.191) but implies that a 
unitary perspective might appeal only in some select enterprises.  However 
its “deep roots in the historical texture of class, status and power” (Fox, 
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1973, p. 191) has ensured its survival, not to say supremacy in modern 
neo-liberal thought.  It is, after all “part of a class ideology which comes 
readily to those who rule” (Fox, 1973, p.191) all the more so during a period 
of restoration of power to that class (Harvey, 2005). 
 
4.3.2 The Pluralist Perspective  
By contrast, “class is not a crucial analytical concept in pluralist industrial 
relations” (Budd, Gomez & Meltz, 2004, p.200) despite pluralism’s general 
roots in “criticism of the political doctrine of sovereignty” (Clegg, 1975, 
p.309).  The idea of a separate ‘system’ of industrial relations was first 
coined by John Dunlop, who described industrial relations systems as 
comprising “certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology which binds … and 
a body of rules created to govern …” (Dunlop, 1958, p.7).  The ideologies of 
the actors, i.e., workers, employers and State, must be “sufficiently 
compatible and consistent so as to permit a common set of ideas which 
recognize an acceptable role for each actor” (Dunlop, 1958, p.17).  These 
ideas influenced early pluralist writers in the UK and underpinned the 
system of “collective laissez faire” (Kahn-Freund, 1954) often used to 
describe what pertained in the UK post World War II.  Hugh Clegg (albeit 
retrospectively) best describes those ideals:- 
 
We were pluralists, believing that a free society consists of a large 
number of overlapping groups, each with its own interests and 
objectives which its members are entitled to pursue so long as they 
do so with reasonable regard to the rights and interests of others. … 
We were also egalitarians, wishing to see a shift in the distribution of 
wealth towards those with lower incomes, and a shift of power over 
the conduct of their working lives and environment towards working 
men and women; and, for both those reasons, emphasising the 
importance of trade unions in industry, in the economy, and in 
society.  We therefore attached special importance to collective 
bargaining as the means whereby trade unions pursue their 
objectives.  
(cited in Brown, 1997, p.139). 
 
So far, so fair and the ‘two sides of industry’ are deemed ‘free’ to organise 
and to bargain and to reach “voluntary agreements honourably observed” 
(Phelps Brown, 1959, p.183) all in “the absence of statutory regulation” 
(Hyman, 1995, p.30).  The state adopts a ‘hands off’ approach except to 
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“address the pathological situation, i.e., where the employer-employee 
relationship goes drastically wrong” (Fennell & Lynch, 1993, p.30).  
 
Hugh Clegg’s version of the “mechanism at work which binds the competing 
groups together” is “the continuous process of concession and compromise” 
(Clegg, 1975, p.309).  It is this process via the “various instruments of 
regulation” (Flanders, 1965, p.86) which becomes the focus of pluralist 
industrial relations.  There is then an endless round of rule-making in:-  
 
… legislation and in statutory orders; in trade union regulations; in 
collective agreements and in arbitration awards; in social 
conventions; in managerial decisions; and in accepted custom and 
practice 
(Flanders, 1965, p.86) 
 
A parity of status between the two sides is presumed which contributes to a 
sense of fairness about the outcome, about the rules agreed, both normative 
and substantive.  If either side views the outcome as unfair they have 
recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms.  These also must be seen to be 
fair, which is often interpreted to mean that numerically they ought not to 
be weighted in favour of any one side. So, for example, the Board of ACAS 
will have nominees from ‘the two sides of industry’, employers and unions, 
and the supposedly independent State.  It should then follow that a truly 
pluralist society would “recognize an acceptable role for each actor” 
(Dunlop, 1958, p.17) including an acceptable role for trade unions. 
Employers would surely recognise a trade union right to exist and to 
function, to bargain.  “The harsh reality is that few employers in fact do so 
voluntarily” (Friedman, 2003, p. xvii) thus necessitating the introduction of 
other provisions such as for example in the UK, a statutory union 
recognition procedure.  A concern with the process, with fair play, extends 
also to these provisions.  In the UK, “unions that can demonstrate majority 
support for collective bargaining within a specified bargaining unit” can 
achieve recognition under the terms of the Employment Relations Act, 1999 
(Moore, 2011, p. 50 – 51).  Where they cannot, the CAC is “required to order 
a ballot if the union does not have over 50 per cent of the bargaining unit in 
membership” (ibid). In true institutional dynamic style, “those who are in 
favour have no right to go ahead” (Leader, 2002, p.130) should the majority 
disagree.   There has been a ballot and any necessary adjudication has been 
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conducted by non-partisan bodies, so once again, ‘fair play’ is satisfied.  Yet 
despite such ideas of ‘fair play’ the extent of employer anti-unionism evident 
in several jurisdictions (Gall, 2010a) suggests that pluralism sometimes 
does not equate to the “enlightened managerialism” Fox describes (1973, 
p.213). While hardly agreeing with Dunlop, it would seem that the 
ideologies of the actors are blatantly not “sufficiently compatible” (1958, 
p.17). 
 
4.3.3 Radical Alternatives 
Radical is rather a generic term used to cover a plethora of ideas sometimes 
with little enough in common other than an acknowledgement of the 
“crucial limitations” of pluralism (Brown, 1997, p.19). Thus Abbott (2006) 
includes feminism and the post moderns under the heading ‘Marxism’ while 
Muller-Jentsch (2004) includes the French regulationistes and then goes on 
to explore institutionalism.    Marxism and radical pluralism agree in their 
depiction of pluralism as constrained in the workplace without regard to 
wider societal influences; overly concerned with order and a disingenuous 
belief that a truly voluntary model exists. Frequent references are made to 
the ever increasing bulk of legislation promulgated to regulate the 
employment relationship in recent years and also the increasing 
individualisation which “alters the balance between legal regulation and 
collective bargaining” and undermines collectivism and solidarity in the UK 
(Colling, 2006, p.140) and in Ireland (Gunnigle et al, 2001).  The gradual 
reform acceptable to pluralists is replaced by a demand for transformation.  
There is a return to a focus on class, not on the managerial class as in a 
unitary approach, but with workers and their needs and aspirations.  To 
continue the word play, the unitary ‘fair pay’ and pluralism’s ‘fair play’ are 
replaced by a demand for a ‘fair share’ for working people.   
 
Leader demonstrates a prerogative interpretation of the right to freedom of 
association in France where “a union has a right to bargain as soon as it is 
deemed ‘representative’” (2002, p.131).  The remainder of Leader’s article 
consists of a debate on the relative rights of majority or minority unions and 
on the right to strike.  Here is a missed opportunity to explore other 
versions of freedom of association where the prerogative, not to say radical, 
version pertains. Returning then to a prerogative view of freedom of 
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association, one which is satisfied “as soon as a number … of people 
converge to pursue a common purpose” (Leader, 2002, p.130).  Leader 
makes no mention of either the locus or the focus of such convergence but 
in Ireland and the UK the locus is mainly the workplace and the focus is 
pay and conditions.  What if the locus is not the workplace but the sector or 
industry?  Take for example Germany, where the concept of trade union 
recognition at the workplace is not mentioned in law and nowhere is written 
a duty to bargain?  There is however a right to conclude collective 
agreements (The Collective Agreement Act or TVG 1949 and as amended in 
1969) which on the workers’ side is granted solely to trade unions and such 
agreements are normally reached at industry level.  Could this arrangement 
be said to represent a prerogative view of freedom of association?  It 
certainly exceeds a static one as it includes the right to “do anything in 
association”, the right to conclude collective agreements.  It also exceeds the 
institutional view as workers do not need to demonstrate majority support 
in a workplace by ballot or otherwise in order to be represented by a union.  
  
Dual representation channels are not always necessary to achieve what to 
Irish and British eyes are radical approaches to freedom of association.  
Take the example of Denmark, as truly a ‘voluntary’ model as either of 
those, where even EU Directives are transposed via collective agreements.  
Again, collective agreements are legally binding and, in addition, Danish 
unions can strike for recognition and can call sympathy strikes, both long 
since outlawed in the UK and Ireland.  Ewing (2002) explores some of these 
essential differences between the Irish and UK experience and that of 
jurisdictions in continental Europe.  Freedom of association in the context 
of industrial relations is often understood as “the right to engage in some 
kind of collective bargaining arrangement” (Ewing, 2002, p.145).  The 
difficulty in Ireland (and the UK), is the failure to “mandate any particular 
form of collective bargaining, much less prescribe the most effective level at 
which bargaining may be conducted” (ibid.).  We turn therefore to an 
examination of Ireland’s national level collective bargaining.  
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4.4                                                                                                                                  
Social Partnership a “paradox in policy and practice”? 
(Gunnigle, 2000, p.39) 
 
Much as Leader (2002) presented the choice of interpretations of freedom of 
association as distinct, the frames of reference or industrial relations 
perspectives are often also presented as “self-contained approaches from 
which the reader can apparently choose at will” (Edwards, 1995, p.10).  The 
implication here then might be that freedom of association is interpreted in 
a static way in Ireland and that its industrial relations are mediated by a 
unitary frame of reference and rigidly reflected in simple notions of ‘fair 
pay’.  There are however pluralist elements to Ireland’s industrial relations 
system, not least the much maligned system of negotiation of national pacts 
known as the social partnership system. 
 
Ireland’s social partnership system has consistently been a vexed question 
and the focus of much Irish industrial relations literature, though with 
polar opposite points of view.  Most of the commentary concerns 
arrangements in place since 1987; a tri-partite system of wage bargaining 
which also includes agreements on other economic and social issues such 
as taxation, housing and social welfare.  Using that limited time span, 
advocates of social partnership point to Ireland’s phenomenal economic 
success during those years (Sweeney, 2008); spectacular growth in 
employment (Teague & Donaghey, 2009) and real improvements in working 
conditions (Donaghey & Teague, 2007).  Detractors taking the same 
approximate 20 year time-span point to rising income inequality (Allen, 
2000); declining trade union density (D’Art & Turner, 2010) and a growing 
dichotomy between approaches, pluralist at the top and unitarist at the 
bottom, specifically pointing to the workplace where “micro-cooperation is 
rare” (Dobbins, 2010b, p.497).  While, perversely, all of these claims are 
correct, they ignore the reality that Irish Governments have generally 
favoured some form of national and at least nominally tri-partite 
arrangements regarding pay and economic and social policy, particularly in 
times of stress.  In addition these quasi-corporatist arrangements have co-
existed with extremes of economic fortune (depression in the 1950s, revival 
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in the early 1970s) and all the while both trade union membership and 
density trebled (Nevin, 1980). 
 
Irish government commitment to corporatist arrangements had waned and 
it was only in an effort to deal with a looming economic crisis in 1987 that 
then Taoiseach, Charles Haughey personally insisted on commencing the 
talks which resulted in the more modern form of social partnership.  It was 
in the throes of another crisis that the Irish Government reneged on an 
almost signed agreement on public sector pay (O’Kelly, 2010).  In other 
words more recent Irish Governments have shown no ideological 
commitment to partnership or corporatist/pluralist arrangements but have 
been content to use them when the political or economic need arose.   
 
The term social partnership is then something of a misnomer which “greatly 
exaggerates the influence of the trade unions” and particularly where 
employers demonstrate “sustained resistance” to union recognition with the 
“active connivance” of the State (O’Connor, 2004, n.p.).  While this 
represents a trade union viewpoint, quite clearly what passes for social 
partnership in Ireland does not entail any “parity of status” or “notion of 
‘equality’” usually implied (Hyman, 2001, p.49).  Nor does the Irish system 
demonstrate much of the voluntarist tradition of a State “reluctant to 
intervene directly in labour relations” (Hyman, 2001, p.69) however much it 
is invoked in the debate on union recognition. 
 
4.5                                                                                                                                  
“Nothing seems able to produce such a united front of 
resistance … than an affront to … [the] … tradition of 
voluntarism” 
(Flanders, 1974, p.352) 
 
Kahn-Freund’s description of voluntarism or “collective laissez-faire” centres 
on the lack of a significant role for the law in “shaping … labour relations” 
in Britain (1954, p.44). These relations instead evolved “by way of industrial 
autonomy” (ibid.); both sides were free to bargain with state support rather 
than state intervention. Though often described as trade union “total 
distrust of state intervention” Flanders suggests that voluntarism implies 
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“not so much a distrust of legislation … as … a distrust of courts of law” 
well founded on more than just a “suspicion of class bias” (Flanders, 1974, 
p.352).  “This British abstentionist consensus” (von Prondzynski, 1989, p.1) 
is part of the Irish industrial relations tradition sometimes described as a 
“preference for joint trade union and employer regulation” (Daly and 
Doherty, 2010, p.315).  It is this idea of preference which seems to have 
changed, alongside a confusion of state support with state intervention.  
Voluntarism now seems to refer not so much to the outcome of the 
deliberations between union and employers, but to the process itself, 
whether or not such deliberations have to exist at all, implying that 
employers have a choice in whether or not to recognise a trade union.  It is 
this version of voluntarism which is held up as the reason not to introduce 
‘mandatory’ recognition or to in any way force employers to recognise a 
union.  Yet the “exponential expansion in individual law” during the 20th 
century in Ireland and in the UK alongside a growing emphasis on issues of 
right with binding outcomes at third party (Dobbins, 2005a, n.p.) suggests 
there is little of the original voluntarist tendency remaining.  Employers 
may ‘volunteer’ to negotiate about issues of interest while the State 
adjudicates on issues of right.  Nonetheless time and again the concept of 
voluntarism and the necessity to uphold it is cited in the debate on union 
recognition.  Meenan for example also describes voluntarism as a misnomer 
(1999, p.51) yet goes on to later claim, “somewhat confusingly” (D’Art et al, 
2013, p.13) that had the Industrial Relations Bill of 1998 been passed “it 
would have undermined the voluntarism of Irish industrial relations” 
(Meenan, 1999, p. 160).  Perhaps the real issue is that interpretations of 
voluntarism are akin to interpretations of freedom of association and 
involve once more Lord Wedderburn’s “ideological assertions” (Wedderburn, 
1989, p.171). 
 
Despite such “threadbare” (Dobbins, 2005a, n.p.) voluntarism even in the 
final decades of the 20th century, the Irish trade union movement was 
viewed, by some at least, as “stronger and more coherent than at any time 
in its past” (MacPartlin, 1997, p.78).  Conventional wisdom held that Irish 
trade union legitimacy remained strong and unchallenged (Roche and 
Turner, 1994) and that unions’ role in society, particularly in the social 
partnership system was a major contributor to the Celtic Tiger phenomenon 
(Sweeney, 2008).  That same social partnership system, masked, some say 
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caused, several difficulties.  Wage setting at national level restricted to some 
extent the scope of issues to bargain over at workplace level and in some 
cases obviated the need for it altogether.  Irish trade unions also were 
falling foul of the problems faced by unions all over the western world, i.e., 
competition from ‘low-wage’ economies; the changing nature of the 
workforce; and ‘rootless’ not to say ruthless, capital typical of growing neo-
liberalism, but also they faced some considerable difficulties of their own. 
 
4.6                                                                                                                                   
“Strangled by Americanisation” 
(Murray, 2008, p.9) 
 
A weak constitutional support for trade unions plus a social partnership 
system predicated on immediate (party) political or economic needs rather 
than any ideological commitment left Irish trade unions quite vulnerable.  
In particular Irish reliance on foreign, largely US, direct investment, caused 
several problems.  In the early years of inward investment, Irish trade 
unions were facilitated by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) in a 
practice of pre-production agreements with incoming investors, often 
referred to in derogatory fashion as ‘sweetheart’ deals, whereby investors 
agreed in advance to negotiate with one trade union representing, usually, 
production workers only.  Such deals were not dissimilar to single union 
agreements in the UK (Gall, 1993) though without their focus on Japanese 
firms.  They shared with the UK a tendency to restrict the scope of 
bargaining but in Ireland they also restricted the grade of worker involved 
tending only to refer to production or hourly-paid workers (Murray, 2008).  
They caused problems at the time as smaller unions complained that they 
were the victims of “an orchestrated exclusion” by the IDA as most were 
signed by one union, the largest general union at the time (Murray, 2008, 
p.10).  There were also occasional rank-and-file revolts against the 
arrangements by workers whose choice of union was constrained (ibid.).   
 
The legacy of such pre-production deals is far more serious.  As a result 
there arose a pattern in Irish manufacturing of a unionised blue collar and 
a non-union white collar sector.  While factory floor workers were the 
majority of those employed at the time, unions had no problem.  However 
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over the later years of the 20th century the nature of Irish manufacturing 
changed in terms of firm ownership; of the product produced and of the 
type of workers needed to produce it.  There was a move into what is now 
described as the “modern sector” as opposed to the “traditional sector”, a 
move towards chemicals and pharmaceuticals; medical, computer and 
electronic goods (Central Statistics Office, 2012b).  Sectors also changed 
direction.  For example, employment in computers changed from hardware 
assembly to higher value software and services; pharmaceuticals from basic 
manufacturing to the higher value active ingredients sector (Barry & Bergin, 
2012).  These changes have necessitated a different type of workforce, more 
highly skilled and better educated.  Not surprisingly then, 40% of those 
aged between 25 and 64 have a third level qualification (, 2012a) and are no 
longer employed solely in the public sector; in education, health and the 
civil service as was the norm.  Now graduates are to be found in the private 
sector, in industry where the norm has been for only blue collar 
unionisation and in the tradable services sector where there is no tradition 
at all of unionisation. The male manufacturing heartland of the trade 
unions has been displaced.  
 
In addition, FDI increased five-fold between 1987 and 2007 and now 
accounts for nearly half of all manufacturing employment and twice the EU 
average in services (Barry and Bergin, 2012) raising questions as to how the 
influence of multi-national corporations’  (MNC) cultures in host countries 
is translated in an Irish context (Almond & Ferner, 2006).  The nature of 
such influences is not universally agreed.  Some see the Irish case as 
confirmation of the ‘MNC dominance thesis’ (Roche & Geary, 1996; Geary & 
Roche, 2001) that multinationals bring with them and enforce their own 
“country of origin” values and systems regarding industrial relations 
(Ferner, 1997, p.19).   Turner et al (1997) however find a significant 
difference between European and US MNCs and virtually no difference 
between US MNCs and the indigenous sectors in manufacturing.  Their 
later work (Turner et al, 2001) suggests that timing is important, finding 
that “companies set up after 1984 were less likely to recognize a union than 
companies established prior to that date” (p.131).  Lavelle et al (2008) give 
further support to this indicating that of those MNCs which do recognize 
unions, a third do so only in some or most of their sites, a practice of 
“double-breasting” union and non-union sites (Gunnigle et al, 2007, p.1).   
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Concurrently, emerging indigenous business seems to have acquired 
permission to declare itself non-union if not anti-union, Ryanair and Esat 
for example (Industrial Relations News, 1998).  According to Sheehan 
(2008), between 2004 and 2007 several other large well-established Irish 
companies “effectively snubbed the state’s dispute resolution agencies” (p. 
103) in rows with unions with which they had previously long bargained 
collectively and successfully.  Turner et al (1997) demonstrate that the 
argument is not therefore about individual companies but that cognisance 
must be taken of a “changed political and economic climate” (p.837).  It is 
not so much a feature of globalization and FDI per se, but of “a distinctive 
form of globalization”, i.e., neo-liberalization or the restoration of “class 
power to ruling elites” (Harvey, 2005, p.156).  The “choir effect” of 
development agencies; Government Ministers (even Labour ones); employer 
bodies and captains of industry all insisting that any moves to rectify the 
situation regarding union recognition would damage incoming investment 
and jeopardise jobs, has had tremendous effect (Dobbins, 2008).  Even the 
trade unions seem to have accepted this, never seeking mandatory union 
recognition, even as a bargaining position from which to climb down (Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, 2002; Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 1998). 
 
4.7                                                                                                                                      
An “urgent need for labour movement revitalization” 
(Turner, 2004, p.2) 
 
Thus, there is in Ireland as elsewhere, an “urgent need for labour movement 
revitalization” expressed in the form of a focus on either institutions or 
mobilization (Turner, 2004, p.2).  Heery & Adler (2004) explain the choice as 
depending on the status of labour such that the strong institutions provided 
by the dual channel representation system in Germany for example means 
“there is less incentive to organize” (p. 64) and a focus on mobilizing arises 
in the US and UK, “by no coincidence where the institutional position is 
weakest” (Turner, 2004, p.7).  The problem for Ireland is that its form of 
partnership is neither the workplace based “isolated projects” (Fichter & 
Greer, 2004, p. 75) of the US and UK nor the “overarching phenomenon” of 
mainland Europe (ibid., p. 80).  The Irish trade union response therefore 
tends to focus on both institutions and mobilization. 
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 4.7.1 - Institutions 
Irish trade unions take a dual approach to institutional means of renewal or 
even survival: - on the one hand lobbying on the question of trade union 
recognition while also campaigning for legislative protections for workers on 
an individual basis.  Such lobbying during the 20th century seldom took the 
form of a demand for a union recognition procedure or any means of forcing 
employers to bargain.  It seemed to unions and others to be unnecessary as 
“despite the obvious dearth of effective procedures … few employers, in fact, 
refuse to recognise trade unions” (Commission of Inquiry on Industrial 
Relations, 1981, p.102).  It was “probable that high existing levels of 
unionisation predispose[d] employers to regard union representation as 
normal or inevitable” and strikes or the mere threat of one were “frequently 
instrumental in securing” recognition (ibid.). Unions were therefore justified 
in their submission to that Commission wherein they  
 
… stressed their belief in the principle that disputes should be 
settled through the collective bargaining process and that direct 
intervention by the law in the bargaining system should be avoided. 
The law was not seen as the appropriate instrument in this area.  
(Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Relations, 1981, p.200)  
 
The ICTU’s position had changed by 1998 and their proposals to the 
reconvened High Level Group made an important distinction between trade 
union recognition and what they termed “representational rights” (ICTU, 
1998).  They sought legislative changes to enable “collective disputes to be 
resolved using the LRC and Labour Court” but also, separately “to allow 
workers to be represented on specified individual issues”, (ICTU, 1998, p.1) 
(my emphasis).  ICTU further emphasises this “distinction between 
collective representation for the purpose of addressing group grievances as 
against collective bargaining” (ICTU, 2002, p.6) which distinction 
contributes to a shifting understanding of what exactly collective bargaining 
entails. ICTU’s most recent submission (ICTU, 2013b) relies on ILO 
Convention 98 to confirm its definition of collective bargaining and also to 
define what it deems not to be collective bargaining: - 
 
The definition of ‘collective bargaining’ used for the IR Acts must 
clarify that collective bargaining cannot be considered to have taken 
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place in a context where the employer has refused to negotiate with 
the trade union – even where a non-union body is in existence.  
(ICTU, 2013b, p.19) 
 
Yet the submission continues on to include proposed “criteria for 
establishing ‘genuinely independent’ non-union ‘collective bargaining’ for 
the purpose of the 2001-2004 Acts” (p.35) though not it states in any way to 
“undermine the position of a trade union” and emphasises the difference 
between collective representation at non-union employments and collective 
bargaining at unionised workplaces (p.21).    
 
In a classic definition collective bargaining is described as occurring when 
the employer  
 
meets with a collective will, and settles, in a single agreement, the 
principles on which, for the time being, all workmen of a particular 
group, or class, or grade, will be engaged”  
(Webb & Webb, 1902, p.173).   
 
According to that definition, collective bargaining is not necessarily “co-
extensive with, nor limited to, Trade Union organisation” (Webb & Webb, 
1897, p.177) but it is the “Trade Union alone which can provide the 
machinery for any but its most casual application”; the trade union which 
brings to the process “both continuity and elasticity” (ibid. p.179).  That the 
role of trade unions in collective bargaining became more definite is 
confirmed by the ILO: “it is now a well-established principle that the 
independence of trade unions is a prerequisite to effective collective 
bargaining” (ILO, 1960).  A more modern definition is: -  
 
…any formal dialogue that takes place between employers and 
representatives of independent trade unions, that has an influence 
on the employment relationship, can be taken to constitute collective 
bargaining 
(Brown, et al, 2008, p.3)   
 
The ICTU has however continued to distinguish between trade union 
recognition and collective bargaining, fearful that “political opposition” in 
the shape of “outright hostility from IBEC and the American Chamber, [of 
Commerce] make formal recognition a non-runner” (Sheehan, 2013, n.p.).  
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Described as “pragmatism” both SIPTU and ICTU declare themselves 
content that their objectives on union recognition “now tie into the 
approach likely to be adopted by Minister Bruton”, the right-of-centre Fine 
Gael Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (ibid.).  To these unlikely 
bed-fellows can be added the Labour Party’s Government Minister and 
former union official, Pat Rabbitte who also believes that “trade union 
recognition is a different issue to the right to collective bargaining” (Millar, 
2012).  
 
As though to compound this “retreat from collective bargaining” (Brown et 
al, 2008, p. 1), trade unions in Ireland have been to the fore in campaigns 
for the introduction of individual legislative protections on issues once 
deemed their preserve (Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Relations, 1981). 
The more recent of these include the introduction of a national minimum 
wage (Sheehan & Geary, 1998a); for an increase in staff at the Labour 
Inspectorate (Dobbins, 2005b) and for the establishment of the National 
Employment Rights Authority (NERA) a statutory body with responsibility 
for the monitoring and enforcement of compliance with employment law 
established in 2007 on foot of a social partnership agreement. This 
emphasis on the individual was also evident in the ICTU complaint 
regarding Ryanair to the ILO specifically pointing to the victimisation of 
individuals employed by the airline (ICTU, 2010). Again, this allowed some 
relief to the Minister for Enterprise, Jobs and Innovation who noted that the 
complaint concerned “a very narrow set of circumstances which involved 
victimisation of workers. It is not reversing the entire edifice of existing Irish 
law” (Bruton, 2011, p.15).  By contrast, when looking at collective issues, 
despite agreeing in principle, unions have seldom forced the issue of 
European Works Councils (Dobbins, 2003) and were virtually silent on the 
transposition of the Information & Consultation Directive and inactive in 
terms of its implementation (Dundon et al, 2014).  
 
4.7.2 - Mobilization 
Forms of trade union renewal with a focus on mobilizing and organising owe 
much to Charles Tilly’s framework of “interest, organization, mobilization, 
opportunity and collective action” (1978, p.7).  Group interests are defined 
by the perceived gains and losses arising from the group’s interaction with 
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other groups.  Organization and mobilization have to do with the group’s 
structure, how best to organise themselves and how to control their 
resources, votes etc.  By opportunity, Tilly meant the group’s relative 
position in the world and the opportunities that it presented for them to act 
“together in pursuit of common interests” (ibid.).  Kelly draws on Tilly's 
mobilization theory or “theory of collective action” with the same five 
components: - interest definition, organisation, mobilisation, opportunity 
and action (Kelly, 1998, p.25).  Interest definition starts from a sense of 
“injustice and grievance” (ibid. p.27) for which the employer can be blamed 
and which contributes to a sense of ‘us and them’.  Organisation “refers to 
the structure of a group” (ibid. p.25) both internally and externally in the 
workplace and so would deal with such issues as union density.  By 
mobilisation is meant that process whereby individuals calculate “the costs 
and benefits of collective action” (ibid. p.34), social interaction in the group 
and the role of leaders.  Opportunity would include “the policies and actions 
of employers and the state” (ibid. p.37) not forgetting the role of repression 
and the essential concept of the balance of power. Finally all of this leading 
to action, to whatever form of collective action is taken. 
 
Martin, (1999, p.1208) while confessing to being a pluralist at heart takes 
issue with the “conventional Marxist trajectory” of mobilization theory and 
in particular the “serious gaps” Kelly (1998) has left in explaining workers’ 
collectivism and the exact conditions under which it arises.  Most other 
critiques focus on the earlier components of the trajectory, on interests, 
organization and mobilization but principally on the role of leaders. Atzeni 
(2010) expresses reservations about Kelly’s use of ideas about injustice 
claiming it “is theoretically flawed and reinforces the idea that collective 
action in the workplace is all about contesting rights instead of power and 
class relations” (p.18).  Using the example of spontaneous factory 
occupations in Argentina, Atzeni also questions whether collective action is 
necessarily achieved via the process of mobilization and in particular 
questions whether or not leaders are needed.  Much depends on the extent 
to which any such occupations are truly spontaneous and in any event it is 
a weak comparison between workers seeking union recognition and those 
seeking to overthrow the management structure if not the state.  Johnson 
and Jarley’s (2004) “test of mobilization theory” (p. 543) calls for an 
emphasis on the difference between “workplace injustice and union justice”, 
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that it is insufficient to “assume that such themes as global fairness … can 
mobilize people to join unions and engage in collective action” (p.557).  
Unions must also have “capacity” to convert that sense of injustice. 
 
Such capacity must derive in the main from union leaders.  While Kelly 
(1998) does not define leaders as such, the implication is that such leaders 
are within the group, meaning activists and shop stewards.  Their role in 
the process of getting from interest definition to collective action is well 
explored in industrial relations if not contested (Darlington, 2001; 2002; 
Fairbrother, 1996; 2000; Batstone et al, 1977; Beynon, 1973).  Beynon 
focussed on the importance of the relationship between the shop steward 
and the members, “the lads at Halewood” (1973) while Batstone et al (1977) 
described very sophisticated shop steward committees and the importance 
of their educational role. Darlington (2001) emphasises the need for left-
wing militants, as does Kelly (1998).  Throughout many of these studies 
there is an explicit or implicit belief in the “bureaucratic inertia of 
entrenched union officials” (Hickey et al, 2010, p.56) often relying on 
Michels’ (1959) iron law of oligarchy. This ignores an important distinction, 
namely that the type of leaders required in order to maintain collective 
bargaining in large male-dominated manufacturing plants or public 
transport with long histories of union activism and collective bargaining 
must perforce be different from that required to instigate union organisation 
in smaller, private sector workplaces staffed by those with little or no 
realisation of the possession of power.  The presumption by Tilly that “the 
rank-and-file’s interest is social revolution” (1978, p.104) seems little in 
evidence, certainly in the Irish sometimes rural context of this study, a 
context which some left-wing union officials describe as being “devoid of 
ideology” (Gibbons, 2003). 
 
The weakness with mobilization theory for this study is at the other end of 
the putative process, around opportunity and collective action.  Opportunity 
is crucial encompassing as it does issues around “the balance of power 
between the parties” (Kelly, 1998, p.25); the nature of repression by 
employers; the role and agency of the state for example in union recognition 
procedures and the effect of anti-union or non-union workers.  There is a 
sense that opportunity is created by others; that it is immovable. The 
definition of collective action is also problematic.   Tilly’s version is probably 
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best explained by the title of his book “From mobilization to revolution” (my 
emphasis) and he acknowledges that due to his Marxian roots he deals 
“mainly with discontinuous, contentious collective action: strikes, 
demonstrations, and tax rebellions” for which his theory is more than apt 
(Tilly, 1978, p.50).  Kelly contends that his “focus on strikes is defensible” 
(1998, p.38) but Tilly had already wondered about the “everyday, continized 
[sic], peaceful collective action” (1978, p.50).  In an industrial relations 
context, this collective action needs to be distinguished from industrial 
action, it has to mean more (or sometimes less) than strikes; it must 
include the everyday sustenance and activity of a “continuous association of 
wage earners” (Webb & Webb, 1920, p. 1). 
 
4.8                                                                                                                                               
A “tool box of practices” 
(Simms & Holgate, 2010, p.157) 
 
The Organising model of trade unionism addresses some of the 
unsuitability of mobilization theory for understanding everyday union 
activity, though without a single reference by its US proponents to 
mobilization theory much less its Marxian roots (Bronfenbrenner et al, 
1998; Milkman & Voss, 2004).  According to Bronfenbrenner et al (1998) 
organising theory emerged in the US in 1988 in a manual published by the 
AFL-CIO and has since been expanded upon to become something of a 
panacea across the English speaking world for falling union density and 
increasing employer hostility.  There is no one theoretical definition but in 
essence it is a “label used to describe an extensive range of union practices 
ranging from direct recruitment methods to political and community 
activism” leading to increased membership and worker collectivism (Turner 
et al, 2009, p.3).  It stipulates that union officers should “never do for 
workers what they should and can do for themselves” and seeks to empower 
union members to set their own agenda “by themselves and for themselves” 
(Gall, 2010b, p.8) thereby creating “the ‘self-organised’ organised (sic) 
workplace” (Gall, 2006, p.3). 
 
The proponents of the organising model see a clear distinction between it 
and what is now referred to as the servicing model of trade unionism.  The 
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latter is typified by staff led recruitment drives to get members into the 
union and service grievances for them in a “reactive, ad hoc and 
unsystematic manner” (Heery et al, 2003b, p.81).  This results in the 
“membership passivity and non-participation in the structures of the union” 
that proponents of organising cite as part of the difficulties with an 
emphasis on servicing (Gall, 2010b, p.7).  Organising theory meanwhile 
makes a distinction between recruiting and organising such that 
“recruitment is part of organising and not the other way round” (Gall, 
2010b, p.17).  Organising the ‘organised’ via in-fill recruitment and 
improved structures is as much a feature of the model as organising the 
‘unorganised’, the principles are the same for both. 
 
Organising theory also starts from the premise that interests are the 
“fulcrum” (Kelly, 1998, p.25) but takes it beyond a fostering of collective 
interests and inculcation of a ‘them-and-us’ attitude.  Firstly there is a 
distinction between interests and issues such that interests are often 
implicit and “must sometimes be inferred” (Simms, 2007(a) p.444) while 
issues are explicit and are easily recognizable as the wish-list around which 
workers and their unions campaign.  Issues tend to be of the justice-and-
dignity variety at the initial stages; partly because those kinds of issues 
have more resonance in the public eye and also because the bread-and-
butter issues like pay are more difficult to make progress on prior to the 
establishment of collective bargaining (Simms, 2007(b)).   Thus an 
Organising manual for unions insists that they should “express campaign 
goals and issues as a fight for social justice” and “translate union problems 
in such a way that the public understands the social justice aspect” (Banks 
& Conrow (a), n.d., n.p.). Pick issues which are “widely felt; deeply felt; 
winnable in part” (ibid) the latter criterion necessary to demonstrate “union 
instrumentality” (Frege & Kelly, 2004, p.34) a major predictor of the 
likelihood of workers to opt for unionisation (Badigannavar & Kelly, 2005).  
After all, that is why they join; for “support if I had a problem at work” and 
to get “improved pay and conditions” (Waddington & Whitston, 1997, 
p.521). 
 
The organising model supports the view that “bureaucracies are not 
necessarily conservative” (Carter & Cooper, 2002, p.735) and that the role of 
the union official is as essential as, although different to, that of the 
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activist.  The role of the Organiser is well defined in the manuals of the 
organising model (Banks & Conrow (b), n.d.).  S/he will help to frame issues 
particularly those which might not be “spontaneously identified” (Simms, 
2007(b), p.125); “identify and construct common interests among a diversity 
of interest groups” (Simms, 2007(a) p.439) and “build the confidence of 
activists” (Simms, 2007(b), p.127). In addition, both Lerner (2003) and 
Erickson et al (2002) take the matter of organisation further and focus on 
union “architecture” (Lerner, 2003, p.9), i.e., the need to have both an 
industrial/sector strategy and a matching union structure, such that 
unions campaign across an entire industry or sector and organise their 
structures accordingly.  
 
The model encourages little mini mobilizations or “tactics” (Banks & Conrow 
(a), n.d., n.p.) such as the wearing of union badges or particular colours by 
the workforce on particular days.  Part of such tactics is also to involve the 
workers in regular tasks such as signing petitions; taking up surveys; 
‘mapping’ the workplace.  But it is at opportunity where the organising 
model makes its mark in a way that mobilization theory does not, where it 
suggests that opportunity can be created by means of a strategic approach: 
campaigns are planned and researched to include the “identification of 
‘levers’ which can be used to pressure resistant employers” (Heery et al, 
2000b, p.39).  An “opportunity structure” is located, by which is meant 
“channels through which demands can be placed” (Badigannavar & Kelly, 
2005, p.520) be that via consumer boycotts; direct appeals to suppliers, 
shareholders, landowners (Heery et al, 2000b; Heery, 2005; Banks & 
Conrow, n.d., (a) and (b)). 
 
4.8.1 - A “credible union renewal strategy?” 
(De Turberville, 2004, p.775) 
 
As a theory, ‘organising’ leaves itself open to and receives much criticism, 
from both left and right.  De Turberville points to its “conceptual porosity” 
and disputes the “golden-age-of-organizing hypothesis that legitimizes the 
model as being historically effective” (2004, p.778).  Certainly its US 
proponents devote many pages to the latter with little mention of concepts 
(Milkman & Voss, 2004; Bronfenbrenner et al, 1998).  Its conflation by 
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some with social movement unionism (Voos, 1997; Milkman & Voss, 2004, 
p.2) is confusing there being a considerable series of steps between the 
various versions described in for example, Banks & Metzgar (1989) and 
Kelly (2005).  Neither has it been helped by events in the US involving some 
of those to the forefront in adopting the model and in canvassing support 
for it in Europe.16   
 
Despite the “questionable” history, the “shaky financial rationale” and 
“dubious assumptions” of organising theory, does the model itself work? (De 
Turberville, 2004, p.788).  Part of the difficulty in assessing is the extent to 
which unions actually comply with the model.  A campaign run according to 
the organising model ought to have several distinguishing features: - an 
organising committee of workplace activists who run the campaign and 
‘map’ the enterprise in order to categorise workers according to how 
supportive they are of the campaign; one-on-one recruitment techniques 
sometimes via house-calls; the use of actions like wearing similar coloured 
T-shirts on a particular day to demonstrate unity or collectivism and the 
publicising of successes. Heery et al (2000b) found fairly close compliance 
with best practice in a green-field campaign run by the Communications 
Workers’ Union (CWU) at TypeCo.  An organising committee was formed; 
issues were identified and expressed via the necessary “moral discourse” 
surrounding fairness, respect and justice and a mapping exercise was 
undertaken (ibid. p.39). Nonetheless there were difficulties reaching some 
workers due to awkward shift patterns and short working hours. 
 
The ‘in-fill’ campaigns by UK trade unions UNISON and Prospect’s fore-
runner STE in the National Health Service and British Telecom respectively, 
emphasise a similar approach in brown-field campaigns: - updating 
membership lists; researching the needs of particular types of members; 
developing recruitment materials appropriate to target and increasing the 
numbers and levels of activity of workplace representatives (Heery et al, 
2000b, pp. 46 – 48).  Each of these campaigns demonstrate the use of only 
some elements of good organising campaigns supporting Heery et al’s earlier 
16 See Fletcher & Gapasin (2008) for an explanation of the formation of Change to 
Win a break-away labor federation from AFL-CIO and also Shaw (2011) regarding 
turf wars between one of the main proponents of the organising model, SEIU, and 
other US trade unions. 
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findings from a large survey that unions’ use of organising methods are 
“patchy and uneven” (2000b, p.42).  Simms’ exploration of organising 
campaigns in two not-for-profit organisations again demonstrates similar 
use of selected elements of best practice (2007b).  Qualitative issues were 
emphasised; winnable targets set and ‘actions’ used.   
 
What of the “entrenched union officials” (Hickey et al, 2010, p.56)?  
Changing to an ‘organising’ model means major changes for union staff.  
There are often new grades employed, researchers and strategists, and new 
if not additional functions required to be filled by existing staff.  The 
experience is not always a happy one as Carter and Cooper (2002) found in 
MSF in the UK and in CPSU in Australia during their respective unions’ 
attempts to change to organising methods. In the case of MSF there were no 
additional resources and structures were not changed.  There were however 
staff redundancies leaving those remaining with extra duties.  For a “policy 
predicated on enthusiasm and involvement” (Carter & Cooper, 2002, p.720), 
it singularly failed to inspire such enthusiasm or involvement in staff.  An 
important element of the model is the role of staff in framing issues, 
training activists and designing campaigns.  This role is often advanced as 
further evidence of a top-down approach and feeds into the debate about 
whether organising is or ought to be a top-down or bottom-up approach, a 
rather unnecessary dichotomy.  Workplace activism has been interpreted 
rather narrowly in some cases to mean “bottom-up grassroots militancy” (de 
Turberville, 2004, p.780) a “romantic” notion according to others (Milkman 
& Voss, 2004, p.7) particularly in light of the already mentioned passivity 
and lack of activism purported to arise when unions function as a service.  
Indeed it is difficult to imagine how “unorganised atomised individuals” 
could motivate and renew activism without some form of external guidance 
and leadership (Gall, 2010b, p.20). Crosby excuses the top-down approach 
in LHMU’s CleanStart campaign in Australia on the basis that it is only 
necessary when workers are particularly weak or vulnerable (2009) though 
that is generally a feature of the unorganised.  Yet, “an over-enthusiastic 
leadership is not a guarantee of success” either (Turner et al, 2009, p.4).  
Heery demonstrates effectively that “change is most likely where there are 
multiple sources of influence” (2005, p.102).  Simms goes further.  Her 
comparison of a top-down AMICUS campaign and a bottom-up CWU 
campaign demonstrates that both “workplace participatory democracy” and  
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“central strategic leadership” are needed though not necessarily in 
“harmonious balance”, rather a “managed activism” (2007b, p.132).  
 
One of the difficulties with the organising model, similar to mobilising 
theory, is the question of what happens at the end of the process.  
Markowitz points to the sense of exclusion felt by the workers after the 
organising campaign ended in both of the cases she studied (2000).  Rose 
(2006) and Connolly et al (2011) identify similar issues in Canada and the 
Netherlands respectively.  Simms’ examination of a CWU campaign found 
membership and activism both dwindling after recognition was achieved 
(2006)  and a later GMB study concluded unions were paying “insufficient 
attention to the link between organising and bargaining” (Simms and 
Holgate, 2010, p.) Oddly enough the more popular organising manuals 
make no mention of this transition problem (Banks & Conrow; International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF, undated); Trades Union Congress, 
2007).  One exception is that produced by the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters which has an appendix entitled “The First Contract – transition 
between organizing and bargaining”.  In it they recommend the 
establishment of a bargaining committee in advance of winning the 
campaign and to involve the local union.  Moore’s (2011) study of union 
activists realises that activists need to learn how to engage in three different 
types of activity ‘facing’ different others (Darlington, 1994) and emphasises 
the need for members and activists to “behave like a union in the 
workplace” from early in the campaign (Moore, 2011, p.63).  There seems a 
contradiction here.  If campaigns are run in accordance with the organising 
model and create the “‘self-organised’ organised (sic) workplace” (Gall, 2006, 
p.3) surely transition should take care of itself?   
 
If adherence to organising principles is “patchy and uneven” (Heery et al, 
2000b, p.42) then outcomes may also be described thus and not just in the 
UK.  Even in the US “there is not much to hang one’s hat on” with general 
trends in membership and activism still downward (Fiorito & Jarley, 2010, 
p.88) apart from some individual unions, particularly SEIU.  Indeed there 
has been much trumpeting of the successes of the ‘Justice for Janitors’ 
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campaign in the US17 and the LHMU’s and SFWU’s imitative ‘CleanStart’18 
campaign in Australia (Crosby, 2009).  Without doubt they have both been 
successful if rather lengthy campaigns; twenty years plus in the case of 
‘Justice for Janitors’ and five in the Australian case.   Campaigns in Britain 
have tended to be shorter and whether as a consequence or not, with more 
mixed results.  Outcomes were “unspectacular” (Heery et al, 2000b, p.50), 
“modest” (Heery et al, 2003, p.93) and even more recently “generally 
disappointing” (Gall, 2010b, p.47). There is here a tendency to measure 
organising theory effectiveness by reference to numbers of new union 
members. Whither the distinction between recruiting and organising?   
 
Of course the distinction is unnecessary as trade unions have always 
organised workers and will always need to recruit and to service, to 
represent their members’ interests.  The heralding of organising as 
something new, “a ‘toolbox of practices’” (Simms & Holgate, 2010, p.157) 
disregards the fundamental, back-to-basics approach which underpins it.  
A hundred years before Bronfenbrenner, Beatrice and Sydney Webb wrote 
that trade unionism was not inspired “by any single doctrine...but more or 
less by three divergent and even contradictory views as to social 
expediency” (1897, p.595) in “a perpetually shifting compromise” (p.559) 
which they described in society as “the ultimate cleavage between 
Conservatives, Individualists and Collectivists” (p.597).  Cole (1939) also 
saw “rival conceptions” of the purpose of trade unionism, class 
consciousness versus trade consciousness with the trade union movement 
operating a compromise between them.  Hoxie (1923) called them business 
unionism and revolutionary unionism.  Later pluralist writers saw the 
purpose of trade unions as “participation in job regulation” (Flanders, 1975, 
p.42) or the protection of its members from the employer (Clegg, 1951, 
p.22).  This sounds very much like Cole’s (1939) trade consciousness or 
what Hyman describes as a “fairly narrow service agency” (1975, p.86) – 
servicing indeed. The “perpetually shifting compromise” is, for now at least 
in terms of union preferences for mobilisation and organising, leaning 
towards the collectivists (Webb & Webb, 1897, p.559). 
 
17 http://www.seiu.org/division/property-services/justice-for-janitors/index.php 
18 http://lhmu.org.au/campaigns/clean-start 
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Much depends on the purpose of organising (Simms & Holgate, 2010) which 
surely must be the same as the purpose of trade unionism.  Yes it must aim 
to “deliver sustainable increases in workplace power” (Simms & Holgate, 
2010, p.165) which may be measured by union density, thus making 
recruitment important.  But it should not be “the sacrosanct indicator of 
labour’s success” (Sullivan, 2010) else how to judge labour success in for 
example, France, with single figure density?  There are other, more 
qualitative changes which ought to result from organising theory.  Changes 
noted include that campaigns “were involving and sought to draw workers 
into the process” (Heery et al, 2000b, p.50) and that “the form of 
representation is beginning to change” (Gonzalez-Perez et al, 2009, p.171; 
Heery et al, 2000a). Crosby (2009) points to the increase in union and 
worker confidence and the lessons learnt by employers.  If organising theory 
is more than just recruitment, there ought to be such qualitative changes.  
That this is not always reflected in the research may, as Turner et al 
suggest, be a result of a reliance on survey based research and its 
consequent “inability to capture the rich texture of everyday social 
processes” (2009, p.10). 
 
4.9                                                                                                                              
Organising Unionism comes to Ireland 
 
The concept of the organising model is still in its infancy in Ireland though 
already most of the private sector unions have declared themselves 
adherents of the model and are making resources available, SIPTU, 
MANDATE and CWU in particular (Gonzalez-Perez et al, 2009).  SIPTU, the 
largest, made an early start in 2001 with the establishment of an 
Organising Unit staffed with organisers and researchers and which “has 
already brought some progress in recruiting new members” (Allen, 2009, 
p.55).  A 2008 report from a special commission on the future of the union 
(Higgins, 2008) was implemented during 2010, which in addition to 
increasing the size of the Organising Department also took to heart Lerner’s 
advice on union “architecture” (2003) and re-modelled from a geographically 
based branch system to industrial divisions19. The organising budget is 
19 http://www.siptu.ie/divisions/ 
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being increased to 25% and all staff members have been re-assigned to 
either green-field organising; to local brown-field organising and collective 
representation or to individual grievance handling.  This provides a good 
example of the “differentiated approach” necessary for full implementation 
of the model (Gall, 2010b, p.16). Although written in advance of the entirety 
of changes in SIPTU, Allen describes that union’s wholehearted embracing 
of the SEIU model and sees the greatest threat to organising coming from 
engagement in social partnership, now defunct as far as the private sector 
is concerned (2009).  Arqueros-Fernandez’s (2009) account of one (probably 
untypical) organising campaign in the mushroom industry in Ireland is too 
specific to shed much light on the general question of organising in Ireland 
and again was conducted in advance of the  complete implementation of the 
model. 
 
Turner et al (2009) include other unions in their postal survey of eight 
private sector unions in Ireland. They found “relatively scant support to the 
advocates of the organising approach” (p.10) but attribute this, not so much 
to the model itself, but to “low uptake and poor adoption of the organising 
approach” and “insufficient resources” (p.4). It is far too early to judge the 
effectiveness or otherwise of organising in Ireland.  Perhaps with greater 
adherence to the model at least in SIPTU over the coming years the real 
impact will become clear.  In any event engagement with the model has 
focussed Irish unions’ attention on mobilization and on the means of doing 
it successfully.  With the collapse of institutions such as the social 
partnership system, this focus on mobilization and organising as a way of 
functioning is likely to continue with or without close adherence to the 
organising model.  It is against this backdrop of a general trade union focus 
on mobilising and organising that Irish trade unions’ concurrent support for 
an institutional means of resolving recognition disputes comes into 
question.  This is particularly so in light of some UK research regarding the 
effects of the recognition legislation in that jurisdiction, bearing in mind as 
ever that what exists in Ireland is not a recognition procedure.   
 
Gall (2010a) examines trends in employer hostility during recognition 
campaigns in Ireland, the UK and US and seeks to demonstrate that it is 
the use of statutory recognition procedures which stimulates the hostility.  
Its usefulness in answering the questions posed in this study is diminished 
 
65 
on a number of fronts.  The research is conducted at a macro level, so  to 
speak, via newspaper coverage. Establishing levels of collective bargaining 
post procedure requires work at a micro level, at the level of the workplace.  
There are also some difficulties with Gall’s interpretation of the legislation 
wherein he states that the 2001 Act allows the Labour Court “to issue 
legally binding recommendations compelling employers to bargain with their 
unionized employees” (p.16) and that the 2004 Act “exhibits a greater 
propensity to force them to recognize and bargain with unions” (p.17).  As 
already enunciated in an earlier chapter, this is quite clearly not the case.  
Nonetheless if statutory procedures of either description can be described 
“as facilitators of employers’ anti-unionism” (ibid. p.12) then this is an 
important consideration when assessing subsequent collective bargaining 
outcomes, if any. 
 
It hardly seems revelatory to find that “employer opposition raises the costs 
and difficulties of recruiting new members” (Turner et al, 2009, p.5) but 
Kelly warns that we ignore employer repression at our peril (1998).  
“Perceptions of union effectiveness” are crucial for successful organising 
and “well publicized defeats...may radically alter employee perceptions of 
general union instrumentality” (ibid. p.59).  Findings of higher levels of 
employer hostility in green-field organising campaigns raise similar 
concerns (Heery & Simms, 2010).  Cognisance must also be taken of the 
results of a study of 64 recognition ballots in the UK between 2000 and 
2003 (Moore, 2004).  Unexpectedly it found that higher numbers of 
members in a bargaining unit “is not related to ballot success” because 
“...once a case is in procedure, a number of contending forces come into 
play...” specifically employer counter-mobilization (Moore, 2004, p.13).  This 
is a crucial point. 
 
Furthermore, Hyman contends that the central issues in interest 
representation are “autonomy, legitimacy and efficacy” (1997, p.310):- 
autonomy of the workplace representative or wider union from the 
employer; legitimacy sustained by a “record of ‘delivering the goods’” (ibid) 
and efficacy in terms of union effectiveness.  In a situation where the ‘goods’ 
are delivered via a third party and where ‘independence’ is compromised by 
a hostile employer there are logical questions raised regarding interest 
representation in such workplaces.  Taking the issue further, Simms 
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concludes that the “sustainability of union organising campaigns rests on 
... [a] ... combination of interest formation and representation both within 
and beyond the workplace” (Simms, 2007a p. 450).  This requires a belief 
that the union “may provide an effective voice” and also access for activists 
to the resources and leadership of the wider union (Simms, 2007b, p.132).  
There must be difficulties with the latter in situations where there is no 
collective bargaining, no engagement with the union by the employer, no 
provisions in Irish legislation for access or training and where employer 
hostility amounts to counter-mobilisation.  
 
Moore’s 2005 work also establishes a “relationship between legislation and 
industrial practice” (p.363) via a survey of employers.  She finds that where 
the scope of bargaining was limited to core issues in the recognition 
agreement, then it seldom expanded beyond that.  This is important as it is 
evidence of the procedure having influence beyond the immediate question 
it sought to settle.  In an Irish context, where the procedure already limits 
outcome by not providing for collective bargaining, are there also even 
further limiting possibilities? 
 
4.10                                                                                                                                 
Research Questions 
 
Research questions evolve from both the theory and the prior research 
outlined above.  They suggest the possibility of a two-fold effect on workers 
subsequent to participation in the statutory procedures laid down in the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2001.  There is the effect, possibly a 
constraint, of the written outcome of the procedure, the Labour Court 
Recommendation.  There exists also the possibility of the process itself 
having an effect, such that it impacts on workers’ perceptions of unions and 
trade unionism; that it fails to encourage belief in collective agency and that 
it implicitly accepts if not encourages employer counter-mobilisation and 
hostility.  If  
 
… the statutory procedure [in the UK] cannot guarantee meaningful 
bargaining in the face of employer opposition: ultimately this has to 
come from union organisation in the workplace  
(McKay et al, 2006, p.99) 
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 Then, what can be said of Ireland? Thus the purpose of my thesis is to 
explore this two-fold effect in an Irish context.  My main research question 
is therefore: -  
 
What effect does participation in the procedures provided under the 2001 Act 
have on workers and their trade unions in Ireland?  
 
Ancillary questions include: - 
 
• What kind of trade unionism or collective bargaining results for those 
who have come through the procedures?   
• Do workers remain in membership and remain active in trade unions 
after going through this procedure? 
• In what way might the 2001 Act conflict with mobilisation theory, the 
organising model of trade unionism, ideas explored above regarding 
interest representation and collective agency? 
• The 2001 Act provides that the Labour Court may determine the 
material issues in dispute; around what issues will workers 
subsequently organise?   
• Is this procedure a facilitator of employer hostility?  
• Does the 2001 Act provide trade union recognition ‘by the back door’ 
or otherwise? 
• Is a legislative approach the best or only means of dealing with trade 
union recognition rows?    
 
Despite the relatively short time span between the promulgation of the Act 
in 2001 and the effective abandonment of its procedures in 2007, there 
exists nonetheless a compact body of literature on the subject.  D’Art & 
Turner (2006) use two case studies to examine the effectiveness of the 2001 
Act “in creating conditions for union recognition” (p.165). While 
acknowledging the small sample size they conclude that the Act is 
“inadequate” in “facilitating members seeking union representation and 
recognition” (p.178).  Their earlier work (D’Art & Turner, 2005) surveyed full 
time union officials from eight trade unions and also concluded that the Act 
was inadequate.  Otherwise the focus of prior research is on documentary 
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analysis of some of the Labour Court Recommendations (Doherty, 2009; 
Doherty, 2013; Higgins, C., 2001; Sheehan, 2004) and the effect of the 
Ryanair judgments (Doherty, 2007; Dobbins, 2007a; Sheehan, 2007a and 
2012b).  Viewing the 2001 Act in conjunction with or as part of union 
renewal approaches such as the organising model seldom features, Turner 
et al, (2013) and Jackson (2007) are two rare examples.  Only the latter goes 
beyond the Labour Court Recommendations to look at the workers involved, 
albeit in just one case.  This thesis seeks to broaden this knowledge of the 
effects of the 2001 Act by examining all of the Labour Court 
Recommendations but also by uniquely seeing beyond the 
Recommendations, to look at the long term effects and to also look right 
into the workplace to those who must live with the consequences of the 
2001 Act. 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 5                                                                                                                                      
“The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men” 
 
The best-laid schemes o' mice an' men 
Gang aft agley, (Go often awry) 
An' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain, 
For promis'd joy! 
(Robert Burns, 1785) 
 
This chapter is in three parts. The “best-laid schemes” section in 5.1  
outlines and justifies the research questions and methodology decisions 
taken and while “nought but grief an’ pain” might be an exaggeration, 5.2 
will deal with what did go awry including any adjustments made along the 
way and finally in 5.3 a full account of the data collection. 
 
5.1 
“The Best-laid Schemes” 
 
5.1.1 -The Research Questions 
Research questions evolved from both the theory and the prior research 
outlined in the previous chapter, in particular ideas generated from a study 
of mobilisation theory (Tilly, 1978; Kelly, 1998); of the organising model of 
trade unionism (Simms, 2007a, 2007b; Heery et al, 2000b) and of the 
effects of the statutory union recognition procedure in the UK (McKay et al, 
2006; Moore, 2004; Moore, 2005). In addition, Markowitz demonstrates that 
“successful organizing campaigns do more than add members”; they are 
“also integral for shaping workers’ perceptions and actions within unions” 
(2000, p.163).  Start as one means to continue perhaps, so if workers’ initial 
encounter with trade unionism involves a lengthy formal Labour Court 
procedure, is this the kind of unionism they will come to expect? How will 
they mobilise or learn to be organised as per the organising model?  After all 
“how unions define their role during the early stages of establishing their 
presence in a workplace can have fundamental consequences for future 
effectiveness in interest representation (Markowitz, 2000)” (Simms, 2007a, 
p.442).  The main research question thus defined was a concern with the 
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effect of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 on workers and 
their trade unions specifically seeking to answer the hypothesis that 
participation in the Act’s procedures militated against worker activism.  
  
5.1.2 - Major Signposts 
There were thus three main areas on which to focus: - a) a broad, general 
knowledge of all of the cases taken; the nature of the actors involved; the 
nature of the recommendations issued by the Labour Court; b) an 
understanding of the nature of collective bargaining and of worker activism 
which arose in workplaces subsequent to taking cases and finally c) getting 
to grips with why this was so.  At a very basic level and taking a positivist 
approach to both ontology and epistemology, it was decided that the answer 
to the first of these would be observable and could be gathered 
systematically and objectively.  It would be possible to take Dunlop’s (1958) 
system of industrial relations for example and count the actors – the 
number and type of employments involved and the numbers of unionised 
workers before and after the processing of cases including any 
improvements in conditions and by means of induction generalise about the 
effect of the 2001 Act on workers and unions.   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that this type of analysis had to be done and 
would be useful information, it still could not answer the main research 
question in its entirety.  Two problems arose.  Firstly, counting the numbers 
of members before and after engagement with a procedure does not prove 
causality, does not guarantee that it is the procedure which is responsible 
for the change in levels, if any, and, as with any social process it would not 
be possible to remove or ‘control’ for extraneous issues which might have 
had an effect, redundancy for example.   In addition, in terms of trade 
union renewal and moves towards formal mobilising strategies, mere 
counting of members would not suffice given the current distinction 
between recruitment and organising nor would it contribute to an 
understanding of what exactly caused any changes. Such counting however 
does serve a purpose, that of providing “major signposts” (Plowman, 1999, 
p.37) and of situating cases for further more qualitative examination 
suitable to an evolving social process.  
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5.1.3 - Complex Social Phenomena 
To reach an understanding of the nature of collective bargaining and of 
worker activism required something more than an examination of the 
Labour Court Recommendations and subsequent levels of membership. 
Thus an ethnographic approach was chosen with case study seeming the 
ideal choice because of the need “to understand complex social phenomena” 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ worker activism was affected by participation in this 
statutory procedure (Yin, 2009, p.4). It was hoped a case study would also 
provide the means “to deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, 
artifacts, interviews, and observations” (Yin, 2009, p.12).  The availability of 
such a variety of evidence has made case study a popular research strategy 
in industrial relations; voluminous paper work and a plethora of actors at 
all levels meant data could be collected in different ways.   Flanders’ and 
later Ahlstrand’s work at Fawley, and Lane & Roberts’ study of the strike at 
Pilkington’s are some classic examples (Ahlstrand, 1990; Flanders, 1964; 
Lane & Roberts, 1971).  The data in many of these studies were collected 
via long term observation, which, although ideal, was not an option here.  
Being a part-time student with a full-time job provided its own constraints 
but in addition understanding how the process affected the workers 
required a look back at events past as well as an understanding of the 
current position. A strategy rich in opportunity for other methods was 
therefore required. 
 
5.1.4 - Mixed Methods 
As both quantitative and qualitative data were required, a mixed methods 
approach was adopted.  The figure on the next page depicts the main 
decisions on methods. 
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Figure 5.1 – Depiction of mixed methods employed 
 
 
Starting at the outer level, it was decided data collection must start with 
assembly of a list of all of those workplaces who had availed of the full 
procedures laid down in the 2001 Act up to and including Labour Court 
hearings.20  These had to be examined to determine the date and type of 
each hearing; the contents of the recommendation; the trade union referring 
and the substantive issues in the case.  In addition the nature of each 
workplace, its main economic activity, country of origin and a description of 
the workers were considered important factors to be examined.  
Determining levels of union membership, whether or not workers stayed in 
unions after taking cases could only be determined by examination of union 
membership records. Determining whether or not collective bargaining was 
conducted at such workplaces and/or the extent of worker activism could 
not be determined by such counting. It was felt some of this could be 
achieved by means of a survey of the union staff currently responsible for 
those workplaces which had come through the procedure asking them to 
20 Data collection cannot start at the level of the ‘voluntary leg’ as for reasons of 
confidentiality the LRC may not divulge the employments involved at that level.  
There is no such stricture at the level of Labour Court hearings. 
 
73 
                                           
account for the collective bargaining arrangements at each workplace and 
levels of activism of the members thereat.  Self-administered questionnaires 
were deemed suitable as the respondents’ ability to “see the questions” and 
their order was not a problem here (De Leeuw, 2008, p.314).  This then was 
the data collection activity at the next level; the population for the survey 
being all of those workplaces where the relevant workers were still in 
membership of the trade union that originally referred the case. 
 
Measuring “mere frequencies or incidence” however, would not be enough 
when there were “operational links needing to be traced over time” (Yin, 
2009, p.9).  The procedures under examination were in place since 2001 
(though the bulk of activity occurred between 2004 and 2008 – see next 
Chapter) and the data for this thesis needed to be gathered during 2012 
and 2013.  Knowing the numbers of shop stewards for example and the 
extent of collective bargaining some years after the event of itself was 
insufficient. What about ‘how’ and ‘why’ the procedure had whatever impact 
it had?  In addition to the ‘what is the effect’ question posed in the survey, 
there was also a need to understand “the dynamics present within single 
settings” (Eisenhardt, 2002, p.8) which it was felt could only be achieved by 
engaging with those involved.  The next level of data collection thus involved 
assembly where possible of the files relating to the various cases and the 
identification and interviewing of the union staff, activists and members 
involved in a sample of such cases.  
 
Sampling should be purposive with cases chosen for definite reasons.  
Remembering that Section 5(2) of the Act stipulates that the Labour Court 
“shall not provide for arrangements for collective bargaining”, and also 
employers’ contention that the Act would introduce collective bargaining ‘by 
the back door’, at a minimum there should have been one case where no 
collective bargaining took place and one where collective bargaining did take 
place despite the prohibition on recommending it.   Benyon & Blackburn 
(1972, p.6) stipulate that “if the research aims at developing valid 
generalizations it must be based upon a comparative analysis” then some 
‘matching’ cases should be included where newly organised workplaces that 
did not use the procedure in their struggle for union recognition, win or 
lose, or rather, win and lose.  In other words, it was decided to select one or 
two cases from each quadrant below: - 
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 Figure 5.2 – Case Selection by Purposive Sampling 
 
Case taken under the 2001 Act 
Collective Bargaining – NO 
 
Case taken under the 2001 Act 
Collective Bargaining – YES 
 
Case not taken under the 2001 Act 
Collective Bargaining – NO 
 
Case not taken under the 2001 Act 
Collective Bargaining - YES 
 
Ideally cases should have come from the same industrial sectors with due 
regard for a balance between workplace size and type, ownership, economic 
activity and so forth but it was decided that precise decisions on this would 
be taken after the assembling of the population, the full list of cases taken 
under the 2001 Act.  
 
5.1.5 - ‘Organisedness’ 
Thus far it was determined that the main research question concerned the 
impact of the 2001 Act on trade union organising and that it would be 
approached from both a quantitative and qualitative perspective: - the 
assembly of information on all cases; the use of a self-administered 
questionnaire to determine levels of collective bargaining and union 
activism in each case, and finally, case studies including those referred and 
those not referred to get to ‘why’ this was so.  How exactly to go about 
measuring trade union organising or activism?  I could have used either 
mobilising theory or the organising model but problematic elements in each 
for this particular study have been identified mostly to do with their 
usefulness in understanding continuous and everyday union activity.   In 
the absence of one word which described what needed to be measured and 
thinking of Blackburn and Prandy’s “unionateness” i.e., “a measure of the 
commitment of a body to the general principles and ideology of trade 
unionism” (1965, p.112) the word ‘organisedness’ was coined meaning the 
extent of the commitment of a unionised workplace to being a “‘self-
organised’ organised (sic) workplace” (Gall, 2006, p.3). 
 
‘Organisedness’ had to have a number of distinguishing features; a set of 
attributes which defined the ‘organised’ workplace from one where the trade 
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union model might more resemble a service (Heery et al, 2000b). There 
should be an emphasis on justice-and-dignity type issues with a collective 
focus as opposed to bread-and-butter issues and/or individual grievances.  
There should be less of a reliance on third party referrals and more of an 
inclination to resolve matters in-house.  There should be a degree of 
autonomy evident within the group and at shop steward level and yet some 
sense of belonging to the wider trade union, if not some involvement 
therein. Thus the questionnaire (See Appendix J) was designed to include 
questions about the most recent issue raised in the workplace, post referral, 
such as:- 
 
• What was the nature of the issue – could it be described as ‘bread-
and-butter’ (i.e., pay) or ‘justice-and-dignity? 
• Did it affect an individual, a minority, the majority or the entire 
bargaining unit? 
• How was the matter resolved – by the workers in-house; negotiated 
by the shop steward; negotiated by the FTO or resolved by third party 
intervention? 
• Is there currently a representative structure at this workplace and/or 
any involvement with the wider union movement? 
 
5.1.6 - Participants 
As this student is also a trade union organiser, personal experience in that 
role informed some of the decisions taken regarding the style of 
questionnaire to be issued.  For example, it would have been ideal to have 
also included questions regarding union density before and after the taking 
of the case.  This was ruled out however on the basis that to ensure the 
high levels of participation which were eventually achieved, the 
questionnaire had to be one which could be completed quickly by the union 
official with current responsibility for the workplace without reference to 
files, membership lists or the detailed history of the case.  The decision to 
exclude questions on membership levels was fortuitous as it emerged that, 
particularly in SIPTU, few if any of the current union officials had had 
responsibility for those members during the processing of the cases under 
the 2001 Act.  They would have been unaware of previous membership or 
density levels.   
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 For reasons of speed and cost, it was also decided to use an on-line 
questionnaire (Survey Monkey) and where possible to identify and contact 
individual organisers directly through personal contacts rather than writing 
to the various trade unions’ head-quarters asking to have the survey 
directed to the relevant personnel.  However in the case of three unions I 
had no personal contact and they were invited to participate by letter to 
their General Secretary.  A copy of the e-mail inviting my own colleagues in 
SIPTU individually to participate is to be found in Appendix E; the letter to 
other unions in Appendix F and a hard copy of the questionnaire for SIPTU 
staff in Appendix J.  The questionnaire for other unions was amended 
slightly to allow for their differing nomenclature and structures. 
 
To not interview employers was a deliberate decision.  The cases under 
investigation were all cases where employers had vehemently opposed the 
representation of workers by their trade union.  I could not seek interviews 
without revealing that I was a union official of long-standing and I felt this 
would have coloured how employers responded or, more likely, did not 
respond.  It might also have been more difficult to deal with my own biases 
in such interviews.  In addition it would signal to employers that I was also 
likely to be interviewing the union members involved, their staff, which 
might cause trouble for the members, something I was keen to avoid.  In 
any event, this thesis concerns the effect of the 2001 Act on workers and 
their trade unions and that remained the focus. 
 
5.1.7 - Some Distinctions 
Industrial relations literature refers to full-time staff in trade unions 
variously as organisers, officers and officials sometimes with little enough 
by way of distinction, at least until recent years when the term ‘organiser’ 
has come to indicate a specialist role in green-field union organising 
campaigns.  For purposes of clarity then, the remainder of this thesis will 
retain that definition of ‘organiser’.  In addition the term union ‘official’ will 
mean a more general on-going representational role often described as FTO 
in the literature while a union senior ‘officer’ will refer to one with senior or 
national responsibilities, usually without direct involvement in campaigns. 
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I distinguish between ‘referring’ and ‘servicing’ officials where ‘referring’ 
means the official who referred the original case to the Labour Court and 
where ‘servicing’ means the official who had or has current responsibility for 
that workplace.  It was expected that in some cases these would be the 
same personnel and also that the servicing official might also mean the 
official who would potentially have responsibility if those workers were still 
in membership. 
 
The term shop steward implies an elected representative of union members.  
In the early stages of union recognition or organising campaigns however, 
leaders emerge who have not been elected and to distinguish between the 
two roles these latter leaders will be referred to in this thesis as activists.   
 
5.1.8 - Interviews  
The interviews were designed to build on the information provided in the 
Labour Court Recommendations and in the survey of union officials, and to 
focus more qualitatively on the personal experiences of the members, shop 
stewards and officials involved in recognition campaigns; if they felt in 
control of events; how employers reacted; how decisions were reached; how 
they interacted with each other and how they felt with the benefit of 
hindsight. It was decided that the following individuals should all be 
interviewed, where possible:- 
 
• The union official who referred the case and the union official with 
current responsibility for the members at that workplace 
• The shop steward or activist involved at the time of the referral or 
initial recruitment plus the current shop steward. 
• At least two rank-and-file members one of which in membership at 
the time of the referral and one newer member 
 
The interview schedule for each group of interviewees is included in the 
appendices – Appendix G for union officials; Appendix H for union 
members, activists, shop stewards.  
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5.1.9 - Analysis 
Bell (1987) advises that the means of analysis of data should be considered 
at the same time as the methods of collection of the data.  Analysis of the 
Labour Court Recommendations and of the survey was expected to be 
straight forward.  Simple counting would produce the “quasi statistics” 
required (Maxwell, 2005, p.112) such as the number of cases in each sector; 
which unions took cases and when; levels of union membership before and 
after referral or over time; issues raised and where and how resolved; 
whether or not there is a shop steward and/or representative structure at 
each workplace.  
 
The interviews required a different approach but it was expected that it 
would be possible to see patterns in the data around which to build a 
framework, a framework constructed from what Barbour describes as the 
“researchers’ a priori codes” (2007, p.115), in this case this student’s own 
ideas about ‘organisedness’.  There should also emerge the “in-vivo codes” 
(ibid.) or ideas or explanations that emerge from the data, from the people 
involved.  Patterns might be discerned concerning individual leadership 
styles of FTOs (Kelly & Heery, 1994) or shop stewards (Batstone et al, 1977); 
the type or intensity of employer hostility encountered.  Less substantive 
and more “theoretical categories” (Maxwell, 2005, p.97) around mobilization 
theory (Kelly, 1998) or power in the workplace (Martin, 2003) were also 
anticipated.  Maxwell’s warning regarding the need to “rule out specific 
plausible alternatives” (2005, p.107) was heeded by anticipating that the 
roles played by FTOs and shop stewards might be key.  Care was taken to 
also watch for other factors and for “discrepant evidence and negative 
cases” that might contradict the original hypothesis but which could not be 
ignored (Maxwell, 2005, p.112). 
 
5.1.10 - Was I the right person to undertake this project? 
I have worked in the trade union movement for almost 30 years and so I 
had to consider whether or not I was the right person to undertake this 
thesis, whether my insider status and possible biases could be problematic 
in terms of ethics, reliability and validity.  Taking insider status first, it had 
many positives.  Access to union files and the levels of personal honesty 
required from colleagues was unlikely to be given to a researcher from 
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outside the organisation.  From an ethical point of view, it was important 
that I protected members in situations where employers were still hostile to 
their union involvement and ensure that nothing in the way I conducted my 
research could result in adverse consequences for them.  Experience helped 
in that regard along with knowledge of how unions work. Of course it 
increased the possibility of bias in a number of ways, in particular that I 
might have favoured the views of union officials such as myself, where they 
conflicted with those of either senior officers or members of the union.  I 
hoped to eliminate this threat to validity by including as broad as possible a 
range of other respondents and by being unequivocal about any possible 
biases I might have had.  While I was and still am certainly biased in favour 
of workers’ right to collectivise or unionise, this was not seen as a problem 
as it is only workers seeking to do this who were the focus of the study.  
Where real issues of bias might have arisen was in regard to the procedures 
provided under the legislation.  I cannot claim to be entirely neutral about 
the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, but I hope I have been 
“objective and critical in the best sense” (Thompson & Bannen, 1985, p.5).  
Such an approach was critical to achieving a genuine understanding of the 
effects of the Act and to making sound recommendations regarding its 
retention, amendment or dissolution; the reason for my conducting the 
study in the first place. 
 
5.2                                                                                                                                            
“Gang aft agley” 
 
I was beset by all the usual difficulties encountered by students, some I 
expected and some unanticipated. 
 
5.2.1 - Anticipated Problems 
It was anticipated that some difficulties might arise in getting information 
from the LRC regarding who took cases under the ‘voluntary leg’ and when.  
At an early stage the LRC confirmed that for reasons of confidentiality it 
would not be possible to provide a list of all workplaces subject to a referral.  
Writing to all unions asking for those who had referred cases to take part in 
a survey was considered and rejected as such self-selection was likely to 
give a low return.  It was decided instead to start the data collection at the 
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second or ‘fall-back’ part of the process, at the Labour Court, examining 
those cases where the LRC had been unable to resolve the issues in dispute 
and/or where trade unions referred the matter directly to the Court usually 
because the employer had refused to participate in the ‘voluntary leg’.  This 
also had the effect of reducing the population to a more manageable 137 
Labour Court hearings as opposed to the 400+ referrals to the LRC. It also 
afforded the opportunity of a written document from which to start, the 
Labour Court Recommendations. It was then necessary to source all of the 
Recommendations achieved by means of searching the Labour Court 
website (www.labourcourt.ie).  A full list of all Labour Court 
Recommendations issued under the 2001 Act is compiled and included in 
Appendix D. The recommendations name the employer and the trade union 
involved, but no more, and therefore necessitated some considerable 
searching to identify the union official who might have had current 
responsibility in each case. 
  
It was anticipated that some of the workplaces might involve small numbers 
of workers and combined with rural locations and the passage of time that 
the numbers available to interview in each case might be few.  This proved 
to be a more severe problem than anticipated particularly as the numbers 
remaining in membership of unions was lower than expected. 
 
5.2.2 - A change of heart 
I had to change my mind about trying to compare those workplaces which 
had taken cases under the 2001 Act with those that had not because 
suitable comparators were not easily found when trying to control for 
economic activity, worker occupations and gender, union strategy, timing. I 
had started the process in one trade union where there were two 
workplaces which were very similar and where one had used the procedures 
under the 2001 Act and one had not.  However on closer examination there 
were so many other variables that did not match that I felt it could not 
safely be construed that it was the use of the 2001 Act procedures which 
defined the differences between them.  I also began to realise that to really 
understand the effects of the 2001 Act I should rather concentrate on those 
workplaces which had used the procedures.  In addition, once the data 
regarding membership and activism levels were assembled, a comparison of 
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those workplaces where there were high levels of membership, activism 
and/or collective bargaining with those where there was not began to look 
exciting. 
 
5.2.3 - Unanticipated Problems 
There were three problems I had not anticipated.  Firstly the tracing of 
cases from the information provided in the Labour Court Recommendations 
back to the referring union and from there to the union officials who had or 
ought to have current responsibility was more difficult and took a much 
longer period of time than anticipated.  Companies closed, changed or 
recorded incomplete names, merged or were forgotten, or membership 
records staff in the various unions never heard of them.  Some workplaces 
comprised just one or two members and had not a servicing official 
assigned to them or they had not contacted the union for a long time.  On 
my original timetable I had blithely ticked “Assemble population and 
contact details for survey” as a task I would complete in the first month 
along with several other setting up tasks.  It actually took three full months’ 
work just in my own union SIPTU and delayed the thesis considerably.  
 
A problem arose with one of the survey questions which is explored further 
in Chapter 8 but briefly mentioned here.  Question 3 asked respondents to 
categorise the workplace according to whether: -  
 
A. I have had no contact with and/or was unaware of this workplace 
B. This union has some individual/confidential members who seldom 
contact the union 
C. This union represents members there on an individual basis only 
D. This union has an active core of members here but no bargaining 
rights 
E. This union has full bargaining rights at this workplace 
 
Once the case studies commenced I found a problem with options B) and C) 
in relation to D).  Where union officials selected option B) or C) and correctly 
reported that they represented members there on an individual basis only 
or had little contact with them, this could mask the presence of an active 
core of members at that location.  I should have kept questions regarding 
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representation separate from questions regarding activism.  It caused 
difficulties later categorising workplaces. 
 
The third difficulty is somewhat related to the second.  I had hoped to select 
cases for further study from amongst each of the categories above so when 
they proved unreliable I had to have a re-think.  In addition the lack of 
members and/or contact with them in category A) cases meant there was 
sometimes nobody to interview.  A failure or refusal to participate on the 
part of a very few union officials compounded this difficulty.  I had intended 
doing no more than six or seven case studies, hoping to cover all of the 
categories above and within specific economic sectors to allow for 
comparison.  In the end there were ten cases where the union official was 
willing and able to participate, in a timely way, and to encourage members 
to do likewise, so I worked with what I could get and all ten were included.   
 
I had hoped to have a wide range of sources in each case: - the Labour 
Court Recommendation; the union’s file; media coverage; interviews with 
both the referring and servicing officials, shop stewards, activists and rank 
and file members.  Such a variety of sources in each case would, I thought, 
contribute well to the “development of converging lines of inquiry, a process 
of triangulation and corroboration” (Yin, 2009, p.116).  Once more however, 
category A) and even B) cases could not have such a range of sources by 
their very definition and there was a reduced range at small workplaces and 
no files or media coverage in other situations. I hoped however that the 
large number of cases would help to compensate for these problems. 
 
5.3                                                                                                                                                           
The “promis’d joy” 
 
The “promis’d joy” comes no doubt with the completion of the data 
collection and the writing of the thesis itself.  To summarise, the data 
collection eventually consisted of:- 
 
1. Assembly of a database of 137 Labour Court Recommendations and 
identification of the workplaces, trade unions and servicing and 
referring officials in each case, conducted from April to June 2012 
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and from January to June 2013. A full list of the Recommendations 
is contained in Appendix D. 
 
2. Analysis of the Labour Court Recommendations, company websites, 
union files and newspapers to determine the nature of each 
enterprise, employer and group of claimants involved. 
 
3. A survey of the servicing officials identified above.  Each union was 
surveyed in turn once all their cases were identified.  The final 
response was received and the survey closed for each union as 
follows: -  
 
16th May 2012 – SIPTU 
9th January 2013 – MANDATE 
7th March 2013 – CWU 
22nd July 2013 – IBOA 
13th August 2013 – UNITE 
16th August 2013 – TEEU 
 
4. Response rates for each union are dealt with in Chapter 7. See 
Appendix E for the e-mail requesting SIPTU staff to participate; 
Appendix F for the letter of invitation to other unions and Appendix J 
for the questionnaire itself. 
 
5. Ten case studies to include examination of union files and 36 semi-
structured interviews with union officials, shop stewards, activists 
and rank-and-file members.  Interviews took place between January 
to September 2013.  The interview schedules are attached in 
Appendix G for union officials and in Appendix H for shop stewards 
and members.  A background note on each of the case study 
workplaces is contained in Appendix I.  Appendix K lists the 
interviewees and dates of interview while Appendix L is the consent 
form used. 
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5.3.1 - Confidentiality and Anonymity 
In order to ensure discretion for trade unions regarding membership levels 
in various workplaces and to protect both union members and union staff, 
all identities have been obscured in writing about the survey and the case 
studies.  Thus for the chapter on the publicly available Labour Court 
Recommendations there is no issue about confidentiality, so each case is 
referred to by its Labour Court Recommendation number, employer and 
trade union.  Later chapters that report on membership levels, the survey 
and interviews, only refer to workplaces by names assigned by myself; and 
to participants as member, activist, shop steward, referring or servicing 
official as appropriate, and with no mention of which trade union was 
involved. 
 
5.4 – The data and analysis chapters 
 
This work turns now to reporting on and analysis of said data and is 
organised as follows: - 
  
Chapter 6 examines all of the Labour Court Recommendations issued under 
the 2001 Act from a macro point of view, assessing the overall coverage and 
effects of the Recommendations.  Chapter 7 starts on the micro 
examination, detailing the results of tracing each workplace from the 
Labour Court Recommendations back to the union that referred the case 
and the results of the survey of union officials regarding the nature of union 
activity and collective bargaining at those workplaces.  Chapter 8 deals with 
the processes – the recruitment/organising campaigns; the referral to and 
the attendance at the Court; the views and concerns of the members, 
activists and staff who were involved in the process, as expressed at a series 
of interviews.  While each chapter also analyses the data it details, Chapter 
9 blends these three strands of data collection by returning to the research 
questions to assess how these were addressed. 
 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 6                                                                                                                         
Return to an Irish Solution to an Irish Problem  
 
6.1 – Introduction 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the effects on trade unions and their members 
subsequent to their participation in procedures provided for in the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, the 2001 Act.  These 
procedures are utilised in situations where employers refuse to engage in 
collective bargaining with the trade union representing the workers.  The 
literature review and prior research explored in Chapter 4 already define the 
need to see the outcomes of such statutory procedures in terms of both 
process and outcome.  The written outcome can have a constraining effect, 
perhaps limiting the range of issues around which workers organise or 
about which they can bargain (Moore, 2005).  The process itself can also 
have an effect, teaching workers early lessons about employer hostility 
(Gall, 2010), about the law (McKay et al, 2006) about collective action and 
about unions (Simms, 2007a, 2007b; Moore, 2004).  That such lessons 
have lasting effect is demonstrated by Markowitz’s study (2000). For the 
purposes of this thesis then, outcomes need to be examined in three ways: 
the written outcome provided by the Labour Court in its Recommendations, 
Decisions or Determinations issued after each hearing (and explained in 
Chapter 3); secondly, the outcome in terms of membership, do these 
workers stay in unions afterwards?  Finally there must be an examination 
of the outcome in terms of the nature of worker activism and collective 
bargaining which is subsequently to be found in each workplace and how 
the process impacts on these.   
 
The outcomes and process referred to above are essentially micro issues, 
examining the effects of the 2001 Act within unions and workplaces and 
explored in the later chapters.  It is also necessary however to view the 
effects of the legislation in a macro sense, to explore the contribution the 
Act makes to the aggravation or the amelioration of the ‘Irish problem’ 
outlined in Chapter 2.  This chapter deals with the macro question by 
examining the written outcome, the Labour Court Recommendations, and 
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establishing who is affected by the 2001 Act before establishing what that 
effect might be.   
 
Section 6.2 below explains how the data for this chapter was assembled and 
then tabulates the main results.  Section 6.3 looks more closely at elements 
of the data chiefly discussing the implications for Irish industrial relations 
against the background of its peculiarities as set out in Chapter 2 – An Irish 
solution to an Irish problem. 
 
6.2 – Labour Court Recommendations, Decisions and 
Determinations 
 
The Labour Court Recommendations, Decisions and Determinations were 
sourced on the Labour Court’s website – www.labourcourt.ie – then 
analysed and used to assemble a database, stored on Excel, detailing the 
subject; employer; union; issues raised and outcome in each case.  To this 
was added additional information regarding employer, country of origin, 
economic sector, worker occupation and social class.  Little of this latter set 
of information was directly available in the Recommendations themselves 
and was instead assembled via examination of companies’ documents filed 
at the Companies Registration Office (CRO), companies’ websites and union 
files. Once collated the information was then analysed, firstly according to 
the main elements of each Recommendation: - subject; preliminary issues; 
employer; claimants and their unions.  The data was then further analysed 
in 6.3 below to understand their contribution to Irish industrial relations.  
 
6.2.1 – Subject  
As outlined in detail in Chapter 3, each Recommendation, Decision or 
Determination, under the heading “Subject”, will define whether it is:- 
 
 a preliminary hearing  
 a referral from the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) 
 a union application 
 a recommendation or decision arising from a previous hearing,  
 a request for a determination 
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Table 6.1 below outlines the number and type of hearings for each year 
between 2002 and 2011.  The Court website lists no hearings for 2012 or 
2013.   
Table 6.1 – No. of hearings under IR Act 2001 by Subject and by Year 
Year 
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 Total 
Preliminary 
Hearing (S.2) 
 
0 2 1 2 2 - - - - - 7 
Referral from 
LRC (S.2) 
 
0 2 11 23 21 8 2 0 1 1 69 
Union 
Application (S.2) 
 
2 4 7 4 9 1 0 0 1 1 29 
Arising from 
previous hearing 
0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 
Request for 
Determination 
(S.6) 
0 2 2 13 5 4 2 0 0 0 28 
TOTALS 2 11 23 43 37 13 4 0 2 2 137 
Source: Labour Court – www.labourcourt.ie 
 
Although there were 137 hearings in total under the 2001 Act, just 97 
separate workplaces were involved as some attended on more than one 
occasion, see the example of Ashford Castle in Chapter 3.  Of the 137 
hearings, just seven were listed as preliminary hearings (though others were 
in effect the same but were not coded as such). The majority, 69, were 
Referrals from the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) with only 29 being 
direct applications from trade unions.  Four were hearings which arose from 
previous hearings and 28 were requests for a determination.  Comparing 
referrals from the LRC with direct union applications, unions tended to use 
the former.  Of the 29 direct applications, 24 were as a result of employers 
refusing or failing to engage with the ‘voluntary leg’ at the LRC. While there 
was some engagement in the other five cases this was inadequate according 
to the unions involved.  There were no LRC referrals in 2002; the tardiness 
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of the process under the 2001 Act and prior to its amendment in 2004 
would have meant few enough cases could have come through the 
procedure in time for a hearing in that year. Between 2004 and 2008 
however, the majority of all Recommendations, excluding preliminary 
hearings and determinations, arose from referrals from the LRC where 
unions had opted to try the voluntary process in the first instance and 
where there was some engagement but ultimately a failure to resolve some 
or all of the issues in dispute.  The number of hearings increases 
substantially in 2004 often attributed to the improvements in the 2004 Act 
though there were also increases between 2002 and 2003.   The numbers 
after 2008 are miniscule by comparison with only one union application 
and one LRC referral each in 2010 and 2011 reflecting the aforementioned 
“fall-out” from the Ryanair case.  
 
6.2.2 – Preliminary Issues 
The first task of the Court is to determine if all necessary pre-conditions 
have been satisfied as per Section 2(1) of the 2001 Act detailed in Chapter 
3.  In addition, as a result of the Ryanair High Court case (Ryanair v The 
Labour Court and IMPACT [2006] 1 ELR challenging DECP051 Ryanair and 
IMPACT), the Court must also first establish if there is a trade dispute in 
existence.  Although only seven hearings were listed with preliminary issues 
as ‘Subject’ and reported on in a Decision, in a further 30 hearings, the 
Court had cause to decide on preliminary issues where the employer 
disputed the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.  If the parties agreed, or if 
neither side raised a preliminary issue then the Court may make mention of 
this as for example: - “both sides agreed the matter was properly before the 
Court” (LCR20080 Global Tele Sales and CWU). As cases are referred by 
trade unions, implying their belief that all pre-conditions are met, 
objections will be raised by employers.  Table 6.2 below details the 
frequency with which Section 2(1) pre-conditions were used by employers to 
challenge the Labour Court’s jurisdiction and the extent to which the Court 
upheld these challenges.  
 
Most employer objections to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction were made 
under Section 2(1)(a); effectively employers sought to prove that they did 
engage in collective bargaining and/or that there were dispute resolution 
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procedures in place which had not failed.  The first leg of this section was 
easier for employers, easier that is to demonstrate that they did engage in 
collective bargaining.  Six of the nine cases where the Labour Court upheld 
the employers’ objections involved ‘poaching’, a union seeking to represent 
workers at a workplace where the employer already recognised another 
union.  The second leg regarding internal dispute resolution procedures was 
more difficult and employers were far less likely to prove their case.  This is 
explored further on in this chapter. 
 
Table 6.2 - Preliminary Issues Raised and Upheld under Section 2(1) – 2001 Act 
 No. of 
Cases 
Upheld Not 
Upheld 
It is not the practice of the employer to engage in collective 
bargaining and …  (S.2(1)a) 
11 9 2 
… the internal disputes resolution procedure normally used has 
failed  (S.2(1)a) 
16 2 14 
The employer failed to obey a provision of the Code – S.2(1)b 4 0 4 
The union frustrated the employer in observance – S.2(1)c 2 0 2 
The union has not had recourse to industrial action – S.2(1)d 3 0 3 
There is a trade dispute (after DECP051) 9 2 7 
Union is not representative 2 0 2 
Other 2 0 2 
 
6.2.3 - Employer Main Economic Activity 
The Labour Court Recommendations are not consistent in providing the 
nature of a firm’s economic activity.  Twenty cases give no information 
though several concern household names whose economic activity is well 
known (Dunnes Stores, Ryanair, etc.). Examination of company records 
registered at the CRO and company websites were used to supplement the 
information provided in the Recommendations as a means of determining 
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the firm’s main economic activity.  These were then categorised according to 
NACE Rev2.2 as per Table 6.3 below. 
  
Table 6.3 – Employer by Main Economic Activity, NACE Rev2.2 
 
In one case the main economic activity could not be determined.  Of the 96 
firms whose main economic activity could be determined, the largest single 
grouping was in Manufacturing, 34 cases in total amounting to 35%.  The 
other main categories were Transportation & Storage (17%); Wholesale & 
Retail (15%) and Human Health & Social Work (11%). 
 
6.2.4 – Employer Country of Origin 
The Labour Court Recommendations seldom made reference to the country 
of origin of an employer, in just 13 cases was there any reference.  An 
examination of company records and websites was therefore necessary to 
determine the location of the head office in each case.  Of the 137 hearings, 
NACE 
Rev.2 
Industrial Group No. 
Cases 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 
B Mining and quarrying 0 
C Manufacturing 34 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1 
E Water supply, sewerage, waste management  4 
F Construction 1 
G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of vehicles 14 
H Transportation and storage 16 
I Accommodation and food service activities 2 
J Information and communication activities 4 
K Financial and insurance activities 2 
L Real estate activities 1 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 1 
N Administrative and support service activities 3 
O Public administration and defence, social security 0 
P Education 0 
Q Human health and social work activities 11 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 0 
S Other service activities 1 
 Total + 1 unknown 97 
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97 individual firms were involved.  As in Figure 6.1 below, the majority were 
Irish owned (n=66) while the UK, other EU and US firms accounted for 10% 
each.  
 
Figure 6.1 – Country of Origin of All Employers 
 
 
Cross-tabulating employer country of origin and/or employer main 
economic activity with substantive issues or with claimants’ occupations 
failed to demonstrate any correlations. 
 
6.2.5 – Numbers Employed 
Unlike the UK, in Ireland the 2001 Act does not prescribe any membership 
threshold which needs to be taken into consideration, so the numbers 
employed in a firm and/or the number of claimants is not always recorded.  
Of the 97 relevant firms, just less than half of Labour Court 
Recommendations (n=45) make no mention of the numbers employed; even 
fewer, (n=33) give details of the number of claimants.  In only four cases full 
information was provided and a distinction made between the numbers 
employed; the numbers in the grade affected and the number of claimants 
or union members.  So for example in the case of Sanirish (LCR18455 
Sanirish Ltd and SIPTU) there were 50 employees, 43 of whom worked in 
production where the union had 25 members.  Nonetheless the information 
is paltry in most cases and insufficient to determine whether large or small 
firms were more likely to attend at hearings nor prove or disprove the 
contention that unions “often” took cases on behalf of non-members 
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(Doherty, 2009).  The matter is further complicated by the possibility of 
members being ‘lost’ during the process, explored further in the next 
chapter.   
 
6.2.6 – Referring Trade Unions 
Almost 60% of all union members are in the public sector which does not 
usually experience recognition problems so cases taken under the 2001 Act 
are almost exclusively taken in the private sector. The only exceptions to 
this are the Independent Workers’ Union (IWU) case against the Western 
Health Board (one regional health board in what is now the Health Services 
Executive (HSE), the state health system) albeit a case of ‘poaching’   
(LCR18117 Western Health Board and IWU), and the TEEU case in An Bord 
Gáis, a dispute about contracts of service as distinct from contracts for 
service (LCR19750 Bord Gais and TEEU).  Bord Gais does recognise and 
negotiate with trade unions.   Unions taking cases under the 2001 Act 
therefore tend to be those representing private sector workers (see Table 6.4 
below) and to an extent, a certain class of worker, as explored in 6.3.6 
below. 
 
SIPTU is the Union named in 99 of the hearings representing 72% of the 
total. The nearest in terms of usage is MANDATE with about a tenth of 
SIPTU’s involvement.   SIPTU’s lead position in terms of usage of the 
procedures can be explained only partly in terms of its relative size, the 
largest union in Ireland, representing one third of all trade union members 
in unions registered in Ireland.  MANDATE’s relatively lower usage of the 
procedures compared to SIPTU (a tenth of the usage with a third to a 
quarter as many private sector members as SIPTU) can be explained by the 
make-up of its membership – although all private sector and generally in 
retail, roughly 50% are in the larger multiples such as Tesco, Penneys’ and 
Dunnes’ Stores, where they have union recognition and collective 
agreements of long standing.  Their recognition cases tended to arise in 
smaller shops and new areas such as Radio Kerry (LCR17919 Radio Kerry 
and Mandate).   
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Table 6.4 – No. of hearings under IR ACT 2001 by Trade Union 
Trade Union Hearings Workplaces 
Services, Industrial, Professional, Technical Union (SIPTU) 
 
 
99 
 
66 
 
MANDATE Trade Union (MANDATE) 
 
10 
 
8 
Independent Workers’ Union (IWU) 
 
6 
 
6 
Communications Workers’ Union (CWU) 
 
6 
 
5 
AMICUS now UNITE the Union 
 
6 
 
4 
 
Technical, Electrical & Engineering Union (TEEU) 
 
5 
 
4 
Automobile, General Engineering and Mechanical Operatives 
Union (AGEMOU) (now SIPTU) 
2 
 
1 
 
Building & Allied Trades’ Union (BATU) 
 
1 
 
1 
Irish Bank Officials’ Association (IBOA) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
IMPACT Trade Union (IMPACT) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
TOTAL 137 
 
97 
 Source: Labour Court – www.labourcourt.ie 
 
The Irish Bank Officials’ Association (IBOA) is in a similar position to 
MANDATE, its membership comes mostly from the large banks, Bank of 
Ireland, Allied Irish Banks, with which they have long bargained.  Its only 
case under the 2001 Act “differs from the generality of cases investigated” 
according to the Court (Bank of Ireland and IBOA, LCR17745).  It concerned 
the bank’s branch managers who wished to change from a system where 
the Union was “recognised by the Bank as the representative of its members 
in management grades in all matters other than in relation to collective 
bargaining” on pay issues which had heretofore been settled by individual 
assessment (LCR17745 Bank of Ireland and IBOA).  Recognition issues 
tended not to otherwise arise for that union. 
 
Other unions which also represent middle management and/or 
professionals seldom refer such cases.  IMPACT, although the second 
largest union in Ireland has only a tiny private sector membership which 
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includes Ryanair via the affiliation to IMPACT of the Irish Airline Pilots’ 
Association (IALPA) where it took its only case under the 2001 Act. The Irish 
Nurses and Midwives Organisation (INMO formerly INO) is not listed as 
having taken any case under the legislation although it does represent 
workers in the private sector.  That union is however mentioned in 
LCR18440 Hillview Nursing Home and SIPTU where both SIPTU and the INO 
initially submitted a claim jointly under the Act. At the hearing however,  
 
The Home agreed to recognise INO for the purposes of collective 
bargaining on behalf of nursing staff … [but] … was not prepared to 
extend the same recognition to SIPTU on behalf of Carers, Domestic 
Staff, Kitchen Staff and Cooks  
(LRC18440)   
 
Union staff interviewed report that this is a “frequent occurrence” 
particularly in private nursing homes such as this (Frank).  Conversely the 
new Independent Workers’ Union with a tiny membership of a few thousand 
has a relatively high usage of the procedures.  An examination of its six 
cases however shows five of them could be described as territorial or 
‘poaching’ that is, seeking to represent workers in workplaces where other 
unions already have bargaining rights, perhaps reflecting its own start-up 
status (LCR18621; LCR18845; LCR18206; LCR18589; LCR18117). 
   
6.2.7 – Claimants’ Occupations 
The Labour Court Recommendations did not always state the occupation of 
the claimants though it was implied in many instances.  In six cases there 
was no indication of claimants’ occupations. Of the remaining 91 over half 
(47) could be described as operatives; they were food and production 
operatives, drivers, security operatives.  Thirteen cases concerned retail 
workers; 11 described skilled or technical occupations such as service 
engineers and electricians while ten came from the childcare and health 
sectors.  Six cases involved clerical administrative and call centre workers 
while senior salaried workers were claimants in only four cases.  See Figure 
6.2 on the next page. 
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Figure 6.2 – Claimants’ Occupations 
 
6.2.8 – Substantive Issues 
It is not possible to glean from Recommendations the full range of issues 
involved in referrals at the ‘voluntary leg’ or the extent to which issues were 
resolved at Labour Relations Commission prior to Labour Court hearings. It 
can only be demonstrated whether or not Recommendations dealt with 
substantive issues and the nature of those issues. By their very nature, 
substantive issues were not dealt with in either the eight Preliminary 
hearings or in the 28 Determinations.  Of the remaining 101 hearings, 17 
did not result in recommendations on substantive issues either because the 
Labour Court deemed it had no jurisdiction or it found the conditions of the 
workers were not out of line with comparators.  As explained in Chapter 3, 
this latter point would be determined by reference to the evidence supplied 
by each side in their submissions.  Because of the time frame and 
notwithstanding the changes in 2004, unions were inclined to submit a 
lengthy list of issues, up to a dozen, as in LCR18151 Quinn Cement and 
SIPTU and in LCR17919 Radio Kerry and Mandate (LCR17919).  Unions 
preferred “Throwing in the kitchen sink” rather than making several trips 
(Higgins, 2006) despite improvements in timing provided under the 2004 
Act.  The Court made recommendations on substantive issues in 84 
separate Recommendations, each usually referring to four or five issues.  
See Table 6.5 on the next page. 
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Table 6.5 –Most frequently mentioned issues in Labour Court Recommendations 
 
 
The largest single issue dealt with was Pay followed by Grievance & 
Disciplinary Procedures and Sick Pay Schemes.  75% (n=63) of the 
Recommendations mention Pay Increase with a further 25% (n=21) also 
separately mentioning the Application of a National Wage Agreement.  Just 
over half (54%) mentioned Grievance & Disciplinary Procedures (n=45) and 
just under half (48%) (n=40) mentioned Sick Pay Schemes.  Other issues 
raised included Overtime, Roster/Shift Issues; Pensions; Representation, 
each of which featured separately in 20% of the substantive 
Recommendations issued (n= 17, 18).  Less than a quarter of 
Recommendations dealt with just one issue (n=20) and Pay tended to be the 
issue in such single issue cases.  Most cases featured several issues the 
average being between four and five invariably including Pay Increase 
and/or Application of National Wage Agreement.   Where Grievance & 
Disciplinary Procedures were mentioned, in 31 of 46 cases the Court 
directed the employer to put in place procedures in compliance with the 
grievance and disciplinary code (S.I. 146 of 2000) while in a further 15 
cases the Court noted that the employer indicated they would or had 
recently done so. 
 
Where National Wage Agreements, Pay Slips/Contracts or Bullying & 
Harassment were mentioned, the Court ruled in favour of the Union’s claim 
in every case.  As National Wage Agreements are (were) reached by means of 
national level collective bargaining under the Social Partnership system, 
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some employers argued that the Court could not recommend that such 
agreements be implemented as the agreements “provide mechanisms for 
collective bargaining … [which] the Court is precluded … from 
recommending …” (LCR17933 Creagh Transport Ltd and SIPTU).  The Court 
has not ever accepted such arguments on the basis that the terms of the 
National Wage Agreements “can be implemented without the necessity for 
collective bargaining at the level of the enterprise” (ibid.). The Court was 
also more inclined to rule in the Union’s favour on: - Working Hours, 
including a 39 hour week (89%); Sunday or Anti-Social Premia (86%); 
Overtime (82%); Rosters/Shift Patterns/Pay for same (77%); Sick Pay 
Schemes (73%); Pay Increase (73%); Pensions (70%).  
 
Successful outcomes on the substantive issues were virtually guaranteed by 
reference to three certain criteria: - by reference to existing labour law (the 
provision of pay slips, anti-bullying and –harassment procedures); by 
reference to pay rates and conditions in analogous employments and by 
reference to pay rates and improved conditions achieved by social 
partnership agreements (sick pay and pension schemes).  Claims for 
improvements outside of these categories were less likely to be successful 
for example those involving Service Pay; Performance Related Pay; Deduction 
of Union Dues or Employee Share Options.  A claim for additional annual 
leave also failed (LCR18692 Irish Guide Dogs and SIPTU).   
 
6.3 – Implications for an Irish solution to an Irish problem 
 
The Irish ‘problem’ described in earlier chapters consists of an industrial 
relations system originating in the voluntarist traditions of the UK and 
having evolved by the late 20th century to demonstrate a unitary frame of 
reference in its interpretation of freedom of association.  The UK tradition is 
again evident in some tri-partite structures though Ireland had in any event 
consistently taken a more corporatist approach to wage bargaining until the 
demise of its social partnership system early in the 21st century.  Trade 
unions’ fortunes seriously declined from the 1980s in terms of union 
density (Dobbins, 2001) and their ability to achieve recognition in an 
economy moving from unions’ traditional manufacturing base to non-union, 
high tech and service industries and becoming increasingly dependent on 
foreign, mostly US, direct investment (Sheehan, 2008; Collings et al, 2008).  
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In addition to the loss of density, trade unions have also faced a loss in 
status, particularly since the demise of the social partnership system and 
often also evident in contentious views as to what constitutes collective 
bargaining and their role therein.  
  
Against this background this thesis seeks to assess the impact of the 2001 
Act; in this chapter particularly seeking to understand how it impinges on, 
or to what extent it is a solution to, these Irish ‘problems’.  This chapter 
concludes that the 2001 Act cannot be seen as a ‘solution’ at least in so far 
as the problems are trade union problems; indeed this piece of legislation 
may very well also aggravate the situation in coming years. 
 
6.3.1 - “...preserving the voluntarist tradition...”  
(O’Sullivan & Gunnigle, 2009, p.255)   
The voluntarist ethos in Irish industrial relations became less evident 
during the 20th century; the term voluntarist gradually re-interpreted to 
mean employers’ voluntary recognition or non-recognition of trade unions, 
as opposed to an unfettered negotiation between them.  The 2001 Act 
compounds this by providing that the Court “shall not provide for 
arrangements for collective bargaining” (Section 5(2)).  Labour Court 
Recommendations refer to this frequently, adding “subject only to that 
restriction” before moving on to the substantive recommendation, see for 
example LCR18582 Fournier Laboratories and SIPTU.  Thus employers can, 
and do, state with impunity their opposition to recognition. Labour Court 
Recommendations when dealing with the background to cases often state 
without elaboration “The Company does not recognise the Union for the 
purpose of collective bargaining” (LCR 18442 West Wood Club Ltd and 
SIPTU; LCR18468 Tara Service Station and MANDATE;) or, “…the Company 
… does not negotiate with unions” (LCR18532 Rochford Brady Legal 
Services and SIPTU; LCR18535 Brackernagh Ltd and SIPTU).  This has the 
effect of legitimising the employer position, further emphasising that a 
voluntarist approach now means employers may voluntarily choose to 
ignore unions joined by their employees. As a direct result of the 2001 Act 
and Ryanair’s High Court case, this has been given even further legitimacy.  
Geoghegan J in Ryanair v Labour Court [2007] 4 IR 199 held that “Ryanair is 
perfectly entitled not to deal with trade unions” and furthermore that 
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“neither could a law be passed compelling it to do so”.  This legitimisation of 
employer resistance to union recognition is further evident in the Labour 
Court deliberations with regard to preliminary issues explored next.  
 
6.3.2 – Providing “both continuity and elasticity” in collective 
bargaining 
(Webb & Webb, 1897, p.179)   
As the first part of Section 2(1)(a) of the 2001 Act requires confirmation that 
the employer does not engage in collective bargaining negotiations, where 
employers demonstrate that they do so engage, then the Court is precluded 
from hearing the substantive issues as in for example (DECP041 Banta and 
SIPTU).  In eleven separate instances, see Table 6.2, employers argued that 
they did engage in collective bargaining and as such the Court did not have 
jurisdiction. In five of those cases this involved ‘poaching’; a union seeking 
to represent members where another union already had bargaining rights 
and where the Court deemed that the necessary pre-conditions were not 
therefore met (LCR18845 Fernley Airport Services and IWU; LCR18621 
Federal Security and IWU; LCR18589 O’Donovan Off Licences and IWU; 
DECP062 Finlay Breton and BATU; LCR18206 MCM Security and IWU).  In 
other instances employers argued variously that “there was no requirement 
for trade union involvement for there to be a collective agreement” 
(DECP052 Quinn Cement and SIPTU) or that it conducted negotiations with 
an excepted body and that this constituted collective bargaining (DECP051 
Ryanair and IMPACT).  In such cases the Court emphasised the word 
‘practice’ and the word ‘normally’, and declared “both words connote 
something which regularly or routinely occurs” (LCR18344 United Airlines 
and CWU) and must not have discontinued (DECP051 Ryanair and IMPACT) 
thereby allowing the Court to decide that it (collective bargaining) did not 
exist and to hear the substantive case.  Conversely if collective bargaining 
has emerged during the process or the employer confirms at the hearing 
that it will now negotiate then the Court “must hold that it is the practice of 
the Company to engage in collective bargaining negotiations” (LCR19154 
Colso Enterprises and SIPTU) and deem it has no jurisdiction.   
 
Those Labour Court rulings above refer to the existence of collective 
bargaining, undefined.  However the definition of collective bargaining had 
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begun to evolve in Ireland since the late 20th century even more so as a 
result of the 2001 Act.  Apart from an unstated acceptance that trade 
unions and collective bargaining were not necessarily “co-extensive with, 
nor limited to” to one another (Webb & Webb, 1897, p.177), in practice, as 
in the UK, it was accepted that  
 
…any formal dialogue that takes place between employers and 
representatives of independent trade unions, that has an influence 
on the employment relationship, can be taken to constitute collective 
bargaining 
(Brown et al, 2008, p.3).   
 
The Labour Court view of collective bargaining up to the Ryanair challenge 
was similar but more expansive as follows: - 
 
Collective bargaining … connotes a process by which employers or 
their representatives negotiate with representatives of a group or 
body of workers for the purpose of concluding a collective agreement 
fixing the pay and other conditions of employment applicable to the 
group of workers on whose behalf the negotiations are conducted. 
Normally the process is characterised by the involvement of a trade 
union representing workers but it may also be conducted by a staff 
association, which is an excepted body within the meaning of the 
Trade Union Act, 1941, as amended. However an essential 
characteristic of collective bargaining, properly so called, is that it is 
conducted between parties of equal standing who are independent in 
the sense that one is not controlled by the other. 
(LCR17675 Ashford Castle and SIPTU) 
 
This was challenged by Ryanair and the High Court ruled: - 
 
If there is a machinery in Ryanair whereby the pilots may have their 
own independent representatives who sit around the table with 
representatives of Ryanair with a view to reaching agreement if 
possible, that would seem to be ‘collective bargaining’ within an 
ordinary dictionary meaning. It would seem strange if definitions 
peculiar to trade union negotiations were to be imposed on non-
unionised companies… 
(Ryanair Ltd v Labour Court [2007] IESC 6 1st February 2007) 
 
 
The Supreme Court also disputed whether  
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… collective bargaining in a non-unionised company must take the 
same form and adopt the same procedures as would apply in 
collective bargaining with a trade union  
(ibid.)   
 
Any amendments aimed at restoring the workings of the 2001 Act must 
take account of this judgment and define collective bargaining.  The 
difficulty is that said definition will clearly distinguish between workplaces 
where unions are recognised and those where they are not with consequent 
implications for what constitutes collective bargaining and the role of trade 
unions in each case.  A foretelling of how such amendments to the 2001 Act 
might work is provided by an exploration of the Labour Court 
Recommendations under the second leg of Section 2(1) (a) below. 
 
The second leg of Section 2(1) (a) of the 2001 Act, that “the internal dispute 
resolution procedures (if any) normally used by the parties concerned have 
failed to resolve the dispute” was relied on in almost half of all preliminary 
issues raised, employers arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction as 
the internal dispute resolution (IDR) procedures normally used by the 
parties had not failed (See Table 6.2).  For example, in LCR17919 Radio 
Kerry and MANDATE, the employer claimed that as they provided an IDR 
procedure which the claimants failed to use, that the Court was precluded 
from hearing the substantive issues.  In this case the Court ruled that the 
procedure is not normally used by the parties to resolve disputes and that 
this would usually “be sufficient to dispose of the preliminary objection”.  
The Court further ruled however that as the employer’s internal procedure 
“expressly provides that issues must be processed individually” and that the 
issues in dispute were collective and the Act is “primarily concerned with 
resolving group or category disputes” that any such procedure could not be 
described as a dispute resolution procedure under the terms of the Act. In 
only two cases did the Court find that the pre-conditions had not been met 
because the IDR had not failed, in LCR18446 Banta (1) and SIPTU) and in 
DECP041 Banta (2) and SIPTU, where the Court ruled that the procedure 
had not failed as the workers had chosen not to use it.  Otherwise the Court 
ruled that a grievance procedure would not suffice under the Act 
particularly if it was not normally used (LCR18274 Exel and SIPTU) or where 
it was merely “available to them” (LCR18454 Johnston, Mooney & O’Brien 
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and SIPTU); if there was “no way for employees to formulate their position 
on issues or to make claims” (LCR18648 Little Rascal Crèche and SIPTU); if 
it was “a creature of the employer” (LCR18307 M1 North Link and SIPTU and 
DECP061 Green Isle and SIPTU); merely consultative (DECP051 Ryanair and 
IMPACT) or where there was a lack of a clear structure (LCR19188 Bell 
Security and TEEU) or “a degree of independence” (DECP061 Green Isle and 
SIPTU).  The Court also found such IDR procedures problematic because “it 
is not clear in the context of a non-union employment, when procedures 
can be regarded as exhausted” (LCR19188 Bell Security and TEEU). 
 
Notwithstanding some of the Court’s rulings on how an IDR might operate, 
the implication is that trade unions are not necessary to collective 
bargaining.  Any forum which articulates the views of a group or category of 
workers which has a clear structure and a degree of independence and with 
which an employer chooses to engage will suffice, whether or not the 
workers choose to be represented in this way.  What now for the definition 
of collective bargaining as discussed in Chapter 4? Again, as a direct 
consequence of the 2001 Act, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) has 
added a convoluted process to their most recent submission wherein it is 
included “criteria for establishing ‘genuinely independent’ non-union 
‘collective bargaining’ for the purpose of the 2001-2004 Acts” (ICTU, 2013b, 
p.35).  If, as the Webbs contend it is the “Trade Union alone which can 
provide the machinery for any but its most casual application” and which 
contributes “both continuity and elasticity” (Webb & Webb, 1897, p.179) to 
collective bargaining, then the procedures acceptable according to the 
Labour Court Recommendations or those which might be created under 
ICTU’s suggestions above would be fragile entities indeed.  
 
If trade unions are not therefore necessary for collective bargaining, what 
then might be “an acceptable role for each actor”, for trade unions in 
particular? (Dunlop, 1958, p.17)  As in the UK, there is evidence of 
increasing individualisation of the employment relationship in Ireland 
(Roche, 2001), and a rise in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
(Teague and Doherty, 2011) with consequent challenges for the building of 
collectivism (Gunnigle, 1995).  The 2001 Act encourages this further.  
Section 2.1(a) provides that the Labour Court cannot hear a case in the 
event of there being internal dispute resolution procedures … normally used 
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by the parties which have not (yet) failed to resolve the dispute.  The 
workings of such a forum if normally practised would, for the purposes of 
the Act, constitute collective bargaining and leave unions without recourse 
to the 2001 Act, such as it is.  While only two cases were found where the 
Labour Court ruled against the union on this very point (LRC18446 and 
DECP041), nonetheless there remains cause for concern for trade unions as 
the existence of an independent employee forum in regular use could easily 
have answered the Court’s objections in 14 other cases (Table 6.2).  In stark 
contrast, employers accept or offer in advance of the hearing to comply with 
S.I. 146 of 2000, the Code of practice on grievance and disciplinary 
procedures. As detailed in Chapter 3 (3.6) that Code provides that a firm’s 
grievance and disciplinary procedures should allow for individuals to be 
represented by a trade union. The implication is that the acceptable role for 
a trade union is in its representation of individuals in trouble but not in the 
representation of collective issues, not collective bargaining.  
 
6.3.3 – Implications for the “court of reasonableness and fair dealing” 
(Kerr, 2005, p.3)  
Ireland’s “static” interpretation of freedom of association (Leader, 2002, p. 
128) is softened somewhat by long years of custom and practice whereby 
trade unions were one of the “immutable features of the fabric of industrial 
relations practice” (Roche, 1997, p.67).  The Labour Court is a good 
example of Ireland’s tendency towards tri-partite structures where unions 
hold equal status with employers on its Divisions, the personnel having 
been nominated by ICTU and IBEC respectively.  This has allowed neutral if 
not union-friendly Labour Court personnel, while unable to either 
recommend union recognition or make any judgement regarding collective 
bargaining, at least to take issue with the lack of any engagement between 
some of the parties.  In LCR18037 Goode Concrete and AGEMOU the Court 
found it “particularly regrettable that the parties did not have the advantage 
of some level of engagement” while “there seems to be no real effort by the 
parties to resolve their differences in a harmonious manner as intended by 
the Act” in LCR18271 Clearstream Technologies and SIPTU.  On another 
occasion the Court notes the LRC report that the employer “never had any 
intention of participating” (DECP032 Ashford Castle and SIPTU).  Similarly 
on two occasions where employers have argued that the union has 
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frustrated them in their intention to observe the Code, for example “by 
making entirely unreasonable demands” (LCR18344 United Airlines and 
CWU), the Court has not upheld the objections.  Union organisers involved 
in the processing of cases have frequently referred to the importance of the 
attitudes of individual Labour Court personnel with one or two in particular 
being held in high regard for their seeming willingness to make the process 
work (See Chapter 8). 
 
A willingness on the part of some individual members of the Court to take a 
broader view of issues is again demonstrated on the issue of the existence of 
a trade dispute.  That the Court must first find that there exists a trade 
dispute was first argued in DECP051 Ryanair and IMPACT and as a result 
in eight subsequent cases.  In finding that it could hear a case involving a 
‘difference’ as well as a ‘dispute’ the Court relied on the Industrial Relations 
Act 1946 as the 2001 Act did not provide the necessary definition.  Section 
3 of the 1946 Act provides that:-  
 
The expression “trade dispute” means any dispute or difference 
between employers and workers or between workers and workers 
connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of 
employment, or with the conditions of employment, of any person. 
   
This was then relied upon in LCR18307 M1 North Link and SIPTU where the 
employer alleged the union was merely trying to “force recognition” on the 
basis of “illusory issues”.  Such union “ambitions” were deemed reasonable 
by the Labour Court in that case and again in LCR18454 Johnston, Mooney 
& O’Brien and SIPTU and in LCR18692 Irish Guide Dogs and SIPTU.  In 
keeping with this 1946 definition, Galway Clinic’s contention that 
employees made redundant the previous year could not now be a party to a 
trade dispute, was overruled (LCR18815 Galway Clinic and SIPTU).  Such 
trade union reliance on the perspectives of individuals at the level of the 
Labour Court’s divisions is however a weak prop and has in any event 
proved ineffectual once legal challenges are taken.  
 
The original description by Flanders (1974) of a voluntarist system wary of 
Court intervention, as opposed to being wary of legislative support, is well 
forgotten if not contradicted entirely.  The 2001 Act provides that either 
party “may appeal to the High Court on a point of law” (Section 11) and 
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Ryanair’s decision to do this has already been explored. The subsequent 
appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in a judgment that has “diluted and 
rendered void the effectiveness of the process” (LRC Annual Report, 2007, 
p.26) and forced the Labour Court to issue new guidelines taking into 
account seven separate legal points arising.  A serious consequence is the 
current requirement for the Labour Court to take oral evidence as in a 
Court of law rather than rely on the evidence of a trade union, thereby 
overturning “years of practice in Irish industrial relations” (Mulvey, 2009, 
p.8).  This became a feature of the few hearings held after the judgment 
(LCR20079 Dell Direct and CWU; LCR19750 Bord Gáis and TEEU; LCR19721 
Cribbin Family Butchers and IWU and LCR19188 Bell Security and TEEU) 
and is a serious inhibitor to any future use of the procedures.  
Notwithstanding protections against victimisation of workers for their trade 
union activity few would be comfortable giving evidence in such fashion. 
 
Subsequent to the Ryanair judgments, several other employers threatened 
to take and some took legal action against the Labour Court; Galway Clinic, 
Fournier Laboratories and Swords Packaging for example (Higgins, 2007a).  
Solicitors for one employer, Swords Packaging, called on the Labour Court 
“to set aside recommendation LCR18807 as an invalid decision” failing 
which they would seek a judicial review (Higgins, 2007b) while Galway 
Clinic issued a press release advising they would seek legal advice on the 
terms of the Labour Court Recommendation (Dobbins, 2007a). The Ryanair 
judgments have prompted trade unions also to seek legal advice before 
engaging in the industrial relations machinery of the LRC and the Labour 
Court and more than one Determination had not been sought for fear of a 
legal challenge or in anticipation of the outcome of other legal cases (see the 
Canalcon and Led-Pack cases in Chapter 8).   
 
The Labour Relations Commission also felt obliged to obtain legal advice as 
the Supreme Court judgment encouraged employers to seek verification of 
the extent of union membership at workplaces before proceeding under the 
voluntary leg of the procedure.  The LRC practice had been to achieve this 
by “obtaining a list of members from the trade union and cross checking 
this against the employers own data such as payroll” (Sheehan, 2007b).  
The legal advice confirms that the LRC’s “present practice is fair and 
reasonable” (ibid.) thus protecting the LRC from having to make any 
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adjustments similar to those imposed on the Labour Court as a result of the 
same judgment.  Nonetheless the problem remains; employers became 
quick to threaten legal action if they were unhappy with Recommendations 
issued under the 2001 Act; trade unions and the LRC have been forced into 
seeking and acting upon legal advice before carrying out long-standing 
procedures while the Labour Court has been forced to make radical changes 
to its operations.  The Labour Court changes refer only to the 2001 Act. 
However some commentators on foot of the same Supreme Court judgment 
immediately predicted “a complete change in procedure in the various 
employment rights forums” [sic] whose modus operandi and “cosiness is 
misplaced” (Fitzgerald, 2007), a worrying possibility for trade unions. 
 
6.3.4 – “Strangled by Americanisation”   
 (Murray, 2008, p.9)   
In Ireland FDI accounts for nearly half of all manufacturing employment 
and twice the EU average in services (Barry & Bergin, 2012) yet the cases 
taken under the 2001 Act concern predominantly Irish firms (see Figure 
6.1).  Turner et al (1997) demonstrate that there is little difference between 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) and indigenous companies in terms of 
attitudes to union recognition but recognition disputes in MNCs (if they 
arise?) are seldom processed under the 2001 Act.  There is a school of 
thought which suggests that MNCs have little to fear from the 2001 Act, 
citing the Labour Court ruling (LCR18013 GE Healthcare and SIPTU) that 
GE Healthcare rates of pay were not out of line and awarding no pay 
increase in that case (Labour Relations Commission, 2006). Why then would 
Government argue against ‘mandatory’ recognition for fear of upsetting this 
sector? (Chapter 2)  After all it is Irish employers who have been to the 
forefront in dismantling collective bargaining; the Construction Industry 
Federation (CIF) were first to pull out of social partnership negotiations in 
2008; the Irish Hotels Federation the first to challenge the Joint Labour 
Committee (JLC) system and set up a fighting fund to support Ashford 
Castle, followed by electrical companies challenging the Employment 
Regulation Order for that industry and not forgetting the infamous Ryanair 
challenge – all Irish employers or representative bodies. However FDI 
influence on the subject of trade union recognition may very well take a less 
public route.  Of significance here is the role of the American Chamber of 
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Commerce in Ireland (ACCI) lobbying on the transposition of the 
Information & Consultation Directive (Dobbins, 2008) and ICTU’s fear of 
their “outright hostility” (Sheehan, 2013) though there are seldom any 
public pronouncements from ACCI on the subject. Questions also arise 
regarding the role of US MNCs in relation to the internal industrial relations 
of their suppliers/sub-contractors.  Chapter 8 includes mention of the role 
of two such companies in the recognition rows of their suppliers: - the role 
of PC Ltd in the internal affairs of two of its suppliers, Deltrans and Led-
Pack and that of Supersizers in Pegasus. 
 
6.3.5 - Industrial Action 
As part of its decision on preliminary issues, the Labour Court must satisfy 
itself that the trade union had “…not had recourse to industrial action after 
the dispute in question was referred to the Commission” (Section 2(1)(d)).  
In no case has the employer proved that industrial action took place, 
although they have argued so on a number of occasions (LCR17968; 
LCR18019 and LCR18265).  However in each case the Court did not view 
the action as cause to rule out jurisdiction on the basis that refusing to 
provide weekend cover is not industrial action (LCR17968 SIFCO Turbine 
Group and SIPTU) and industrial action on another topic, or which was 
threatened but not instigated is not sufficient either (LCR18019 RPS Group 
and TEEU).  Where parents of children at a crèche wrote to the employer 
complaining about the treatment of the workers, the Court deemed that this 
was not industrial action as there was no evidence that it was done “in 
combination or under a common understanding with the union or its 
members” (LCR18265 Tots & Co., and SIPTU). 
 
While it is not a prohibition on the taking of industrial action, on which 
“employee power rests in the last resort” (Gospel & Palmer, 1993, p.191), 
Section 2(1)(d) does have the effect of making unions less inclined to take 
industrial action lest it prevent them from opting to use the procedures at a 
later date.  It was certainly a factor in at least one of the cases to be 
reported on in Chapter 8 (Garry’s) where the shop steward recalls 
reluctance to strike.  On the other hand, all at Deltrans were at pains to 
point out that it was having “strike sanction in the back pocket” (John) that 
won them recognition.  An earlier small study on union recognition by this 
 
108 
student found that the “taking or threatening of industrial action had a 
50:50 chance of success [in gaining recognition] while going the S.I. 145 
route had virtually none” (Gibbons, 2003, p.68).  Additional pressure on 
unions not to select the strike option leaves them with fewer choices 
regarding how to proceed with a recalcitrant employer.  
 
6.3.6 – Pay “in relation to the average of the class”  
(Taylor, 1947, p.27)   
Claimants’ occupations were discussed in 6.2.7 above and over half of them 
found to be from operative grades with very few from senior salaried grades.  
In order to make comparisons with the Irish working population, these 
occupations were re-classified to demonstrate social class and shown 
alongside figures for those at work by social class in the 2006 census in 
Figure 6.3 below.  The occurrence of ‘Non manual’ and ‘Skilled manual’ 
classes in those ‘At Work’ in the 2006 census closely matches their 
occurrence in the social class of claimants under the 2001 Act.  ‘Non 
manual’ represents 20% of those at work and 21% of claimants; the figures 
for ‘Skilled manual’ are 20% and 24% respectively.   
 
Figure 6.3 –Comparing ‘At Work’ with claimants’ social class 
Source: CSO 
 
It is the categories either side of manual occupations where the major 
differences are found.  ‘Professional’ and ‘Managerial & Technical’ classes 
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constitute a third of all at work but only 4% of claimants.  Equally, ‘Semi 
skilled’ workers make up just 14% of those at work but are a major 
component of claimants at 42% of the total.  This is further aggravated by 
the over-representation of declining sectors in the cases taken to the Labour 
Court.  Of particular concern is Table 6.3 on page 90 demonstrating the 
economic sectors in which employers operate.  At a time when the economy 
is quite clearly moving from the “traditional sector” to the “modern sector” 
(CSO 2013), 35% of cases under the 2001 Act concern manufacturing firms 
which comprise 13% of those at work, a figure which is also declining.  
 
The economic sectors from which claimants arise is of concern not only for 
what it may imply about union organising targets (conversely it could imply 
that unions have no recognition problems in the modern sector) but also 
because the Labour Court awards improvements in pay and conditions 
based on industry norms or by comparison with “similar workers in 
unionised firms” (Sheehan, 2013).  This is achieved by one or both parties 
making  
… comprehensive written and oral submissions and … [providing] 
the Court with comprehensive information on rates of pay and other 
conditions of employment in what they regard[ed] as analogous 
employments  
(LCR18582 Fournier Laboratories and SIPTU)  
  
Analogous employments the Court will accept are those in the same sector, 
“the preponderance of private hospitals” for example in the case of Galway 
Clinic (LCR18815 Galway Clinic and SIPTU), and those “in which pay is 
determined by collective bargaining” (LCR18772 Sercom Solutions and 
SIPTU).  The Court will not concede a claim where such information is 
absent: - “the Court was not provided with any information from which it 
could be deduced that this claim is justified by reference to negotiated rates 
in comparable companies” (LCR18583 O’Connor Meats and SIPTU) or where 
it is sparse: - “only two comparators were cited by the Union in support of 
its claim for additional annual leave” (LCR18692 Irish Guide Dogs and 
SIPTU). In the event that the ‘Ryanair judgment’ issues are repaired, the 
2001 Act will still have very limited use in terms of pay issues in 
new/emerging or previously non-union sectors.  How will analogous 
employments whose pay and conditions are negotiated be found in such 
sectors or for new occupations? 
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In earlier chapters this thesis traced the connection between the unitary 
roots of Ireland’s approach to freedom of association and the consequent 
emphasis on notions of fair pay in industrial relations.  The 2001 Act 
reaffirms this emphasis by directing that the Labour Court shall “have 
regard to terms and conditions of employment” (Section 5(1)) and not 
collective bargaining.  The Labour Court interprets this to mean that its 
function is “to provide a measure of protection to workers whose pay and 
conditions of employment cannot be determined by collective bargaining” 
(LCR17607 Moquette Ltd and MANDATE) because they cannot be 
represented by a trade union.  The Labour Court therefore awards increases 
if the pay of the claimant is found to be out of line with that of comparators.  
Once again, wages must be in “relation to the average of the class to which 
the man belongs” (Taylor, 1947, p.27). Class also arose in other situations, 
in for example Hillview Nursing Home’s decision to recognise the union 
representing nurses but not that of support staff (LCR18440 Hillview 
Nursing Home and SIPTU).  Similarly, at Galway Clinic the CEO objecting to 
LCR18815 Galway Clinic and SIPTU explained: - “We pay the same rates as 
the HSE for nurses and clinical staff. It’s when you get down to cleaning 
and so on that there’s a difference” (Dobbins, 2007a). 
 
An emphasis on pay is further complicated by events of recent years, the 
demise of both the Celtic Tiger and of the social partnership system.  
Seventy-five per cent of all substantive recommendations issued by the 
Labour Court under the 2001 Act deal with pay; 25% with the application of 
national wage agreements on which the Court always ruled in favour.  The 
difficulty now is that since 2008 there are much fewer pay increases and 
national wage agreements are no more; eligible comparators might well be 
introducing pay cuts rather than pay increases. Trade union defensiveness 
about the 2001 Act’s ability to at least improve the pay and conditions of 
vulnerable workers would come to naught under these circumstances.  
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6.3.7 – “...unlikely to leave any perceptible mark on the industrial 
relations landscape”  
(Rabbitte, 2000, p.6)   
Trade unions, employers and politicians alike gave the 2001 Act but a 
lukewarm welcome.  There was little outright opposition, most welcoming 
what they saw as support for the Act from both unions and employer 
representative bodies who seemed prepared to at least use it to avoid 
confrontation.  At worst it looked to a few as something of a damp squib 
that would “sink ignominiously” (Higgins, 2001, p.17) and otherwise not 
“leave any perceptible mark” (Rabbitte, 2000, p.6). This study contends that 
it has left a mark and quite a perceptible one at that.  It has legitimised 
both employer hostility to union recognition and employer support for non-
union dispute resolution procedures whilst corralling trade unions into the 
individual representation of workers in trouble.  Gall (2003, p.235) 
mentions the positive “demonstration and shadow effects” of the usage of 
Britain’s statutory recognition provisions.  There are also such effects from 
the usage of the procedures under the 2001 Act in Ireland but with 
arguably less positive tones.   The 2001 Act has contributed to the changing 
meanings attributed to collective bargaining and changing views as to trade 
union roles therein.  Cognisance should also be taken of the consequences 
of the procedures’ association with semi-skilled workers in declining sectors 
when progress on substantive issues is so dependent on comparisons with 
analogous employments and the terms of social partnership agreements no 
longer negotiated.  There is also the contribution of the Labour Court 
Recommendations to custom and practice and to the perceptions of what 
will succeed at the Labour Court.  Trade unions are now disinclined to take 
industrial action and inclined to seek legal advice before proceeding under 
the Act.  Employers and even the LRC are now also so inclined to the latter.  
There may yet be longer term implications for the “seemingly benign form of 
intervention” provided by the LRC (Murphy, 1997, p. 327) and the Labour 
Court’s role as a “court of reasonableness and fair dealing” (Kerr, 2005, 
p.3). 
 
These are the affects in a macro sense, actual and implied, but what of the 
effects at local level, the workplaces about which these Recommendations 
were issued?  In exactly one-third of substantive recommendations, 28 out 
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of 84, unions subsequently applied to the Labour Court for a determination, 
i.e., where the employer had not implemented the Labour Court 
Recommendation and the union sought a Court order to force 
implementation. It is not safe to assume however, that all the other 
substantive recommendations were implemented nor to assess the effects of 
the 2001 Act by reference to the content of the Recommendations alone. 
Doherty (2013) remarks on the “outright concession of collective bargaining 
rights by employers” in two named Labour Court Recommendations but 
this study found that there are now no trade union members nor no 
collective bargaining at either of those locations (see next two chapters) 
further demonstrating the need to see behind the paper outcome and take 
the study to the workplace.   
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 7 
Where Are They Now? 
 
The Labour Court Recommendations discussed in the previous chapter 
were issued over a 9 year period from 2002 to 2011 as per Table 6.1 on 
page 88.  This study establishes the extent to which there are still workers 
at each location still in membership of the unions which took the cases, 
before moving on to examine the nature of that membership via a survey of 
union officials with current or potential responsibility in each case.  This 
chapter deals with the results of this search in 7.1 below followed by the 
results of the survey regarding membership levels in 7.2, and includes 
workplaces no longer in membership, some in membership but with little 
activity, and finally, to a handful where collective bargaining occurs.  
Section 7.3 explores the survey results regarding bargaining and 
representative structures.  In general, low levels of membership, weak 
representative structures and little bargaining activity were found amongst 
those workplaces involved in the procedures provided for in the 2001 Act. 
While there are difficulties attributing those levels entirely to the 2001 Act 
procedures, particularly in the absence of comparator workplaces, it is 
unlikely that such levels are representative of the trade union movement as 
a whole.  The findings are summarised in the final section of this chapter, 
7.4. 
 
 7.1 – Where are they now? 
 
All of the unions who participated in the Labour Court hearings (as per 
Table 6.4 on page 94) were contacted; this project explained; given a list of 
workplaces where they had taken cases and asked if these workplaces 
remained in membership of their union and if so to provide the name and 
contact details of the official with current or potential responsibility. Each 
official was then contacted and invited to participate in a survey (See the 
questionnaire in Appendix J).  The initial contact with six of the nine unions 
involved was made via telephone calls to personal contacts on the staff of 
each union (AGEMO/SIPTU; MANDATE; CWU; UNITE; TEEU and IBOA).  
Formal letters were written to the remaining three (BATU; IWU and 
IALPA/IMPACT).  The personal contact seems to have been effective as all of 
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the unions contacted in this way eventually participated; none of the other 
three did.  
  
Mutual trust played a role but two other issues may also be relevant.  The 
non-participating unions were responsible for just eight of the total 97 
workplaces involved, six of which were ‘poaching’ cases, unions seeking to 
represent members of the union for which this researcher works, which 
may have coloured their inclination to participate.  Also the very nature of 
‘poaching’ cases is that they fail at the preliminary stages of the process as 
the employer can legitimately demonstrate that s/he does engage in 
collective bargaining.  It is more than likely that none of these workers are 
in membership of the original union.  In any event, it was possible to 
identify the current membership status of 92% (n=89) of the 97 workplaces 
where cases were taken, thereby ensuring the continued validity of the 
survey. 
 
Of the 89 workplaces involved in cases taken by participating unions, just 
less than a quarter (n=23) were no longer registered with those unions (See 
Table 7.1 below) meaning all of those members registered at that 
employment had resigned their membership or otherwise ceased to pay 
union dues21.  There thus remained registered with unions a total of 66 of 
the original 89 companies where cases were taken under the 2001 Act by 
participating unions.  The union organiser with potential responsibility for 
each was identified, contacted and invited to complete an on-line 
questionnaire at Survey Monkey (see Chapter 5 and Appendices E, F and J).  
Follow-up conversations with some officials resulted in 10 cases being 
deemed unsuitable for inclusion in the survey despite some workers still 
registered in membership.  The reasons for their exclusions varied: - in five 
cases mergers and acquisitions resulted in the workplaces becoming part of 
much larger enterprises which already recognised unions.  In the other five, 
the relevant unit closed or the relevant grade were made redundant or 
resigned although members in other units or grades remained employed 
and in the union but had not been the subject of the claim under the 2001 
21 Unions maintain membership lists, usually called registers, organised by place of 
employment.  If all members in a workplace resign or if they all remain in arrears 
for a particular length of time (which varies from union to union), that workplace is 
removed from the register. 
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Act.  There thus remained 56 workplaces for inclusion in the survey.  Table 
7.1 below outlines the response rates of each of the participating unions.   
 
 Table 7.1 – Defining the Survey Population 
 
SIPTU
 
M
A
N
D
A
TE
 
C
W
U
 
U
N
ITE 
TEEU
 
IBO
A
 
Total % 
Cases Taken by 
Participating 
Unions 
67 8 5 4 4 1 89 
 
Workplaces not on 
membership 
register 
17 4 2       23 26% 
Not suitable due to 
merger/ 
amalgamation 
9   1       10 11% 
Survey Requests 
Issued 
41 4 2 4 4 1 56 63% 
Completed 
Questionnaires 
36 3 1 3 4 1 48 54% 
Percentage Response 
Rate 
88% 75% 50% 75% 100% 100% 86% 
 
 
A total of 48 responses were received representing an overall response rate 
of 86% although the responses from individual unions varied between 50% 
in the case of the CWU; through 75% at MANDATE and UNITE; 88% in 
SIPTU and reaching 100% in both TEEU and IBOA.  These 48 responses 
represent 54% of the cases taken by participating unions and 50% of all 
cases taken under the 2001 Act. 
 
7.2 – Survey Results - Membership 
 
The data was collected for two reasons: - 1) to determine the extent to which 
members remained in trade unions after the taking of a case under the 
2001 Act and 2) to also understand the extent of their activism, the 
awkwardly named ‘organisedness’ from Chapter 5.  Respondents were 
therefore asked four main questions about the membership at each 
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workplace, dealing with their membership status (Question 3); their 
representative structure (Question 4); the last industrial relations issue 
dealt with there (Question 5) and its means of resolution (Question 6).  
Question 2 concerned the length of time for which they had been 
responsible for the workplace and Question 8 sought to determine whether 
they were also the official who had referred the original case (See Appendix 
J).  Appendix M tabulates the results of Questions 3, 5 and 6. 
 
7.2.1 – Length of time for which officials have been responsible for 
workplaces – Questions 2 and 8 
Table 7.2 below details the answers respondents gave to Question 2 
regarding the length of time for which they had been responsible for each 
workplace. 
 
Table 7.2 - Length of time officials had responsibility for workplace - Question 2 
 SIPTU MANDATE TEEU UNITE IBOA CWU Total 
Less than 1 year 17      17 
1 – 3 years 16      16 
3 years + 3 3 3 3  1 13 
Unknown 0  1  1  2 
Total 36 3 4 3 1 1 48 
 
Roughly one-third of officials have been responsible for the relevant 
workplace for less than one year; another third between one and three years 
and a third for in excess of three years.  Staff turnover is particularly 
evident in SIPTU, which, as explained earlier, has re-assigned all staff into 
new economic divisions having traditionally organised along geographic 
lines, see Chapter 4.  This forms part of that union’s implementation of the 
organising model and the consequent changes to union “architecture” 
required (Lerner, 2003).  This is further emphasised in the answers 
respondents gave to Question 8 where respondents were asked if they were 
also the official who processed the original claim under the 2001 Act.  
Responses from each union were as detailed in Table 7.3 on the next page. 
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Table 7.3 – Current servicing officials who also referred the original claim under 
the 2001 Act – Question 8 
 SIPTU MANDATE TEEU UNITE IBOA CWU Total 
Question 8 “Are you also the Official who referred the original case …  
…under the 2001 Act?” 
YES 5 1 3 3 0 1 13 
NO 31 2 1 0 1 0 35 
Total 36 3 4 3 1 1 48 
 
In SIPTU, only 5 officials out of 36 with current responsibility for a 
workplace was also the official who processed the original claim under the 
2001 Act.  Just less than one-third of workplaces have the original official 
as their local contact.  Issues about staff turnover were also raised in some 
of the interviews with union members, explored in the next chapter.  While 
some changes took place several years after the Labour Court 
Recommendations, in others they contributed to a sense of abandonment 
felt by some of the members involved in cases particularly where staff 
changed soon after the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendation (See 
Chapter 8). 
 
7.2.2 - Membership Status – Question 3 
Respondents were asked to describe the status of the members at each 
workplace and these are the groupings used in all of this study’s 
subsequent analysis: - 
 
A. whether these members were known to them22 and/or still paying 
union dues;  
B. if there were some individual / confidential members there but who 
had little contact with the union;  
C. if the union represented members there on an individual basis only;  
D. if there was an active core of members but without bargaining rights  
22 Union members sometimes pay their union dues by direct debit to union head 
office and have no contact with their local union branch office. 
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E. or if there existed full bargaining rights at that workplace (Question 3 
on the questionnaire in Appendix J).  
 
Full bargaining rights were not defined in the questionnaire nor in the 
letters of invitation to participate; it would be unnecessary to do so for 
practitioners but for the sake of clarity it is envisaged along the lines of 
Brown’s 2008 definition explored in the previous chapter, that: -   
 
…any formal dialogue that takes place between employers and 
representatives of independent trade unions, that has an influence 
on the employment relationship, can be taken to constitute collective 
bargaining 
(Brown et al, 2008, p.3).   
 
Table 7.4 below outlines the responses regarding bargaining status. 
 
Table 7.4 –Bargaining Status – Question 3 
Status Total % 
A. Unknown to Respondent or non-paying 24 50% 
B. Rare or no contact with current union official 6 13% 
C. Individual representation only 9 19% 
D. Active core of members but without recognition 7 15% 
E. Full bargaining rights 2 4% 
Totals 48 
 
 
Half of all workplaces reported on (n=24), while still on the union’s national 
register were unknown to the local union officials for their area and/or the 
members had ceased paying union dues, perhaps indicating in some cases 
more recent closures and/or resignations from the union, see Group A in 
the Table 7.4 above.  In Group B were a total of six (13%) workplaces where 
there were some individual confidential members who seldom contacted the 
union.  Nine workplaces (19%) involved a membership that the union 
represented on an individual basis only, Group C.  There was an active core 
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of members but without full bargaining rights in seven cases (15%) (Group 
D) and in two cases (4%) Group E, the respondents chose full bargaining 
rights as the option which best described the current status of the members 
at that workplace. See Table 7.4 above.  These then are the categories to 
which union officials assigned each workplace.  Workplace activists or shop 
stewards might well categorise their own workplace differently.  This has 
happened in one of the ten cases explored in the next chapter (See Ard-na-
Gaoithe) but as this chapter deals with survey results only those 
categorisations remain for now. 
 
7.2.3 – Explaining Membership Levels 
The data above demonstrates quite low levels of membership remaining in 
workplaces where cases were taken under the 2001 Act, both in terms of 
actual numbers of workplaces considered ‘unionised’ and in terms of the 
actual numbers of union members within such workplaces.  Attributing this 
paucity to the 2001 Act alone is problematic.  In light of the serious 
downturn in the Irish economy in the years between the taking of cases and 
the undertaking of this research, it is expected that some membership 
attrition may be attributed to economic factors via redundancies.  Yet it was 
not possible to determine if all of those workplaces no longer on union 
registers had ceased functioning in the economy; seven of the 24 removed 
from national registers were found to have closed, but this is insufficient in 
answering the question.  
 
In order to help determine whether economy was a factor, an examination of 
the economic sectors in which the relevant firms operated was undertaken.   
The previous chapter outlined the main economic activity of all firms 
involved in the 2001 Act, see Table 6.3.   The largest single groupings were: 
- Manufacturing at 35%, Transportation & Storage (17%); Wholesale & Retail 
(15%) and Human Health & Social Work (11%).  The economic sector of 
those firms removed from unions’ national registers was also determined.  
Manufacturing and Transportation & Storage operations account for half of 
those workplaces removed from union registers since the Labour Court 
Recommendations were issued, six and four respectively. Those two sectors 
combined also account for a 48% reduction in the numbers at work 
between 2006 and 2011 (CSO, 2012).  The reduction in those two sectors 
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therefore closely matches their reduction in the economy.  Conversely 
Human Health & Social Work Activities (n=3) is the only other significant 
sector amongst removed companies but in terms of numbers at work, it 
shows an increase between 2006 and 2011 (CSO, 2012).   
 
In setting up the survey population it was found that 24 of the workplaces 
which remained on union national registers were said by local officials to be 
unknown to them and/or the members had ceased paying union dues.  The 
economic sectors in which these latter companies operate differ only slightly 
from those workplaces removed from the registers at an earlier date. See 
Figure 7.1 below.  
 
Figure 7.1 – Workplaces locally reported as closed/no members  
by Economic Sector 
Agriculture, 
forestry and fishing
4%
Manufacturing
46%
Wholesale and 
retail
21%
Transportation and 
storage
13%
Information and 
communications
8%
Professional, 
scientific, technical
4%
Administrative and 
support service 
4%
Chart Title
 
 
While Manufacturing is still the largest sector its share is twice what it was 
in the removed companies and with Wholesale & Retail both sectors 
account for three-quarters of all of these companies deemed by local 
officials to be not paying or completely unknown to them.  See Figure 7.1 
above.  
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Those workplaces remaining in membership were also examined with 
regard to economic sector.  As with the total number of cases taken, 
Transportation & Storage and Manufacturing describe half of all workplaces.  
See Figure 7.2 below. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Economic Sector of Workplaces still in Union Membership 
Water & Waste
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Main economic activity was also compared to membership status groups, A 
to E, as per survey Question 3.  In Group E where respondents report full 
bargaining, both firms operate in the Transportation and Storage sector of 
the economy.  This is hardly significant however as there were 14 other 
companies in the same sector, one identified as having an active core of 
members and two where the members seldom if ever contact the union.  
There is no consistency in the economic activity of the companies in the 
other groups.  In Group D, those with an active core of membership, six 
separate economic sectors are represented; the nine companies in Group C 
(individual representation) span six sectors; Group B, four.  (Appendix M).   
 
There is then some correlation between the sectors most affected by the 
recession and those workplaces where unions no longer organise but little 
of subsequent membership status can be attributed to economic factors.  
Country of origin patterns seem not to account for any differences either 
with Irish companies dominating every group; Irish owned firms 
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represented 68% of all workplaces where cases were taken and 78% of the 
24 cases involved in the survey.  Numbers of non-Irish firms are so small in 
each group that no significance can be attached. 
 
What of membership levels within those workplaces where unions still 
organise subsequent to involvement with the 2001 Act?  While union 
membership levels and density are not necessarily “the sacrosanct indicator 
of labour’s success” (Sullivan, 2010), the levels reported here must be of 
some concern.  Of the 97 workplaces involved in the Labour Court hearings, 
eight were taken by non-participating unions so their status is unknown; 
10 cases were unsuitable for comparison and officials responsible for a 
further eight did not participate in the survey.  This leaves 71 workplaces 
whose membership status is known and for 47 or 66% of those it is 
confirmed that they are no longer in membership of the union.  This 
attrition rate seems high but in the absence of exact comparisons with 
other workplaces which did not refer cases under the 2001 Act, tells very 
little.  Only SIPTU was able to confirm, without elaboration, that its attrition 
rate for those years is considerably lower than the 66% rate found here.   
 
Levels of membership within workplaces are quite low.  It was expected that 
unions would be reluctant to provide exact membership figures for each 
workplace so questions regarding numbers or even density were not 
therefore included in the questionnaire.  During the process of tracking 
each workplace back to the referring union and contacting the current 
servicing official however, indications were given in confidence of the level of 
membership in each workplace.  In order to preserve that confidentiality, 
numbers of members are expressed in Table 7.5 below according to whether 
membership is in single or double figures for those workplaces reported 
upon in the survey.   
 
Table 7.5 – Membership Levels 
Membership Levels No. of Workplaces              Total  48 
Membership levels of 10 or more 11 
Membership levels of less than 10 32 
Zero membership 3 
Unknown 2 
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Three-quarters of workplaces had membership in single figures, a good half 
of those recording just one or two members; none had membership in treble 
or higher figures.  The lack of comparators is again a problem but 
membership levels such as this are unlikely to be representative. 
 
In addition to difficulties determining the reasons for loss of membership 
and deciding whether or not such losses are out of line with normal 
attrition rates, there is also a problem with determining at what point such 
losses occurred.  Did members drift during the ‘voluntary leg’; while 
awaiting the Labour Court Recommendation or in the years since the latter 
was issued?  Was it the process or the outcome which caused the drift?  
Devine & Halpenny’s examination of the voluntary leg procedures (in SIPTU) 
after just 18 months operation noted the following: -  
 
What stands out here is the very high membership density in the 
cases referred – an approximate average of 70%, with a range up to 
100%.  What is equally clear is that in a small number of cases 
membership collapsed or discontinued altogether in the course of or 
as a result of the process  
(Devine & Halpenny, 2002, p.5) 
 
Member joining patterns could be discerned in 45 of the workplaces 
involved in the 2001 Act by reference to some unions’ membership records 
and lists of members or copies of application forms on file.  Those patterns 
were as follows: - 
 
• Seven workplaces record no new members after the issuing of the 
Labour Court Recommendation 
• Twelve workplaces show some joining activity immediately after the 
issuing of the Recommendation but which then ceases 
• Twenty-two workplaces have gaps of between one and five years 
between the issuing of the Recommendation and the next newly 
recruited member at that workplace 
• Four workplaces show a similar and on-going pattern of new 
members each year before and after the issuing of the 
Recommendation.  The only significance to be drawn from this is that 
of these four workplaces, two are those two workplaces in Group E 
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which have full bargaining and one is from Group D, those with an 
active core but without full bargaining. 
 
Thus the results of this part of the research are disappointing and point to 
a need for some means of tracking union membership attrition rates but do 
at least indicate low levels of new member recruitment amongst post-2001 
workplaces. 
 
7.3 – Survey Results – ‘Organisedness’ 
 
On the basis that there ought to be a distinction between recruitment (of 
union members) and organising (as per the organising model), this thesis 
sought not just to examine the levels of membership in workplaces post-
2001 Act procedures but also to understand the nature of that 
membership.  In speculating as to the relationship between utilising the 
2001 Act procedures and modern efforts at union renewal, there is an 
obvious need to be able to assess the extent to which members have formed 
a “‘self-organised’ organised (sic) workplace” (Gall, 2006, p.3), to assess 
their ‘organisedness’.  This suggested a number of indicators that might 
distinguish the ‘organised’ workplace from one where the trade union model 
might more resemble a service (Heery et al, 2000b); varying levels of 
“deliberative vitality” perhaps (Levesque & Murray, 2010).  Thus the survey 
included questions regarding representative structure plus recent issues 
raised and resolved.  The results are explored below. 
 
7.3.1- Representative Structure – Question 4 
Where respondents chose the first status option in Question 3 (see Table 
7.4 on page 119), indicating that the members at the relevant workplace 
were unknown to them and/or were actually no longer in membership 
(Group A), the survey skipped to the end of the questionnaire as the 
subsequent questions regarding representative structure, issues dealt with 
and their means of resolution would not be relevant. As this option was 
chosen in 24 cases, there remained 24 continuing cases for the remaining 
questions. 
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Table 7.6 – Representative Structure – Question 4 
Representative Structure Total % 
No. of cases being reported on 24 
 
There is an elected shop steward 15 63% 
There is an elected representative committee 5 21% 
There is an elected safety representative 6 25% 
One or more representatives are active at other levels in the Union 2 8% 
One or more representatives are active at Trades Council or other TU body 2 8% 
One or more representatives have been released with pay to attend training 
or union meetings 
5 21% 
 
In Question 4, respondents were asked to answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ 
to a range of questions regarding the existence of shop stewards, elected 
committees or elected safety representatives at each location and to also 
answer in the same manner regarding the activities of these representatives 
outside the workplace.  Table 7.6 above outlines the total positive responses 
which demonstrates a reliance on just one representative at workplaces; 15 
or 63% of workplaces had one elected shop steward though only a third of 
these, five or 21% of total responses, reported the additional existence of an 
elected representative committee.  There is an elected safety representative 
in a quarter of the workplaces (n=6); in five workplaces the union had 
succeeded in getting paid release for meetings or training.   Activity outside 
the workplace was minimal; in only two cases was there any reported 
involvement within the union at sectorial or divisional level or outside the 
union at, for example, Trades Council.  In nine workplaces respondents 
report the lack of any representative structure; no shop steward; no 
committee, no safety representative, no involvement in the union internally 
or on outside bodies.   
 
 
126 
Not surprisingly the likelihood of there being a representative structure 
increased the further a workplace was along a rough continuum between 
Group B who rarely contacted the union to Group E with full bargaining 
rights.  Both workplaces in Group E with ‘full bargaining rights’ reported 
the existence of shop stewards, of elected representative committees and the 
acquisition of paid release.  One of these also reported the existence of an 
elected safety representative.  All seven workplaces in Group D, with an 
active core of members, reported the existence of an elected shop steward; 
two of these also included an elected representative committee and one had 
secured paid release.  See Table 7.7 below. 
 
Table 7.7 – Bargaining Status and Representative Structure –  Questions 3 and 4 
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B - Rare or no contact 6 1 - - - - - 
C - Individual Representation 9 5 1 2 1 2 1 
D - Active Core 7 7 2 2 1 - 1 
E - Full bargaining rights 2 2 2 1 - - 2 
 
The presence of elected safety representatives was reported in some 
workplaces across all groups except those in Group B those with little or no 
contact with the union.  They may exist or existed in the past but the 
current union official is unable to report on that.  In each of the two 
workplaces in Group E, with full bargaining rights, there was yet no 
reported activity outside of the workplace.  In fact none of the bigger unions 
reported any activity outside of the workplace; only TEEU and IBOA 
reporting some, perhaps reflecting the greater competition for places in 
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larger unions.  Alternatively it could be easier for officials in smaller unions 
to be aware of the activities of shop stewards and in the larger unions 
officials may not have been responsible for members for very long as already 
explored in Question 2 above. 
 
7.3.2 – The nature of issues raised and their means of resolution – 
Questions 5 and 6 
Respondents were asked in Question 5 to report on the nature of the last 
completed issue dealt with at those workplaces under examination.  This 
included a question on the exact nature of the issue, followed in Question 6 
by questions regarding how the issue was resolved.  Twelve of 21 
workplaces reported a collective issue being the last issue raised and 
resolved.  Half of those collective issues were to do with pay; the others were 
hours of work (2) and one each of redundancy, pension, transfer of 
undertakings and one collective disciplinary issue (See Appendix M). 
 
The two workplaces with full bargaining rights in Group E both reported 
collective issues (pay and hours respectively) as the issues last raised there 
and both were resolved at 3rd party, either the Labour Relations 
Commission or the Labour Court.  Of the seven workplaces reporting an 
active core of members but without full bargaining rights (Group D), pay 
(n=3) and hours (n=1) again featured and along with one transfer of 
undertakings case represented five collective issues raised at those 
workplaces.  The other two issues raised in Group D workplaces concerned 
individual disciplinary matters.  
 
Not surprisingly individual issues dominated in Group C, those workplaces 
where the union represents members on an individual basis only.  There 
were however three collective issues reported out of nine cases.  There was 
some confusion with the responses regarding two Group B workplaces, 
those that rarely if ever contact the union official.  In two cases 
contradictory responses were given in the survey, where union officials 
reported a collective issue in Question 5 despite having already identified in 
Question 3 that there were just a handful of confidential members at that 
location.  Telephone calls to the two union officials revealed that they were 
reporting on the issues they had taken to the Labour Court under the 2001 
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Act those being the last issues raised at that workplace, which were indeed 
collective.  They had dealt with no other issues there since.   The issues 
reported on in the four other workplaces in Group B were two individual 
and two collective issues regarding disciplinary matters and pay 
respectively. 
 
7.3.3 – Explaining levels of ‘Organisedness’ 
If there were difficulties reaching causal explanations for membership 
patterns in the membership section of this chapter, then explaining levels of 
‘organisedness’ is no easier.  Yes, there is a correlation between bargaining 
status and representative structure; the further a workplace is along a 
continuum between ‘rare contact’ with the union official and ‘full 
bargaining’ the greater the likelihood that there is a shop steward, an 
elected committee and a safety representative. There is also a greater 
likelihood that collective issues are dealt with as opposed to individual 
disciplinary issues which are more likely at the other end of the continuum. 
Examination of the means of resolution of the last issue raised in each 
workplace revealed little.  Part of the thinking behind this question was that 
the more ‘organised’ workplaces would demonstrate an ability and/or 
tendency to resolve issues in-house, by the shop steward.  There was little 
evidence of this even in the otherwise more organised workplaces, but the 
question was answered by the union official who might not in any event 
have been aware of any issues resolved locally.  The questionnaire asked 
about the last issue raised with them as officials.  The fault may lie with 
reliance on surveys they being somewhat restrictive and dry by their nature, 
but viewing union officials as ‘the union’ is also problematic.  The cases in 
the next chapter demonstrate that a different viewpoint is often expressed 
by the shop stewards and members at workplace level and that there is 
sometimes a level of activity beyond what union officials can see.  Indeed is 
that not what should be expected from the “self-organised organised 
workplace”? (Gall, 2006, p.3) 
 
As with the interpretation of membership figures, the absence of 
comparator workplaces is keenly felt and makes it difficult to state with 
conviction that the levels found in these workplaces are at odds with those 
found in the generality of workplaces in union membership.  An important 
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contributor could also be workplace or membership size; the largest groups 
of members are found in Groups E and D; membership levels in Groups B 
and C are all in single figures with a significant number recording just one 
or two members.  Whether this refers to low density rates or low numbers in 
employment is not clear, but in either case, activity beyond the level of a 
single shop steward is nigh on impossible in those circumstances. 
 
7.4 - Conclusion 
 
Figure 7.3 below summarises the membership, bargaining and 
representative status of workplaces involved in the procedures provided for 
under the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 2001.   
 
Figure 7.3 – Membership, bargaining and representative status 
 
In summary, of all the cases taken in 97 workplaces, the membership 
status of 89 has been established through contact with the trade unions 
involved.  Sixty-six workplaces are still recorded on union registers 
maintained at each union’s head-quarters.  Of those, 10 are unsuitable for 
further comparison as merger and acquisition activity means the 
workplaces on the register are not the workplaces involved in the original 
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case.  The potential servicing official of each of these 56 workplaces was 
identified and contacted and invited to complete the questionnaire as 
attached in Appendix J. Forty-eight did so and reported that a further 24 of 
these, while listed on the union’s national register, are either unknown to 
the local union official or the members listed are no longer paying their 
dues or no longer working at that location.  A further six, while consisting of 
paying members and of which the union official was aware, are not in 
contact with the union.  This and in some cases a lack of familiarity with 
workplaces may be explained by the short length of time for which some 
officials have held their current responsibilities. 
 
The recession in the Irish economy may have contributed somewhat to the 
loss of membership through redundancies but otherwise the economic 
sector (nor country of origin of the employer) makes no substantial 
difference to the retention of members or the subsequent bargaining or 
representative status.  The nature of issues raised is closely linked to the 
bargaining and representative status identified at each workplace.  
Collective issues such as pay and hours are more likely to be reported 
where there is greater union activity and where the workers and their union 
have had some success in achieving collective bargaining despite the stated 
prohibition on same in the 2001 Act.    Individual, mostly disciplinary 
issues are those raised where the union is least active and where there is 
individual representation but without any collective bargaining.  A concern 
that emerges, of a changing union role, from collective bargaining to 
individual representation, has already been raised in the discussion on the 
Labour Court Recommendations and the survey results confirm the trend.    
 
Fourteen workplaces have some kind of a union representative structure, 
nine of which report an active membership.  In two (4%) of 48 cases 
reported on in the survey, the official reports the existence and exercise of 
full bargaining rights.  Attributing cause to the 2001 Act is problematic but 
in terms of one of the supplementary research questions, i.e., whether the 
2001 Act provides for union recognition “by the back door” (Creaton, 2005) 
or otherwise, the response must be a resounding no. Yet collective 
bargaining does exist albeit in a few locations.  The next part of this study 
seeks inter alia to understand how this happened, how those two groups of 
workers were successful in establishing and maintaining collective 
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bargaining in an otherwise bleak picture for union membership and 
collective bargaining. 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 8 
Return to “…the complex interactions of agency 
and dimension”  
(Willman & Kelly, 2004, p.5) 
 
This chapter continues the journey originally described in Chapter 5, from 
the overview of documentary analysis of the Labour Court 
Recommendations in Chapter 6 and moving in to the examination of union 
membership levels and of the nature of such union membership via a 
survey of union officials (Chapter 7).  This chapter gets right to the core, to 
the workplace itself and those involved at that level. It is here that the data 
becomes rich and contributes further to some of the unique findings of this 
study.   
 
The data reveals the importance of each union’s organising campaign; how 
the campaigners (union staff, activists and shop stewards) set about 
organising the workers and representing their interests.  An essential point 
emerged regarding the use of the procedures under the 2001 Act, whether it 
was viewed by the union at local level as a means or an end in itself. There 
were significant differences in outcome for those campaigns that consisted 
of a referral to the Labour Court as a last resort, and those campaigns 
where the referral to the Court was just one of a number of ‘tools’ used in a 
campaign with a broader focus and where not all of the members’ interests 
were subject to the Labour Court Recommendation. This has important 
implications for mobilisation theory and for the organising model of trade 
unionism.  The data also echo some of the findings regarding the statutory 
recognition procedure in the UK: - the “shadow and demonstration effects” 
explored by Gall (2005 and 2010) particularly with regard to the effects of 
the Ryanair case, and recognition of the “contending forces [that] come into 
play” (Moore, 2004, p.13) once the referral is in process.   As in the UK, 
there are questions raised regarding the “relationship between legislation 
and industrial practice” (Moore, 2005, p.363).  Leaders played a pivotal role 
in each campaign, in terms of both union officials and local activists.  The 
chapter concludes in agreement with McKay et al, that the “... statutory 
procedure ... cannot guarantee meaningful bargaining in the face of 
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employer opposition: ultimately this has to come from union organisation in 
the workplace” (2006, p.99).   
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: - 
 
Section 8.1 introduces the ten cases examined and situates them according 
to the continuum outlined in the previous chapter, from Group A with no 
members or no contact with the union through Groups B, C, and D, to 
Group E with full bargaining rights. 
 
Section 8.2 examines the cases through the prism of theories on mobilising 
and organising seeking to establish to what extent the campaigns run 
matched or contradicted ideal types and thereby continuing the 
measurement of ‘organisedness’.  It also explores the extent to which the 
Labour Court Recommendations were implemented and whether there was 
substantive improvement in the conditions of employment as a result. 
 
Section 8.3 returns to the idea of the continuum and compares the 
processes discussed in 8.2 with the outcomes in 8.1, exploring the 
connection between how campaigns were run and the subsequent 
membership, representative and bargaining status emergent in each case. 
 
8.1 – Ten Representative Cases 
 
The selection of cases for inclusion in this part of the study did not go 
according to plan but did eventually achieve a representative group.  
Starting with Group E, there were only two such cases with full bargaining 
rights, referred to hereinafter as Deltrans and Pegasus23, both warehouses.   
The referring and servicing officials were easily sourced and more than 
willing to participate and encourage members to do likewise.  Those 
interviews were set up and conducted early on in the project.  Likewise two 
Group D workplaces were available, the firm referred to herein as Garry’s 
23 In order to protect the workers at each location and to afford some discretion to 
union staff, all workplaces and individuals’ names are anonymised.   
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and one other, a charity.  Interviews in the latter had however to be 
postponed for a number of months due to extended leave on the parts of 
both the servicing official and of the shop steward.  Garry’s went ahead and 
during those interviews the referring official offered to also participate on 
another case, Rosses, a Group C case bringing the total at that stage to two 
Group E workplaces, one Group D and one Group C; two warehouses and 
two manufacturing plants.   
 
Two Group B workplaces were available, Blackwater and Ard-na-Gaoithe, 
from the health and services sectors respectively.  The confusion in 
Question 3 of the survey, between representation and activism now 
emerged.  During the Ard-na-Gaoithe interviews it quickly became clear 
that although the servicing official had coded the workplace as Group B 
meaning the union represented members there on an individual basis only, 
there was a level of activism at that site which indicated it could also be 
coded as Group D, with those where there is an active core of members.  It 
was decided to accept Ard-na-Gaoithe as the second Group D workplace 
along with Garry’s in place of the charity which was then dropped from the 
study.  Another workplace from Group B was sourced, Oakchurch, a second 
from the services sector.  There seemed little hope initially of getting Group 
A workplaces, those with no members remaining or who were not in contact 
with the union official.  However a chance remark during the Deltrans 
interviews led the way to Led-Pack a campaign in another warehouse in 
which all the main players from Deltrans had played a role.  After many 
fruitless e-mails and telephone calls a former member at another Group A 
workplace, a care home here referred to as Knockrada, agreed to interview 
and the referring official was then also contacted and interviewed. 
 
Table 8.1 below depicts the cases according to the membership status 
defined in Question 3 of the survey (See previous chapter) except for Ard-
na-Gaoithe, and showing economic sector and geographic location and type.   
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 Table 8.1 – Ten selected cases by membership status, economic sector and location 
Workplace Membership Status Economic Sector Location 
Deltrans E - Full bargaining Transportation & Storage Urban 
Mid-West 
Pegasus E - Full bargaining Transportation & Storage Urban 
East 
Ard-na-Gaoithe D – Active Core 
 
Services Rural 
West 
Garry’s D - Active Core 
 
Manufacturing Urban 
South-East 
Rosses C - Individual 
Representation 
Manufacturing Urban 
South-East 
Canalcon C - Individual 
Representation 
Manufacturing Rural 
North 
Blackwater B – Confidential / Rare 
contact 
Health Urban 
West 
Oakchurch B - Confidential / Rare 
contact 
Services Rural 
Midlands 
Led-Pack A – No contact Transportation & Storage Urban 
Mid-West 
Knockrada A – No contact 
 
Health Rural 
Midlands 
 
The cases are relatively representative of the generality of cases taken by 
economic sector: - there are three manufacturing plants, three 
transportation & storage facilities, and two each from the health and 
services sectors.  It was not possible to get workplaces from Retail & 
Wholesale, the only other significant sector.  The workplaces are 
geographically dispersed around the country: - one on the East coast; two 
each in the South-East, South-West, the West and the Midlands and one in 
the North.  Four are in rural locations, two in small towns and four in larger 
cities.  In keeping with the generality of claimants identified in Chapter 6, 
seven of the ten workplaces are Irish-owned and most of the workers 
involved are semi-skilled; only the two health sector cases had mixed 
occupations. 
 
A total of 36 interviews were conducted in the ten cases; the referring 
official in all cases; the servicing or potential official participated in nine 
cases though all completed the questionnaire as explored in the previous 
chapter. Interviews were also held with a mixture of current and former 
members, activists and shop stewards in all cases except Oakchurch where 
there were no members and no contact details available for former 
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members.  Table 8.2 below lists the interviewees in each case and also 
indicates whether the union case file was made available. 
 
Table 8.2 – Ten selected cases - Interviewees 
Workplace Group File 
Available 
Referring 
Official 
Servicing 
Official 
Ordinary 
Member 
Activist Shop 
Steward 
Deltrans E No Conleth Lesley Rory (F) John (F) Tim 
Martin 
(F) 
Pegasus E Yes Eileen Kelly Marius 
Liam 
 Karl (F) 
Eamon  
Ard-na-
Gaoithe 
D Yes Kevin Frank (F)   Todd 
Garry’s D Yes Morgan Fred   Eric 
Rosses C No Morgan Fred   Corina 
Kenneth 
Canalcon C No Oran  Peter  William 
Blackwater B Yes Kevin Harry 
Frank (F) 
  Caroline 
Oakchurch B Yes Owen     
Led-Pack A No Conleth Majella 
Lesley (F) 
Rory   
Knockrada A  
 
Yes Ross Ross Sara   
 
All named are current post-holders except where names are followed by (F) 
indicating that the individual formerly held the role under which they are 
listed.  In addition it should be noted that all of those listed as current shop 
steward with the exception of Tim in Deltrans, and Eamon in Pegasus were 
also present and active in the early stages of their respective campaign and 
could also be listed as former activists.  There were redundancies at Garry’s 
shortly before the interviews took place there and technically Eric was no 
longer shop steward as he was one of those made redundant.   
 
Rather than have confusion about the use of the word organising, and 
distinctions between organising and recruiting, the remainder of this 
chapter will refer to union campaigns and campaigners meaning union staff 
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and activists/shop stewards.  Campaigns are referred to according to the 
assigned name, Deltrans or Knockrada for example and it is the campaign 
which is referred to unless the text mentions the employer. 
 
8.2 – Ten Cases through the prism of ‘organisedness’ 
 
An essential question regarding the effect of the 2001 Act is how it affects 
those at the level of the workplace; how it interacts with current approaches 
to union purpose and renewal, particularly mobilisation theory and the 
organising model of trade unionism.  Of equal importance are questions 
concerning agency and dimension; the relative merits of relying on 
mobilisation or institutional arrangements, and concerns about process and 
outcome.  It is time then to return to the roots of these ideas, to Charles 
Tilly and his framework of “interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity 
and collective action” (1978, p.7).  This part of the chapter views the 
campaigns in each of the cases through the prism of ‘organisedness’ a 
hybrid of mobilisation theory, the organising model and the extent to which 
the positive effects of each continue after the initial campaign. A pattern is 
found: - that those cases where the focus was on mobilisation, where there 
were higher levels of ‘organisedness’ were more successful in improving 
conditions, in building activism and in achieving recognition than those 
with a singular focus on the institution, on the 2001 Act alone. 
 
8.2.1 - Interests  
These are a group’s perceived losses and gains arising from their 
engagement with others, in this case a group of employees and their 
interaction with their employer.  A necessary starting point in this 
perception is a sense of “injustice and grievance” (Kelly, 1998, p.27) 
contributing to a sense of ‘us and them’ with the ‘us’, the workers, 
attributing blame to ‘them’, the employer.  The distinction between interests 
and issues (Simms, 2007a) has already been noted but the focus in this 
chapter is on issues, those matters workers raised with officials and/or 
were the focus of the Labour Court Recommendations. In the ten cases 
studied here the issues varied little, rates of pay generally but often 
complicated by employer behaviour such as reneging on a relatively small 
bonus payment or being selective as to its application.  
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 The cancellation or perceived unfairness of bonus payments was a trigger in 
three cases, Deltrans, Garry’s and Canalcon.  In late 2002, Deltrans 
management advised workers that the company was not doing well and that 
it intended to discontinue payment of the annual €50 bonus at Christmas. 
Conleth, the local union official, says he  
 
... couldn’t believe [his] luck the day Ringo [Deltrans shop steward] 
came into the office and said “the gobsh***s outside there have gone 
and cancelled Christmas” and shoved 160 [membership application] 
forms in to my hand!   
 
Conleth had been representing members individually for about two years on 
mostly disciplinary issues with some limited success but had never been 
able to increase membership beyond 45 or so nor to bargain collectively.  
The employer having “cancelled Christmas” (John at Deltrans) was an 
emotive enough issue to wrought a sense of injustice in these workers who 
had for quite some time been indifferent to the union’s organising efforts.  
The bonus itself was paltry; it was the sense of unfairness which united the 
workers, inculcated a ‘them and us’ feeling. 
 
The bonus and employer mismanagement were also the triggers that 
stimulated union membership at Garry’s.  Eric, a shop steward at the time 
of the interview, was, in his own words “just an ordinary member” at the 
early stages of the campaign and recalls management circulating a list of 
workers and the bonus paid to each. Eric was a production worker and he 
and his colleagues felt particularly hard done by as “it was us on 
production putting out the big orders and they [other grades] were making 
money on our backs” (Eric). Their ire at the time was directed at other 
grades rather than the employer. 
 
A history of dissatisfaction with individual pay rates and proposed changes 
in the bonus system prompted the workers at Canalcon to approach a local 
trade union official, Oran.  He recalls well the day “two lads arrived looking 
to join … saying others interested too”.  He had had other similar 
approaches over the years that “went nowhere” so was not overly 
enthusiastic at first but agreed to meet whoever was interested in joining in 
a local hotel the following Friday evening.   
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I shoved 10 or 12 [membership application] forms into my pocket on 
the way and when I got there the whole place had showed up, 
operatives, fitters and supervisors, the lot, it was great but I had to 
get someone to dash back to the office for more forms  (Oran) 
 
Oran reports a long list of issues raised by these workers; different issues 
for different grades and locations, but those “shouting loudest” were 
concerned mostly about the bonus. 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the social partnership’s ‘national wage 
agreement’ was used as a benchmark for pay increases beyond the 
unionised sectors.  At Blackwater, in its first two years of operation it paid 
nurses, but not support staff, the public sector rates of pay and honoured 
the percentage increases under national wage agreements for both 
categories of staff.  In 2006, claiming a financial crisis, it failed to honour 
the increases due that year prompting large numbers of both support staff 
and nurses to contact the local general union.  The failure of Rosses to pay 
national wage agreements was also a major bone of contention for the 
workers there. 
 
A change in ownership triggered an upsurge of interest in union 
membership in several cases.  At Ard-na-Gaoithe a new owner fell afoul of 
the local population (which included staff and their families) by claiming 
sole fishing and boating rights along sections of the lake and by disputing 
long-used walkers’ right of way through the woods where the complex was 
located. He also replaced the General Manager who had been there for 27 
years, part of the rural community where the complex was located and 
popular with staff and locals alike.  “If he could replace him, none of us 
were safe” (Todd, shop steward at Ard-na-Gaoithe) prompting other grades 
of staff to join.   The campaign here was a lively one, sometimes fought in 
the community, on local radio and newspapers; the referring official, Kevin, 
was politically active and adept at using the media.  He describes the 
campaign as “brilliant” and “ideal for its iconic location in a small 
community, picture perfect really with its history, you can just see the 
master and servants in the castle”.  While a change of ownership was the 
trigger at Knockrada, Sara a student at the time of the campaign “wasn’t 
too bothered” as she lived with her parents and had support there.  Her 
concerns were more in relation to the plight of non-national workers and 
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the patients than herself as worker.  Similarly at Rosses where there was “a 
lot of infighting” and where “a real sense of grievance was just not there” 
(Morgan). 
 
Organising theory advocates the selection of issues which are “widely felt; 
deeply felt; winnable in part” (Banks & Conrow (a), n.d., n.p.); this was 
certainly the case in Deltrans.  The reverse may explain the later lack of 
success at Led-Pack, which was targeted deliberately by Conleth who had 
been so successful at Deltrans.  He felt he “had to think strategically and 
protect our Deltrans members’ work, you know, they did similar work for 
the same customer on a lower rate of pay”.  He organised the Deltrans 
workers wearing their Deltrans uniforms to distribute leaflets outside the 
Led-Pack plant calling for parity of pay.    Rory still works at Led-Pack and 
explains why the issue was not widely felt.  He says “the core of the union 
at Led-Pack was the warehouse, that’s where all the members came from” 
and they “alienated themselves” by seeking the Deltrans pay rates.  
  
Those were warehouse rates only, there was nothing [in the Deltrans 
pay scales] about a production line, because they didn’t have one, 
but we [at Led-Pack] did and they forgot that  (Rory) 
 
In addition, the production line consisted mostly of non-nationals and “they 
didn’t get it ... they thought that’s the Irish looking after themselves and 
expecting us to support them” (Rory).  The shop steward at Canalcon, 
William, reports something similar regarding the bonus there. He says this 
could never have been resolved as they did not present a united front.  The 
employer decided to cut a 7% bonus for those employed after 2003 to 4.5% 
while those with longer service could retain the higher rate.  When they 
tried to resolve this those who retained the 7% did not want any claim 
taken but “weren’t upfront with Oran about it”. He concludes that “there 
isn’t a union in the world could sort that one out” (William).   
 
Heery et al (2000b) point to the importance of justice-and-dignity type 
issues and Organising manuals also exhort campaigners to “express 
campaign goals and issues as a fight for social justice” (Banks & Conrow, a, 
n.d., n.p.).  Deltrans certainly made a justice-and-dignity issue of an 
emotive “cancelling of Christmas” over a mere €50, a pathetic sum by 
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comparison with the 17% pay increase and incremental salary scales later 
achieved.  The campaign at Ard-na-Gaoithe had something of the David and 
Goliath story to it which Kevin happily exploited.  Knockrada could have 
made more of the plight of non-national workers at that location, used it to 
create a campaign about justice-and-dignity, but seems not to have done 
so, and concentrated on the bread-and-butter type issues of the Irish 
membership. 
   
8.2.2 - Organization  
This “refers to the structure of a group” (Kelly, 1998, p.25), how they 
organise themselves. Simms concludes that the “sustainability of union 
organising campaigns rests on ... [a] ... combination of interest formation 
and representation both within and beyond the workplace” (Simms, 2007a 
p. 450), both internally in the workplace and externally in the wider union 
movement and society.  Important organisational issues found in this study 
include these matters but also union density and the union campaign itself, 
where and how the workers organised and how campaigners dealt with 
minority groups.  
 
Within the workplace - At Ard-na-Gaoithe the union campaign was “strong on 
communication” (Todd) and had “a compulsion on participation” by all 
members, making them all attend general meetings and participate in every 
decision (Kevin).  For the first meeting at the LRC Todd says “we already 
had a committee, a rep [representative] from every department and all eight 
of us filed into the meeting; that knocked them”.    All of those involved in 
Deltrans noted the strength of the union organisation at this plant.  Martin 
and John were elected shop stewards at Deltrans when membership 
increased substantially in 2002 but had also been union activists in 
previous employments.  They describe a very organised and focussed union 
campaign at Deltrans.  “We were propagandists, building mountains out of 
molehills” and “leading management into battles we knew we could win” 
(Martin).  Management at Deltrans had been dealing with the union official 
on individual matters, though only ever meeting him off-site and never 
putting anything in writing.  Nonetheless campaigners realised the value of 
this for demonstrating “union instrumentality” (Frege & Kelly, 2004, p.34).  
John says “it was handy to have the individual cases going, that kept the 
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union profile up, kept union in people’s minds” while they used the system 
of rotating shifts to systematically target all of the workers and ensure all 
were signed up.   
 
Minority Groups – Union campaigners at both Pegasus and Deltrans were 
aware of some of the minority groups amongst the workforce and took care 
to address their issues, or at least those groups which might materially 
affect their case.  At Deltrans the union organising committee identified a 
weak point for them whereby 40% of the workers were employed by an 
agency and not directly by Deltrans.  The committee advised the agency 
workers that 
  
...once we get to the table the first item on the agenda would be all 
agency workers removed from the site or else made direct [employees] 
so they all joined too  
(Martin, former shop steward)   
 
At Pegasus the union approached the company regarding English language 
classes for migrant workers on the production line and reached an 
agreement whereby the union would provide the classes for its members 
and the employer would provide the facilities.  This was later a factor in the 
firm’s winning of an award.  Yet it is only in 2013, some 7 years later that 
clerical workers are being targeted. Karl and Eamon, the shop stewards 
reported some limited success this year in recruiting two or three of “the 
girls in the office” but that grade was unimportant to them in the initial 
stages of the campaign. 
 
At Knockrada, Sara, though otherwise “not too bothered” was upset at the 
way some of the non-nationals were being treated. 
   
Those nurses worked dreadful hours.  One of them, straight from 
India, never got overtime, no holiday pay, she was owed loads ...the 
Philippine nurses, well they were institutionalised you know, they 
thought it was normal 
 
Yet Ross, the union official makes no mention of this group of workers at all 
in his interview and seems not to have approached them regarding 
membership.  Nowhere in the Knockrada file or the media coverage of the 
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case, is there any sense of an emphasis on the difference between 
“workplace injustice and union justice” (Johnson and Jarley (2004, p.557).  
Todd noted at Ard-na-Gaoithe that the Philippine workers never joined the 
union.  Probing revealed that they worked and lived as a group and were 
distinct from the other workers as they worked in a restaurant in an annexe 
separate from the main complex.  “There wasn’t an issue really, there were 
a few Polish and Czech people working here in the main complex and they 
joined when the rest of their Department did” (Todd). 
 
Beyond the workplace –The survey reported on in the previous chapter 
highlights fairly low rates of outside involvement specifically at Trades 
Council or at Sector or Divisional levels within unions with only two out of 
24 workplaces recording any such activity.  Some few exceptions arose in 
this part of the study.  Martin and John when they worked at Deltrans were 
instrumental in organising other plants owned by the same firm and also 
established and served on the European Works Council.  However those 
currently in membership there have no outside involvement on the Trades 
Council or at sectoral, divisional or national level in their union.  At 
Pegasus, Karl sometimes takes annual leave to attend training on occasions 
when he is unable to acquire paid release and on his day off has shown 
support to two local groups of striking workers.  These are exceptions.  In 
the weeks preceding the interviews the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU) had organised major anti-austerity demonstrations; a national 
protest in Dublin on the 26th November 2012 and local demonstrations in 
several locations on the 9th of February 2013.  None of the member 
interviewees had attended any of them and the majority were unaware of 
the events entirely. 
 
While levels of wider union involvement are low now some years after the 
initial organising of these workers, there also seems to have been little 
involvement at the time of the original campaign even just in terms of moral 
support for one another.  Take Rosses and Garry’s as examples:- both 
located in the same town each within five minutes walk of the union office; 
were both organised at the same time by the same referring official; 
attended at the LRC and at the Labour Court under the 2001 Act within 
weeks of one another and have the same servicing official.  Yet there was no 
connection between them; none of the member interviewees at one knew the 
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others nor were aware that they shared similar difficulties with their 
employers. 
   
Union density – While accepting that union density need not be “the 
sacrosanct indicator of labour’s success” (Sullivan, 2010) nevertheless 
unions cannot exist without members and there is in any event a critical 
mass needed to have any effect at the workplace. Determining numbers and 
density levels in the cases under review here was difficult.  In some cases 
unions provided information while in others the information was collated 
from information on union files such as copies of application forms or 
attendance sheets at meetings or for ballots.  This was augmented by the 
recollections of officials and shop stewards though the “twin problems of 
veracity and recall” (Field et al, 2005, page 55) should be borne in mind 
here as with any such recollections.  Below is the information on each 
workplace after which Table 8.3 below on page 148 shows the resulting 
estimates in tabular form. 
 
Deltrans - Union density at Deltrans reached the 100% mark at this 
particular location after the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendation 
and other depots in the same firm were subsequently organised. When its 
main customer, PC Ltd, closed its manufacturing plant there were 
disastrous consequences for Deltrans.  The plant under examination here 
which once employed 300 now employs less than 50; 38 of those are in the 
warehouse with 25 in membership of the union. 
 
Led-Pack - Conleth thinks union membership at Led-Pack never passed 40 
and the union records for January 2010 (a few months after PC Ltd closed) 
show 26 names 14 of whom were in arrears.  The following year that 
reduced to 4 and from January 2012 there has been just one member 
recorded there, the constant Rory. 
 
Pegasus - Consistent with Eileen and Karl’s description of events, the 
membership records at Pegasus show 15 new members in May of 2005 and 
an additional 5 later in the year.  A further 10 joined during 2007.  There 
are 4 or 5 new members each year since then, though likely to be 
replacement workers for those leaving or retiring as membership has 
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remained consistently between 30 and 33 members since 2010 out of an 
average workforce of 45. 
 
Knockrada - The Knockrada file records the names of 10 members voting in 
a ballot on industrial action in June 2005, reducing to six by January 2006 
when they voted to accept the Labour Court Recommendation.  Records 
from 2010 show just two in membership, one joined just before the 
Recommendation was issued and one afterwards but neither name is on 
either ballot list. None of the original workers associated with the claim are 
in membership of the union at that location, though one has been located 
working elsewhere and still in membership. 
 
Blackwater – the first members joined at Blackwater when it opened in 2004 
with two or three joining each year up to 2006. Surges in membership are 
then noticeable when the employer first announced its changes to the pay 
structure and again just in advance of the Labour Court hearing. Kevin 
claims he had about 90 members at one point; Caroline the shop steward 
says 70; Frank says it “was well down” from those figures by the time he 
took over from Kevin and it now stands at 20.  If there were circa 80 
members there in 2006, density at that time is estimated to be at around 
50%.  Staff numbers have trebled since then and density now is likely not to 
exceed 15%. 
 
Rosses - Early problems with union density at Rosses appear not to have 
been resolved.  After the initial eight workers joined in 2005, a further five 
joined just before the Labour Court hearing.  Since then four joined in 
2007; two in 2009 and one in 2012 though total members in benefit has 
remained at 11 or 12 members at all times in this workplace with 
approximately 85 employed.   
 
Garry’s - Though the union claimed at various times to have a significant 
number of members, suggesting 35 at one point, and Eric the former shop 
steward says all production workers were in membership, the records show 
five in membership when the first approach was made to the company.  A 
further five joined later in 2005 and five more just before the Labour Court 
hearing.  Since then there has been one new member in 2008; two in 2009 
and one in 2011.  The records show a total of between 12 and 16 benefit 
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members each year to 2012 and as a result of redundancies there are now 
only eight members remaining, Eric is unemployed.  Perhaps density 
reached 50 – 60% of the production workers at one point but quickly 
reduced to a third or less and now stands in single figures. 
 
Canalcon - Oran’s recollection regarding members joining en masse in 2005 
is supported by the membership records.  Thirty-five workers joined 
between February and March when the first Labour Court Recommendation 
was issued; with one other joining just before the Determination was issued 
and one other directly afterwards.  It took another five years before one new 
member was added in Canalcon when between May and October 2011, 17 
new members are recorded, shortly after a change in ownership.  Current 
membership stands at 30.  Density now is about 56% due to the influx in 
2011 but had been less than 40% for the five years prior. 
 
Ard-na-Gaoithe - Both Todd and Kevin claim high rates of union density were 
achieved during the campaign, 70% and 90% respectively.  If their estimate 
of 100 workers is correct then, from the records to hand, density was 
significantly lower than either had claimed.  Thirty four workers joined the 
union during 2002 and a further two or three each year up to 2012.  
Numbers remained around 30 up until redundancies in 2010 and there 
appear to be only six paying members currently.  A further 11 are on the 
books but are in significant arrears24.  If that latter group are included it 
brings current density to about 15%. 
 
Oakchurch - Membership records are not available for this workplace but 
Owen claims 50% of the grade in question were in membership at the time 
the case was taken.  There were major changes afterwards.  There had been 
a pattern of lay-off during the winter months and re-hire the following 
spring.  Few if any of the claimants were recalled in spring the year 
following the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendation but “the usual 
pattern there is they join when there is a problem - we resolve it and we 
24 It transpires some of these may be paying their union dues into the wrong 
account. 
 
147 
                                           
hear no more until the next problem” (Owen).  There are currently no 
members at that location. 
 
Table 8.3 below shows current membership numbers in each location with 
estimates of union density at the time the Labour Court Recommendation 
was issued and again at the time of research 2012/2013. Apart from 
Deltrans and Pegasus with density levels of 66% and 70% respectively, 
rates are very low in the remaining cases. Blackwater, Rosses and Ard-na-
Gaoithe at best are at 15% and the others in single figures.   Oakchurch, 
Led-Pack and Knockrada have no union membership at all except for Rory 
at Led-Pack.  Redundancy has been a feature in some cases (Deltrans; Ard-
na-Gaoithe; Garry’s; Oakchurch and Led-Pack) and expansion at 
Blackwater.  Nonetheless Deltrans and Pegasus stand out in terms of 
density levels and the consistency of same since they were first organised. 
 
Table 8.3 – Ten selected cases - Membership and density levels 
Workplace Group 
Current 
Member
ship 
Density 
before 
LCR 
Density 2012 / 
2013 
 
Deltrans 
 
E 
 
25 
 
100% 
 
    66% 
 
 
Pegasus 
 
E 
 
33 
 
70% 
 
70% 
 
 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
 
D 
 
17 
 
30% 
 
15% 
 
Garry’s 
 
 
D 
 
8 
 
50% 
 
≤10% 
 
Rosses 
 
C 
 
12 
 
15% 
 
15% 
 
 
Canalcon 
 
C 
 
37 
 
70% 
 
56% 
 
Blackwater 
 
B 
 
20 
 
0% 
 
15% 
 
 
Oakchurch 
 
B 
0 50% 
0% 
 
 
Led-Pack 
 
A 
1 10% 
0% 
 
 
Knockrada 
 
A 
0 24% 0% 
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 8.2.3 - Mobilization  
Atzeni (2010) disputes the essential role of leaders particularly with 
reference to workplace leaders and mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998).  Other 
studies emphasise the role of activists (Darlington, 2001; 2002; Fairbrother, 
1996; 2000; Batstone et al, 1977; Beynon, 1973) while organising theory 
that of union officials or organisers who will help to frame issues 
particularly those which might not be “spontaneously identified” (Simms, 
2007(b), p.125); “identify and construct common interests among a diversity 
of interest groups” (Simms, 2007(a) p.439) and “build the confidence of 
activists” (Simms, 2007(b), p.127).  This study notes the role of each type of 
leader including those with national responsibilities. 
 
National/Senior union officers played varying roles in these cases, twice 
brought in by local officials to talk to the members to help get them out of 
what were perceived to be difficult situations. In Deltrans, the workers voted 
to go on strike when the employer refused to implement the Labour Court 
Recommendation.  Management made an interim offer of 14% in light of the 
pending strike.   Tim (current shop steward) recalls the reactions to this, 
particularly that of Conleth (the official) who according to Tim “nearly went 
off his head” when the Committee rejected the offer.  Conleth “brought up 
the Regional Secretary” and it was “no plain sailing” but the Committee 
insisted that they now “had management on the back foot so let’s keep 
going and go to the gate” meaning to go out on strike (Tim).  A similar 
situation arose in Ard-na-Gaoithe where a senior officer came to meet the 
members after a ballot in favour of industrial action there.  The worker 
reaction here was different however according to Todd who remarks “were 
we ever glad to see him coming.  He explained about the 2001 Act, that we 
could use that instead and wouldn’t have to go on strike – phew!” 
 
National officers were also those who took decisions in relation to 
Recommendations or Determinations once they became the focus of legal 
proceedings.  At Canalcon, Oran the referring official, sought a 
Determination when the employer failed to implement the Recommendation.  
The employer reacted by issuing proceedings at the High Court.  Union 
Head Office advised Oran that they would not be defending against 
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Canalcon’s legal challenge “they were pulling the plug as Ryanair had 
already won their case” (Oran).  A Settlement Agreement between the 
employer as applicant, the Labour Court as Respondent and the union as 
notice party is included on the Canalcon file.  Effectively the union agrees 
“not to take any action in relation to the Determination” and the company 
agrees to adjourn proceedings much to Oran’s disappointment. A similar 
situation arose at Blackwater where Frank’s attempt at getting a 
Determination failed. “When Head Office saw Blackwater’s submission, I got 
a call saying ‘why haven’t you that effin’ thing withdrawn?’” (Frank). The 
senior/national officers in this study demonstrated more support for the 
2001 Act than the local union officials and certainly seemed to prefer that 
option than to take industrial action in pursuit of union recognition. 
 
What of the “entrenched union officials” (Hickey et al, 2010, p.56)?  Their 
role in this study was often complicated by the “dual system of 
accountability to which union officers are subject”, to the members on one 
side and to senior officers on the other (Kelly & Heery, 1994, p.90), as per 
Frank’s and Oran’s experiences above.  This was aggravated by time 
constraints and staff turnover.  Ross was the referring official at Knockrada 
at a time when officials in his union fulfilled all roles, from recruiting new 
members; servicing grievances locally and at third party and dealing with 
political and administrative issues for c. 2,000 members in a rural area.  As 
such “I couldn’t put the time into that campaign, you’d need Organisers to 
do the spade work” (Ross).  Staff turnover was also an issue.  At Blackwater, 
Kevin, the referring official was promoted and left the area after the Labour 
Court Recommendation was issued. Frank who took over from him 
remarked “Kevin got the Rec and took off” and there was a delay in applying 
for the Determination which eventually proved fatal.  Blackwater’s employer 
submission to the Labour Court drew the Court’s attention to “the inaction” 
of the union “during the inordinate period of time which has passed since 
the Recommendation was issued” (Blackwater file).  “They had us there, it 
wasn’t dealt with in a timely fashion” (Frank).   
 
It would have been ideal to examine the roles of union officials further 
particularly to see if for example they would conform to Watson’s typology of 
“cosmopolitans and locals” (1988, p.83) or Kelly and Heery’s 1994 study of 
“managerialists, regulationists or leaders” (p.192).  Different styles and 
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personalities were certainly apparent: - Conleth and Eileen very focussed on 
organising; Kevin a more political animal and Ross at wit’s end servicing a 
large number of members in a wide geographical area.  Taking this any 
further on the basis of interviews of one or two hours duration and with a 
singular focus on the 2001 Act in one workplace would have been futile, 
though their attitudes to the 2001 Act bear notice.  Owen and Eileen 
profess themselves pleased enough with the process in particular 
situations, Oakchurch and Pegasus respectively while Morgan is more 
neutral having used it only when he had “run into a road block” in both 
Garry’s and Rosses.  Conleth and Kevin were reluctant to use the 
procedures each having first balloted for strike though Kevin was happy 
with the outcome at both Ard-na-Gaoithe and Blackwater.  Those in a 
servicing role were less happy, perhaps because they dealt with those same 
workplaces at a later date and many expressed a preference for a statutory 
recognition procedure in line with D’Art & Turner’s similar findings in 2005.  
Frank was particularly forthright: -  
 
it was great for those working there at the time, they lined their 
pockets and fair play to them but we still didn’t get recognition.  
What about those coming after them? They [management] wouldn’t 
let me inside the gates; you’d think I was the devil incarnate.  As an 
organising tool it’s an absolute waste of space, there’s no way of 
keeping the momentum alive (Frank) 
 
Officials tended to credit activists and shop stewards for successes: - Ringo 
in Deltrans; Karl in Pegasus; Peter in Canalcon; Todd in Ard-na-Gaoithe 
were all praised by their referring official.  Equally, workplace leaders were 
deemed part of the problem elsewhere; Conleth “didn’t have a Ringo” in Led-
Pack; a “totally inexperienced” Corina in Rosses subsequently ‘sent to 
Coventry’ by the members and at Garry’s a “so enthusiastic” Eric but with 
“unreal expectations” (Morgan).  All except John at Deltrans described 
themselves as Martin did, that is, “not really a leftie”, so no sign then of the 
apparently essential “left-wing militants” (Kelly, 1998, p.35) even in the 
most successful campaigns.  In fact, some officials felt the lack of 
enthusiasm acutely; Morgan was “doing all the pushing” at Rosses though 
good relationships between the referring official and the shop steward seem 
to have been a factor in the early stages in Pegasus, Deltrans, Ard-na-
Gaoithe and Canalcon.  Relationships changed as staff changed but also as 
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the role itself changed.  Caroline was successful as an activist in Blackwater 
but seems ineffectual now as shop steward though in a situation where 
there is no recognition and she clearly is unimpressed with the current 
servicing official.  William in Canalcon is similar.  Eric at Garry’s is an 
interesting case, weak in the early organising campaign but seems to have 
come into his own during their 3 week protest regarding their redundancy 
payments.  There may then be issues regarding the “transition from 
organising to representation” as identified by Simms (2006). Moore (2011) 
encounters similar situations and sees the need for training for activists 
recalling Darlington’s three types of activist activity ‘facing’ different others 
(Darlington, 1994).  Perhaps the example of John at Deltrans suggests that 
rather than there being entirely different kinds of activists, that some at 
least can develop into left wing or militant shop stewards as a result of 
prolonged union activism. 
 
8.2.4 – Opportunity 
 Opportunity speaks to those issues which trigger a group into acting 
“together in pursuit of common interests” (Tilly, 1978, p.7) usually “the 
policies and actions of employers and the state” (Kelly, 1989, p.37).  
Deltrans is a good example where the campaigners rejoiced at the 
cancellation of the bonus “and we got our chance” (John) something 
management at Led-Pack “was not stupid enough” to do (Conleth).  Owen at 
Oakchurch seized the opportunity of what he termed an “emboldened” 
Chairperson of the Labour Court presiding over the Ard-na-Gaoithe case 
and also used the leverage opportunity of a forthcoming high profile event 
due to take place at Oakchurch. 
 
Deltrans and Pegasus also understood quite well what could not be 
construed as opportunity.  Conleth, for the Labour Court hearing “decided 
to narrow the issue down to the PPF [the most recent social partnership 
agreement], that way everyone would gain when we won”, calculating 
correctly that there was no point in taking the agency workers issue to the 
Labour Court, nor the emotive but monetarily puny Christmas bonus.   
English lessons for non-nationals at Pegasus was another issue correctly 
not viewed as appropriate for the Labour Court but kept in reserve, 
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something it was in the employer’s interest to later concede and around 
which the union could continue to campaign.  
 
There is also revealed in these cases the concept of missed opportunity and 
the mistaking of process with outcome and vice versa. There is a sense 
amongst some union staff and shop stewards that the ‘voluntary leg’ of the 
process at the LRC was merely a passage, a means to the Labour Court and 
in turn that the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendation was in itself 
an end.  Taking the ‘voluntary leg’ first - in several cases (Rosses, Garry’s, 
Oakchurch) progress was made at the LRC which suggests some form of 
bargaining or at least accommodation between the parties.  Yet this was not 
seen as an outcome in itself, an achievement to parade, an opportunity to 
demonstrate “union instrumentality” (Frege & Kelly, 2004, p.34).  Indeed 
there is a suggestion that the relationship might actually have worsened as 
a result of the Labour Court hearing despite progress at LRC level, 
something also noted by Devine and Halpenny’s earlier study (2002).  At 
Garry’s for example some progress was made at the LRC on at least four 
items which the members “relished” (Morgan) but later the company 
implemented the Recommendation to the letter refusing to extend it to 
grades not specifically mentioned.  The Ard-na Gaoithe recommendation 
was eventually implemented in full, but the next servicing official there 
could “hardly get past the gate” (Frank).  There is a sense that the Labour 
Court hearing somehow worsened the situation in several cases in line 
perhaps with Moore’s contention that “...once a case is in procedure, a 
number of contending forces come into play...” (Moore, 2004, p.13)   
 
Part of the problem for union officials is that the Labour Court 
Recommendation in other contexts is generally the end of the matter, of one 
particular issue.  It will either be accepted by the membership or they may 
vote for industrial action or negotiations may even re-commence.  Either 
way the Recommendation comes at the end of a process of engagement and 
negotiation between the parties, a process where there is likely some give 
and take.  The difference with the 2001 Act is that the Labour Court 
hearing is held in isolation, maybe the only time the parties have been in 
the same room. 
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Such difficulties did not arise in Deltrans where there was “such excitement 
about that rec” recalls Martin, “the non-union [workers] worried they 
wouldn’t get it” and the remaining 85 workers all joined.  John says they 
“stayed on a high after that” which the official and activists used to good 
effect.  Conversely, the Labour Court Recommendation was very much seen 
as an end in some other cases.  In Oakchurch, the members “took the loot 
and ran” (Owen) while at Ard-na-Gaoithe they “lined their pockets” without 
thinking of “those coming after them” (Frank).  Knockrada members “saw 
no victory” in the Labour Court Recommendation (Ross) while Garry’s 
members were “pleased to have ‘won’ as such but they had expected more 
money” (Morgan).  Some union staff seemed also to see the issuing as 
opposed to the implementation of the Recommendation as an end in itself 
and allowed a sort of hiatus to develop after the Recommendation was 
issued.  Rory reports no union activity at all at Led-Pack after the 
Recommendation; Sara at Knockrada felt they, the members, “were left in 
limbo” afterwards; Eric says “it all fell apart” at Garry’s while at Blackwater 
Caroline says “it all just faded away”.  Some of the “inaction” at Blackwater 
might be attributable to staff changes but not the “inordinate period of 
time” (employer submission to Labour Court) which elapsed between the 
issuing of the Recommendation and the application for the Determination.  
The Recommendation is seen as an end in itself, rather than part of the 
process, unlike at Pegasus, Deltrans and Ard-na-Gaoithe where the 
Recommendation was seen as an opportunity and immediately put to use 
but also crucially where they had other on-going issues around which to 
mobilise. 
 
8.2.5 - Collective Action  
Collective action in the context of this study means something other than 
Tilly’s revolution or Kelly’s strikes, something more along the lines of the 
Webbs’ “continuous association of wage earners” (1920, p.1) working 
together, doing something collectively “in pursuit of common interests” 
(Tilly, 1978, p.7).  Deltrans and Pegasus have consistently engaged in 
collective action in the years since their respective Labour Court 
Recommendations were issued.  Deltrans shop stewards helped organise at 
other locations and established a European Works Council in the firm; 
Pegasus shop stewards ensured the continuation of English classes and 
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ongoing though unfinished negotiations on the handbook.  Ard-an-Gaoithe, 
notwithstanding Roger’s view in the survey, demonstrates some 
collectivism; Garry’s did too in terms of organising a 3 week protest 
regarding their redundancy.  At Blackwater Hospital, Rosses and Canalcon 
there is little evidence of any collective or co-operative action; most of what 
passes for union activity is merely conversations between individual shop 
stewards and the union organiser. In dealing with management, Kenneth 
would not “mention union as such … I just say ‘the lads were wondering 
this or they were saying that’”. Led-Pack and Knockrada never had any 
union activity after the Labour Court Recommendation and have none now 
and hardly a member between them.   
 
Part of the difficulty with the 2001 Act is that use of the procedures can 
hardly be described as a collective act.  The union files available all contain 
letters and submissions to and by union officials; advice and guidance from 
senior union officers; legal opinion, affidavits and judgments.  The 
processing of cases requires little actual input from the workers themselves, 
the union members, by comparison with that required by union staff.  In 
some cases there seemed to be little understanding of what was happening.  
Caroline at Blackwater knew nothing about the application for a 
Determination.  An otherwise well-versed Karl at Pegasus admits he “didn’t 
realise that it wasn’t just another Labour Court hearing”.  Todd admits he 
found the process “daunting” and “a nightmare at times” and of the 
preliminary decision he said “that was six pages of legalese, no way I’d put 
that around”.  Marius remarks that when he first started work at Pegasus 
“the outside reps [union officials] were more active but now they have too 
many shops and we do not see them since a long time”.  Todd at the start of 
his interview enquired warmly after all the union staff he had encountered 
during the Ard-na-Gaoithe campaign; not just Kevin and Frank, but also 
their immediate superior the Regional Secretary, the administrative staff, 
the Head of Organising and the Head of Legal Affairs.  He named them all 
correctly, first and last names, yet later in the interview when trying to 
speak of the then current servicing official, “yer man” was as much as he 
could manage without being prompted. 
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8.2.6 – Substantive benefits from the Labour Court Recommendations 
It is time to collate the extent of the mobilising nature of the campaigns, to 
compare the process with the outcomes such as membership, 
representative structures and ‘organisedness’, but one other factor needs 
first to be taken into consideration.  Some in the trade union movement 
defend the 2001 Act on the basis of its usefulness in improving the terms 
and conditions of employment of union members, that is those who would 
never be able to negotiate such improvements (Shanahan, 2007; Dobbins, 
2007b).  Has this been true of those cases in this part of the study?  In four 
of the ten cases, Deltrans, Pegasus, Ard-na-Gaoithe and Garry’s, the terms 
of their respective Recommendations were implemented and represented a 
substantial improvement in the pay and conditions of workers at those 
locations thus: - 
 
Deltrans - In the case of Deltrans the Labour Court recommended in favour 
of the union’s claim for payment of the terms of the then current national 
wage agreement, and it was implemented in full, albeit after a ballot for 
industrial action.  
  
Pegasus - At Pegasus the Recommendation represented a substantial 
improvement in the terms and conditions of employment of all grades of 
worker at Pegasus. While the pay terms were implemented fairly swiftly, the 
non-pay elements were to be incorporated into an employee handbook 
which is still under negotiation.    
 
Ard-na-Gaoithe - At Ard na Gaoithe the Labour Court ruled in favour of the 
union’s claim on all points which meant pay increases in the region of €60-
70 per week for many grades; a 13 week sick pay scheme and a 5% pension 
contribution from the employer to add to that of the employee.  After the 
High Court ruling the pay increases were applied retrospectively to the date 
of the first meeting at the LRC and resulted in lump sum payments of up to 
€20,000 in some cases. 
 
Garry’s - The Labour Court recommended that in Garry’s a pay structure be 
implemented on rates closer to those being offered by the company but 
significantly lower than those being sought by the union although subject to 
 
156 
subsequent national wage agreement increases.  The Court found in favour 
of the company’s offer of a graded sick pay scheme but ruled against the 
many restrictions the company had also suggested.  The pay terms were 
implemented.   
 
Only the workers directly involved in the claim at Oakchurch were 
successful.   
 
Oakchurch - On the substantive issues the Court ruled that “the current 
rates paid to those associated with this claim are out of line and should be 
adjusted”.  Rates of pay were adjusted from €11 per hour in April 2006 
incrementally to €14.50 per hour by January 2008 and were also subject to 
normal national wage agreement increases.  These increases involving 
substantial improvements were implemented immediately for those involved 
in the claim but the rates were not applied to subsequent employees. 
 
Rosses - At Rosses the Labour Court Recommendation did not provide any 
gains as such but confirmed agreement reached during the ‘voluntary leg’ at 
the LRC.  The company had already offered to increase pay and to introduce 
both shift premia and a sick pay scheme.  The Court recommended that 
these should be accepted and in addition that pay should be increased in 
line with any national wage agreements.  Morgan was pleased with the 
Recommendation believing that while most of what was gained was as a 
result of the ‘voluntary leg’ process, the Recommendation “copper-fastened 
things, put it in writing”.  The Recommendation was implemented without 
any further discussions and the employer remained hostile even to the 
extent of having Morgan escorted off the premises by security staff when he 
drove into the car park to deliver leaflets to the shop stewards. 
 
Workers at Canalcon, Blackwater, Knockrada and Led-Pack never 
benefitted from the substantive terms of their respective Labour Court 
Recommendations. 
 
Led-Pack - The Labour Court recommended that Led-Pack “introduce a 
service related salary scale, in line with that paid by Deltrans”; that 
increases should be in line with National Wage Agreements and accepted 
the company’s assurances that it would amend its disciplinary and 
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grievance procedure so that individuals could be represented by a union.  
The employer failed to implement the Recommendation and the usual 
course of events would have included an application for a Determination.  
Lesley was covering for Conleth’s sick leave at the time and chose not to 
apply for a determination, awaiting the outcome of the Ryanair case.  
  
Knockrada - At Knockrada the employer conceded recognition to the nurses’ 
union at the hearing, so the Labour Court Recommendation dealt only with 
the issues raised by the general union.  The Court was satisfied that rates 
of pay were “out of line with appropriate standards” and awarded pay 
increases close to the union’s claim and the introduction of standard shift 
and overtime payments.  The Recommendation was never implemented and 
the provision under the Act to seek a Determination in the event of a 
Recommendation not being implemented was not utilised. The 
Recommendation therefore had no substantive impact for those associated 
with it. 
 
Blackwater - At Blackwater the Labour Court Recommendation provided 
that rates of pay be those negotiated in the HSE and generally paid in other 
health facilities; increased redundancy payments to 4 weeks per year of 
service and ruled that all further redundancies be implemented according to 
the Last-In-First-Out principle and that Blackwater should re-introduce the 
sick pay arrangements it originally offered to staff. The Recommendation 
was not implemented and the union applied to the Labour Court for a 
Determination.  The hearing never went ahead and no Determination was 
ever issued.  
 
Canalcon - The Court declined to rule on the substantive issues in dispute at 
Canalcon ruling that “the conditions of employment … for this group of 
workers, when viewed in their totality are not out of line with appropriate 
standards” and taking into consideration the employer’s commitment to the 
introduction of a 39 hour week and a sick pay scheme and that its 
grievance and disciplinary procedures would be amended to include the 
“use of the machinery of the State in appropriate cases”.  The employer 
however “did exactly what it says on the tin” (Oran) and proposed a sick pay 
scheme in to which however the workers had to pay a fee before they were 
eligible for payment.  William and Peter the current shop stewards said the 
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payments from the scheme were quite poor and that “if you were married or 
had kids you’d be better off just getting the welfare and not claiming that at 
all”.  The company adjusted the working week from 42 to 39 hours, the 
norm in the industry, but failed to compensate the workers for the loss of 
working hours.  The union sought the Determination on the basis that the 
employer “failed to honour the[se] commitments” made at the Court hearing 
and referred to in the Recommendation (union correspondence to Labour 
Court).  The employer based its objection to the Determination on the 
grounds that it had merely “intended” to implement these changes and that 
they were not part of the Recommendation as such and could not therefore 
be the subject of a Determination. In effect, “there was no benefit in the 
end” (William). 
 
There is then a strong correlation between the bargaining status of a 
workplace (Groups A to E) and whether or not there were improvements in 
pay and conditions of employment as a result of the implementation of the 
Labour Court Recommendations.  The best results were achieved in Groups 
E and D – Delpack, Pegasus, Ard-na-Gaoithe and Garry’s. 
 
8.3 – Is the 2001 Act “a credible union renewal strategy”? 
(De Turberville, 2004, p.775) 
 
Table 8.4 on the next page lists seven measures, the five components of 
mobilisation theory and of the organising model adjusted to take account of 
the situation since the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendations 
(Interests 8.2.1 above, Organization 8.2.2 above, Mobilization 8.2.3 above, 
Opportunity 8.2.4 above and Collective Action 8.2.5 above) alongside the 
outcomes in the shape of Membership Patterns (Table 8.3 above) and 
Substantive benefits from Labour Court Recommendations 8.2.6 above.  
Workplace names are entered opposite each according to whether they 
could be deemed to have scored positively or negatively under each 
measure, or are omitted for a measure where it was unclear, mixed or 
contradictory or where there was insufficient information. 
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 Table 8.4 – Ten selected cases - Comparing ‘Organisedness’ and Outcomes 
 
 Measures Positive Negative 
‘O
rganisedness’ 
 
Interests 
Deltrans 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Garry’s 
Knockrada 
Rosses 
Led-Pack 
Canalcon 
 
Organization 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Knockrada 
Rosses 
Garry’s 
 
Mobilization 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Canalcon 
Blackwater 
Led-Pack 
Rosses 
Garry’s 
 
Opportunity 
Deltrans 
Oakchurch 
Pegasus 
Knockrada 
Led-Pack 
 
Collective Action 
 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Blackwater 
Rosses 
Canalcon 
Knockrada 
Oakchurch 
Led-Pack 
O
utcom
es 
 
Membership Pattern 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Knockrada 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Garry’s 
Rosses 
Canalcon 
Blackwater 
Oakchurch 
Led-Pack 
 
Substantive improvements 
from Labour Court 
Recommendation 
 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Garry’s 
Canalcon 
Blackwater 
Knockrada 
Led-Pack 
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 Giving a plus or minus score for each entry as appropriate allows a ranking 
of workplaces into three broad categories according to how ‘organised’ they 
were, how good measurable outcomes were and according to bargaining 
status, Groups A, B, C, D, and E.  See Table 8.5 below: - 
 
Table 8.5 – Ten selected cases – High, medium and low scores on ‘Organisedness’ 
 High Medium Low 
 
 
‘Organisedness’ 
 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
 
Blackwater 
Canalcon 
Oakchurch 
 
Garry’s 
Rosses 
Knockrada 
Led-Pack 
 
Outcomes  
(Membership & 
Substantive 
Improvements 
 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
 
Blackwater 
Oakchurch 
Garry’s 
Canalcon 
Rosses 
 
Knockrada 
Led-Pack 
 
Groups  
D & E =High 
C = Medium 
A & B = Low 
 
Deltrans 
Pegasus 
Ard-na-Gaoithe 
Garry’s 
 
Rosses 
Canalcon 
 
Blackwater 
Oakchurch 
Knockrada 
Led-Pack 
 
Thus a pattern emerges which might be described as a continuum whereby 
the greater the emphasis in the union’s campaign on mobilisation and 
organising model type methods, the better the outcome in terms of 
membership levels, improved conditions, union activism and the likelihood 
of collective bargaining.  Deltrans, Pegasus and Ard-na-Gaoithe can be seen 
at the higher end of the continuum opposite Knockrada and Led-Pack 
consistently at the lower end, with the middle ground occupied by 
Blackwater, Oakchurch, Canalcon, Garry’s and Rosses.  Of course there are 
anomalies; these are notional categories, the middle ground is occupied by 
very different situations. Garry’s which might have scored quite lowly in 
terms of the early campaign at that location yet had an active core by the 
time redundancies took place in 2012.  The crisis of redundancy might have 
contributed to this but the changing abilities of Eric as his role changed has 
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already been noticed. Ard-na-Gaoithe, consistently at the higher end of the 
continuum had initially been categorised by Roger the current servicing 
official as fitting into Group D, confidential members who rarely contact 
him.  Todd explains “There are no issues here, we don’t need the official, 
we’ve taught them [the management] a lesson”.  He goes on to describe an 
incident which took place during negotiations he led (without the union 
official) regarding redundancies and pay cuts as a result of the economic 
recession in 2010. One Department Head was seeking to have cuts applied 
to a service charge paid in departments other than her own.  The General 
Manager replied, according to Todd, “like a burnt child who’s always 
careful, he said to her ‘yeah, I’ll cut the service charge alright, but YOU can 
go to the High Court and try to explain it’”. 
 
This chapter describes campaigns in ten very different situations with 
varying outcomes, though a pattern can be established.  The more a 
campaign matched a mobilising or Organising model approach and with 
subsequently higher levels of ‘organisedness’ the better the outcome for the 
union as an organisation in terms of membership levels and activism.  This 
also holds true for members; higher levels of ‘organisedness’ seem to 
contribute to greater improvements in their pay and conditions, at least in 
so far as the Labour Court Recommendations were actually implemented.  
Positive views of the process can be expected from union members in 
Groups D and E though few of them credit the 2001 Act procedures per se 
with their current situation. There are no members remaining at Oakchurch 
or Knockrada; the lone member at Led-Pack was not enamoured of the 
process; there are mixed views at Canalcon.  Several however echo Kenneth 
and Corina at Rosses who associate the Labour Court process with “getting 
the union in” and who both said that their workplace was previously, and 
would again be, “ten times worse” without the union. 
 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 9 
The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men - Revisited 
 
The ‘best laid schemes’ of this or any qualitative research are informed by 
the goals of the researcher, two major goals being the practical and the 
intellectual (Maxwell, 2005, p.16).  Practical goals are bound up with the 
need to justify the study and with achieving something practical “meeting 
some need, changing some situation, or achieving some objective” (Maxwell, 
2005, p.21).  Intellectual goals concern the need to understand meanings 
and contexts and to discover and elucidate the “unanticipated phenomena 
and influences” and causal explanations of a study (Maxwell, 2005, p.22-
23).  This chapter will deal with these practical and intellectual goals and 
the extent to which they and the research questions outlined in Chapter 4 
have been answered. 
 
9.1 - The intellectual goals 
 
The intellectual goals of a study are those most closely linked to the 
conceptual framework which in this case concerned the interactions 
between a particular dimension and the agency of a particular actor.  The 
dimension was described as a “static interpretation of freedom of 
association” (Leader, 2002, p.128) and the industrial relations framework 
which evolved therefrom; the agency, that of workers and trade unions and 
how they function or renew themselves (Chapter 4).  Thus, the main 
research question concerned how one aspect of that dimension, the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, interacted with the agency of 
the workers and trade unions trying to mobilise under its terms.   
 
The exploration of Labour Court Recommendations in Chapter 6 reveals 
patterns in the usage of the 2001 Act procedures.  The bulk of the cases are 
taken by two trade unions (SIPTU and MANDATE) representing mostly 
semi-skilled workers employed in just a few economic sectors 
(Manufacturing, Transportation & Storage, Wholesale & Retail) by Irish 
employers.  The emergent substantive recommendations deal for the most 
part with pay and those union claims which are successful are so by 
reference to three specific criteria: - by reference to existing labour law (e.g., 
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provision of pay slips,); by reference to pay rates and conditions in 
analogous employments and by reference to pay rates and improved 
conditions achieved by the currently defunct social partnership system (sick 
pay and pension schemes).  In terms of direct effect, then, the 2001 Act 
procedures confirm legal minimum or social partnership conditions of 
employment for mostly semi-skilled workers which category constituted 
some 14% of the total ‘At Work’ figures during the years in which the cases 
were taken (CSO, 2012).  At least that would be the effect if the Labour 
Court Recommendations were implemented; Chapter 8 demonstrates that 
many were not.  
 
The narrowness of the 2001 Act coverage is also emphasised by reference to 
the economic sectors in which cases are mostly taken.  At a time when the 
economy is quite clearly moving from the “traditional sector” to the “modern 
sector” (CSO 2013), 35% of cases under the 2001 Act concern 
manufacturing firms which comprise 13% of those at work, a declining 
sector in itself.  A focus on pay and comparisons with rates in unionised 
firms in the same industry must present a difficulty for unions attempting 
to use the procedure during a recession where there is downward pressure 
on wages and/or in new emerging previously non-union sectors. How will 
analogous employments be found for these workers?  How will ‘fair pay’ 
increases be determined in the absence of national wage agreements?  
 
The Recommendations also have indirect effect, suggesting or emphasising 
particular approaches to industrial relations.  As the 2001 Act is precluded 
from providing for collective bargaining, the rights or wrongs of trade union 
recognition are not discussed; there is no debate nor arbitration on the 
merits or otherwise of trade union recognition in any particular workplace. 
The 2001 Act exerts such “control over the agenda” that “the matter is not 
discussed” (Lukes, 2005, p.22).  There is however increased discussion on 
legal interpretations of the Labour Court Recommendations with, 
particularly in light of the Ryanair challenge of one Recommendation, an 
inclination on the part of employers to sue in the courts of law; a 
consequent inclination to seek legal advice on the part of trade unions, the 
Labour Court and the Labour Relations Commission.  The Labour Court 
has already had to amend how it hears cases under the 2001 Act amid 
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concerns that such juridification may yet extend to the Labour Court’s 
operations under other industrial relations legislation. 
 
Part of an intellectual goal can be to address a perceived gap in the 
literature, in this case, rather than focussing separately on the 2001 Act 
and on union organising, to see the connections and possible contradictions 
between trade union participation in the 2001 Act procedures and those 
same trade unions’ adherence to new forms of renewal, a focus on 
mobilisation or the so-called ‘organising’ model of trade unionism.  Is there 
a conflict?  At the level of the workplace the effect of the 2001 Act depends 
on the context in which it is used.  A pattern emerges in Chapter 8, 
described as a continuum, whereby the greater the emphasis in the union’s 
campaign on mobilisation and organising model methods, the better the 
outcome in terms of membership levels, improved conditions, union 
activism and the likelihood of collective bargaining.  See Figure 9.1 below. 
 
Figure 9.1 – An ‘Organisedness’ Continuum 
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The more successful union campaigns included: -  
 
• issues that were “widely felt; deeply felt; winnable in part” (Banks & 
Conrow, (a), n.d., n.p.); that included outlying or minority groups and 
grades; 
• issues that could be described as justice-and-dignity issues even 
though (and particularly if) the bread-and-butter type issues were 
referred to the Labour Court;  
• union officials with an organising as opposed to a servicing focus;  
• strong workplace leaders and consistency in union density;  
• the use of the Labour Court referral and recommendation as an 
opportunity, a means to an end and not ends in themselves and 
finally,  
• the coexistence of the Labour Court process with some forms of 
collective action, if not industrial action or its potential 
 
In that sense the 2001 Act need not conflict with mobilisation theory or the 
organising model of trade unionism so long as it is used as just one tool in a 
strategic approach, one from the “‘toolbox of practices’” available (Simms & 
Holgate, 2010, p.157).   
 
The nature of the collective bargaining and trade unionism which emerges 
as a result of the 2001 Act emphasises the foregoing even further.  
Collective bargaining does not automatically follow from participation in the 
procedures provided for under the 2001 Act, not that it was ever intended to 
so do.  In only two cases out of 48 for which there is such information can 
collective bargaining be said to exist; collective bargaining, that is, 
according to traditional definitions involving trade unions as defined by 
Brown (2008) and by the Labour Court in the Ashford Castle case 
(LCR117675) (See Chapter 6).  The 2001 Act however, in allowing legal 
intervention into such definitions has changed the definition of collective 
bargaining in Irish industrial relations.  There now exists, even in trade 
union minds, the concept of “‘genuinely independent’ non-union ‘collective 
bargaining’” even if only “for the purpose of the 2001-2004 Acts” (ICTU, 
2013, p.35). 
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The changing definition of collective bargaining also speaks to the nature of 
the trade unionism which emerges from the 2001 Act.  Chapter 6 
demonstrated the tendency of Labour Court Recommendations to support 
the role of trade unions in the representation of individual members in 
trouble with their employers via grievance and disciplinary procedures.  
Acceptance of non-union forms of collective bargaining emphasises this 
corralling of unions into the role of individual representation, likely confined 
to issues around misbehaviour and exit, as opposed to the trade union role 
of representative of a class. Chapter 7 confirms this changing role.  
Membership levels in workplaces where cases were taken are mostly in 
single figures; so low as to make any kind of collectivism virtually 
impossible.  This raises a question as to why these workers stay in 
membership of the union.  The answer, in the absence of any “improved pay 
and conditions” must be “support if I had a problem at work” (Waddington 
& Whitston, 1997, p.521), ‘if’ being the operative word; union membership 
becomes a type of insurance.  One union official describes it so: - “the usual 
pattern there is they join when there is a problem - we resolve it and we 
hear no more until the next problem, then they join again …”, hardly a 
recipe for union renewal. 
  
In many of the cases explored in this study, there is no obvious organising 
subsequent to the issuing of the Labour Court Recommendations, so 
determining the kinds of issues around which workers organise had few 
examples to examine.  Of the workplaces traced and where the servicing 
official participated in the survey, less than one-third are in contact with 
the union after having used the procedures, and by implication there must 
be little by way of union activity in those workplaces which are not in 
contact. Individual issues are more likely to be raised than collective issues 
particularly at the end of the continuum where low membership levels and 
low compliance with strategic mobilising are to be found.  It is worth noting 
that at both Deltrans and Pegasus, in addition to the bread-and-butter type 
issues being dealt with at the Labour Court, there was concurrently a 
separate justice-and-dignity type issue being dealt with in the workplace 
(agency workers; English classes for minorities).  A culture of collective 
activity seems to have been created during the campaign and seamlessly 
continued after the Labour Court Recommendation was issued. 
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9.2 - The Practical Goals 
 
Ireland is at a crossroads where trade union recognition is concerned.  The 
procedures introduced in legislation in 2001 and amended in 2004 with the 
aim of resolving disputes on recognition has failed to satisfy either side and 
has fallen into disuse as a consequence of Ryanair’s legal challenge.  Trade 
unions via ICTU are lobbying for, and Government Ministers are promising, 
amended legislation.  Determining the specifics of any such new legislation 
needs to be informed by discovering and acknowledging any limitations in 
the existing legislation, including limitations specifically separate from 
those caused by the Ryanair judgments which might in any event be 
resolved.  It is essential to know what other effects participation in the 
legislative procedure might have, on membership levels for example and on 
employers, whether it could aggravate employers further or prove their 
allegation that the procedure would let “union recognition in by the back 
door” (Creaton, 2005).   
 
Taking membership levels first and seeking to determine whether or not 
workers remain in unions and remain active, on the evidence of this study, 
they do not. Excluding the ten cases not suitable for inclusion in the survey 
and the eight cases where officials did not respond, this leaves 71 
workplaces whose membership status is known and for 47 or 66% of those 
it is confirmed that they are no longer in membership of the union which 
referred the original case to the Labour Court.  There may yet be economic 
reasons for this level of attrition and in the absence of comparators it is not 
possible to attribute all of the loss of membership to the taking of cases 
under the 2001 Act.   However levels of activism or ‘organisedness’ are also 
low.  Only 14 out of 24 workplaces in contact with their union official have 
some kind of a union representative structure, nine of which report an 
active membership.  In two (4%) of 48 cases reported on in the survey, the 
official reports the existence and exercise of full bargaining rights. Unlike 
membership levels, economic decline can hardly be responsible for low 
levels of activism; intuitively it should increase activity at least with 
negotiations on redundancies.  Union density levels particularly in small 
workplaces could be a factor, but as with membership levels, the union 
movement could not have continued in existence if those levels of 
membership and activism were representative of the movement as a whole. 
 
168 
 Gall (2010a) contends that employer hostility is increased by the use of 
statutory recognition procedures in which he includes the 2001 Act, which 
prompts asking that question of the cases in this study.  A retrospective 
examination of events five or six years later however is not the ideal route as 
it cannot be determined whether employers were more or less hostile before 
the taking of a case and there would in any event be difficulties attributing 
causality.  Without comparison with other campaigns where the 2001 Act 
was not a feature, it cannot be determined if those employers were any more 
or less benign.  Nonetheless some of the cases studied herein suggest at 
least a tendency to worsening of relations after the Labour Court hearing 
where previously progress had been reported at the ‘voluntary leg’ at the 
LRC.  Such progress suggests some level of accommodation between the 
parties, contrived or enforced perhaps to the extent that the parties derive 
no ownership or no worth from it, and there is no lasting effect in terms of 
building a relationship. 
 
Does the 2001 Act provide trade union recognition ‘by the back door’ or 
otherwise?  If assessing this question by reference to the cases in this 
study, that is those cases that proceeded through the ‘voluntary leg’ to the 
‘fall-back’ procedure at the Labour Court, then the answer has to be a 
resounding ‘no’.  Of the 97 workplaces examined and excluding the ten 
cases not suitable for comparison, in only two cases was there found what 
union officials recorded as ‘full bargaining rights’, in Deltrans and Pegasus.  
In one other case, Ard-na-Gaoithe, the union is recognised only to the 
extent that the shop steward conducts negotiations; union officials, 
management “wouldn’t let … inside the gates” (Frank).   
 
Trade unions, via ICTU, have campaigned for legislative measures to deal 
with the question of trade union recognition though there seems little 
debate much less research to support the view that such measures are the 
best way of dealing with recognition rows.  In the absence of comparisons 
with other means of resolving the situation it is not possible to rank the 
various means according to which is best or worst.  The question also needs 
further defining: - the ‘best means’ for whom exactly?  In terms of the 
pertaining issue of trade union recognition, what can be said is that the 
2001 Act does not address the question at all.  It side-steps it and deals 
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with the substantive issues in dispute and makes no provision for collective 
bargaining or any “continuous association of wage earners” (Webb & Webb, 
1920, p.1) at the workplace.  It also side-steps the issue in a macro political 
sense; the discussion on union recognition in Ireland now centres on fixing 
what Ryanair broke.  The results of this study would indicate that that is 
the wrong debate for trade unions. Fixing what Ryanair broke will not 
address the other problems identified in this study such as low retention of 
members and low levels of activism even amongst retained members.  In 
addition, any appreciable improvement in pay and conditions should be 
attributed to mobilising tendencies rather than Labour Court 
recommendations. 
 
In terms of whether or not the 2001 Act is the best approach for trade 
unions as organisations wishing to “offer more to its members than a long 
and unsuccessful dispute” (SIPTU, 2001), then the 2001 Act is certainly 
successful.  It is a less costly and painful route for all concerned, though 
trade unions have not gained from it in terms of membership, activism nor 
demonstrations of “union instrumentality” (Frege & Kelly, 2004, p.34) 
whatever its contribution to industrial peace.  Some of the union members 
involved may however feel differently about the process.  In some of the less 
successful campaigns, members there view the process as “getting the 
union in” (Kenneth) without which they say “things would be ten times 
worse” (Corina).  Others expressed relief that they could use the process 
and “wouldn’t have to go on strike” (Todd) and where a “strike wouldn’t 
have worked” (Eric).  Whether as a result of their success in achieving 
collective bargaining, or because of it, none of those involved in the Deltrans 
or Pegasus campaigns credit the 2001 Act with their achievements.  
Perhaps it is the best approach for weaker groups of members, the last 
refuge of the powerless. 
 
This thesis now turns to the final chapter providing conclusions and a 
return to centenary commemorations. 
 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Chapter 10 
Centenary Commemorations 1914 - 2014 
 
This concluding chapter provides a summary of the work undertaken and 
details its contributions and limitations before reflecting on the lessons 
learnt during the process of its completion. 
 
10.1 - Summary 
 
The starting point for this study has been trade union recognition in 
Ireland: - its vexed history detailed in Chapter 2 while the interpretation of 
freedom of association which underpins it was explored in Chapter 4.  That 
latter chapter also dealt with how trade unions function and hope to renew 
themselves by institutional means and by mobilising and gave some 
prominence to the organising model of trade unionism currently popular 
with Irish trade unions.  Chapter 3 explained the institutional means at the 
disposal of unions in situation where employers refuse to recognise them, 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act of 2001 in particular.  The mixed 
methods approach chosen (Chapter 5) afforded an extensive exposé of the 
workings of the 2001 Act; from a broad macro overview of the Labour Court 
Recommendations and their implications (Chapter 6) to a thorough 
determination of the extent and calibre of union membership remaining at 
each relevant workplace (Chapter 7) and finally to an in-depth 
understanding of how union campaigns unfolded in ten selected workplaces 
(Chapter 8).  Each data chapter analysed and discussed the data reported 
on therein while Chapter 9 discussed the results of all data streams by 
reference to the precise research questions posed.  The study confirms the 
inadequacy of the 2001 Act in providing for trade union recognition but also 
raises concerns with the narrowness of its usage and heralds important 
implications for its revival in the event of anticipated amendments to its 
terms.  Poor levels of both membership and activism were found though the 
use of mobilising or organising model techniques alongside the 2001 Act 
procedures tended to result in better outcomes. 
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10.2 – Contributions and Limitations 
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the only study of the 2001 Act 
which both examines all of the Labour Court Recommendations issued, 
placing them in industrial and political context and also uncovers their 
consequential impact.  The contribution made is therefore on a number of 
levels: - to the body of UK and Irish literature on union recognition and 
union mobilising/organising; to recommendations on trade union practice 
and to the debate on trade union recognition.  The UK and Ireland share 
common industrial relations origins making their literature on union 
organising and recognition mutually relevant and of interest.  For that 
reason it was decided to limit the conceptual framework of this study to the 
literature mostly from those two jurisdictions seeking to also make a 
contribution there. There is a focus too on the organising model of trade 
unionism because of its potential importance to Irish trade union function 
in the future and partly as the Irish literature on this topic is more sparse.  
While the campaigns in the cases studied here were not run in accordance 
with a classic organising model, they were measured against its basic 
tenets.  In addition to confirming the usefulness of some aspects of the 
model, the findings also point to some of the potential pitfalls, two related 
issues in particular, union “architecture” (Lerner, 2003, p.9) and the use of 
dedicated organisers.  The organising model’s distinction between 
organising and servicing and its focus on organising the industry rather 
than the individual employer suggests changes to union structures 
potentially creating separate divisions for green-field organising, for brown-
field or in-fill recruitment and servicing, and for individual grievance 
handling.  The cases studied here demonstrate that staff turnover and 
differentiated functions can contribute to a lack of continuity in the 
members’ connection with their union and a sense of isolation or 
abandonment after having been the intense focus of perhaps several 
members of staff, and then becoming the responsibility of one hardly known 
individual.  Campaigns run truly according to the organising model might, 
even ought to create stronger more resilient union groupings but even then 
there may be a need to focus more on the hand-over from initial organising 
to whatever form of on-going relationship is to exist.   
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This work also contributes to the literature on trade union recognition in 
both jurisdictions, particularly with reference to statutory union recognition 
provisions.  The debate on trade union recognition in Ireland often includes 
examination of the statutory union recognition provisions in the UK and 
speculation that were such a system available in Ireland it might address 
some of the problems with the 2001 Act (Geary, 2014).  Yet many of the 
shortcomings of the UK’s statutory union recognition procedure are evident 
in the cases studied here: - greater employer hostility and counter 
mobilization (Heery & Simms, 2010; Gall, 2010a); consequent limitations on 
scope (Moore, 2004; Moore, 2005); a dearth of collective bargaining (McKay 
et al, 2006) and a failure to mobilise or stimulate activism.   The 2001 Act is 
demonstrably not a statutory recognition procedure but a statutory 
resolution procedure for issues in dispute.  Perhaps the real matter in 
contention is not so much union recognition as it is statutory procedure; that 
statutory procedure in and of itself is the essence of the problem.  The non-
negotiable delivery of terms by a third party cannot have mobilising effect 
and does nothing either to build a relationship between the parties. 
 
The data suggests particular issues for professional trade union practice, 
principally the best results achieved by those union campaigns displaying 
particular elements: - a mobilising /organising model focus; good leaders 
both staff and workplace based and an ability to view the 2001 Act 
procedures as just one element in an otherwise strategic campaign.  In 
some cases a hiatus seems to have developed after the issuing of the Labour 
Court Recommendation, accidentally wrought by staff turnover but also in 
some deliberate and not always explicable decisions not to proceed any 
further.  There is a need to see beyond the Recommendations and view the 
union campaign as continuing.  Unions should also consider when referring 
cases under the legislation whether “throwing in the kitchen sink” makes 
sense (Higgins, 2006); workers need issues around which to organise.  
 
Previous studies regarding the 2001 Act focussed on the contents of the 
Labour Court Recommendations (Doherty, 2009; Doherty, 2013; Higgins, 
C., 2001; Sheehan, 2004), the ‘Ryanair effect’ (Doherty, 2007; Dobbins, 
2007a; Sheehan, 2007a and 2012b), on limited time periods (D’Art & 
Turner, 2006) or on the attitudes of union officials (D’Art & Turner, 2005).  
This study included all the Recommendations under the 2001 Act but also 
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examined issues at the level of the workplace. The experiences of all union 
campaigners, staff and members alike were a crucial part of the study; the 
inclusion of those who have to live with the consequences, the workers, 
contributed greatly to the study’s originality.  Initial plans to compare 
workplaces which had been through the procedure with those which had 
not could not be fulfilled within the timescale of this study.  That limitation 
can be addressed in the future by comparing the cases in this study with 
those where only the ‘voluntary leg’ was used; those who took the ‘Section 
20’ route and/or with those who had taken industrial action to achieve 
recognition.  In the event of the enactment of the anticipated changes to the 
2001 Act, a cohort of cases taken after those changes could also be used for 
comparison purposes. 
 
10.3 - Reflections 
 
Question 3 on the union officials’ survey regarding bargaining status 
caused me some disquiet (See Chapters 7 and 8).  Officials could 
legitimately describe the workplace as one where they represented members 
on an individual basis only, Option C, but, as I discovered later this could 
co-exist with an active core of members, Option D.  Although probably rare, 
it nonetheless provided an important lesson regarding the difference 
between representation and activism and that the two are not mutually 
exclusive.  It also emphasised that servicing officials may not always 
appreciate the nuances of the union activity of members in their charge 
thus the necessity for research to reach beyond them and to also include 
the general union membership. 
 
Did this thesis support or negate the hypothesis that participation in the 
procedures provided for under the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 
2001 militated against worker activism?  That something has militated 
against worker activism is beyond doubt though whether all of it can be 
attributed to the 2001 Act is a moot point.  The context in which the 2001 
Act procedures were used has been shown to be of major importance.  
Where all of the issues in dispute were referred to the Labour Court as a 
last resort when campaigners found themselves in deadlock, then the 
results suggest there was little achieved by this sole reliance on the 
procedure.   There is little evidence that working conditions, membership 
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levels or union activism benefitted at all from the Labour Court 
Recommendations which ensued even if they were implemented.  If however 
only some of the issues of importance to the workers were referred to the 
Labour Court and there remained in place a wider campaign around some 
other perhaps justice-and-dignity type issues, then there have been gains 
on all three  measures, i.e.,  working conditions, membership levels and 
union activism.  An exclusive reliance on the procedures under the 2001 
Act raises difficulties for the “autonomy, legitimacy and efficacy” necessary 
for interest representation (Hyman, 1997, p.310). Autonomy of the 
workplace representative or wider union from the employer is irrelevant if 
there is no engagement; there is no “record of ‘delivering the goods’” (ibid) 
nor efficacy in terms of union effectiveness; the ‘goods’ are delivered via a 
third party. It is not so much that the 2001 Act per se militates against 
worker activism more its usage in the wrong context, as the last refuge of 
the powerless, has detrimental effect. 
 
One of the shortcomings of the 2001 Act for trade unions is its failure to 
deal with the question of trade union recognition, still at issue 100 years 
after the 1913 Dublin Lockout.  Those tumultuous events were being 
commemorated while writing the foregoing chapters.  Now as the final 
chapter is being written it is 2014 and the opportunity presents to 
commemorate the events of 1914; the return to work “on the best terms 
available” of those still on strike by mid-January of that year (Yeates, 2001, 
p.521) an “inconclusive end” to the Lockout (Plunkett, 1980, p.133).  
Plunkett reflects: - 
 
That, then, was about as far as general trade unionism in Ireland 
had progressed up to the outbreak of the First World War.  It had 
established its right to organise … [and] … it had won official 
endorsement for the view that the employee had a right to be heard 
(Plunkett, 1980, p.133) 
 
What has changed? One hundred years later trade unions still have the 
right to organise and any return to using the 2001 Act procedures 
according to their original intent still only guarantees that an employee, 
singular, has a right to be heard.  It does nothing to promote, seems almost 
to deny, the right to collective bargaining or union recognition, that is 
management and unions “jointly determining terms and conditions of 
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employment on a collective basis” (Salamon, 1987, p.408).  Will it take 
another 100 years to resolve 1913’s “unfinished business”? 
 
▬▬0▬▬ 
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Appendix B 
S.I. No. 145/2000 - Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice on 
Voluntary Dispute Resolution) (Declaration) Order, 2000 
  
WHEREAS the Labour Relations Commission has prepared under subsection (1) of section 
42 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (No. 19 of 1990), a draft code of practice on voluntary 
dispute resolution where negotiating arrangements are not in place and where collective 
bargaining does not take place; 
  
AND WHEREAS the Labour Relations Commission has complied with subsection (2) of that 
section and has submitted the draft code of practice to the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment; 
  
NOW THEREFORE, I, Mary Harney, Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, in exercise 
of the powers conferred on me by subsection (3) of that section, the Labour (Transfer of 
Departmental Administration and Ministerial Functions) Order, 1993 ( S.I. No. 18 of 1993 ), 
and the Enterprise and Employment (Alteration of Name of Department and Title of Minister) 
Order, 1997 ( S.I. No. 305 of 1997 ), hereby order as follows: 
  
1.      This Order may be cited as the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 (Code of Practice on 
Voluntary Dispute Resolution) (Declaration) Order, 2000. 
  
2.      It is hereby declared that the code of practice set out in the schedule to this Order shall 
be a code of practice for the purposes of theIndustrial Relations Act, 1990 (No. 19 of 1990). 
  
SCHEDULE 
  
1 - INTRODUCTION 
  
1.   Section 42 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 provides for the preparation of draft Codes 
of Practice by the Labour Relations Commission for submission to the Minister, and for the 
making by him of an order declaring that a draft Code of Practice received by him under 
section 42 and scheduled to the order shall be a Code of Practice for the purposes of the said 
Act. 
  
2.  In May 1999 the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment requested the Commission 
under section 42 (1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1990 to prepare a draft Code of Practice 
on Voluntary Dispute Resolution where Negotiating Arrangements are not in place and where 
Collective Bargaining does not take place. 
  
3.  The Code of Practice is in response to the recommendations set out in the Report of the 
High Level Group on Trade Union Recognition on voluntary dispute resolution procedures. The 
High Level Group, involving the Departments of the Taoiseach, Finance and Enterprise, Trade 
and Employment, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC) and IDA-Ireland, was established under paragraph 9.22 of Partnership 
2000 for Inclusion Employment and Competitiveness, to consider proposals submitted by the 
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ICTU on the Recognition of Unions and the Right to Bargain and to take account of European 
developments and the detailed position of IBEC on the impact of the ICTU proposals. 
  
4.  When preparing and agreeing this Code of Practice the Commission consulted with the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, ICTU, IBEC and the Labour Court and took 
account of the views expressed to the maximum extent possible. 
  
5.  The major objective of the Code is to provide a recognised framework that has the full 
support of all parties for the processing of disputes arising in situations where negotiating 
arrangements are not in place and where collective bargaining fails to take place. 
  
2 - PROCEDURES 
  
Where negotiating arrangements are not in place and where collective bargaining fails to take 
place, the following process should be put in place with which management and unions 
should fully co-operate in seeking to resolve the issues in dispute effectively and 
expeditiously:- 
  
1.  In the first instance, the matter should be referred to the Labour Relations Commission 
who will appoint an Officer from its Advisory Service to assess the issues in dispute. 
  
2.  The Labour Relations Commission Officer will work with the parties in an attempt to 
resolve the issues in dispute. 
  
3.  In the event that the issues in dispute are not capable of early resolution by the Labour 
Relations Commission intervention, an agreed cooling-off period shall be put in place. 
  
During the cooling-off period, the Labour Relations Commission Advisory Service will continue 
to work with the parties in an attempt to resolve any outstanding issues. The Commission may 
engage expert assistance, including the involvement of ICTU and IBEC, should that prove 
helpful to the resolution of any differences. 
  
4.  If after the cooling-off period all issues have been resolved, the Labour Relations 
Commission will disengage. Before disengaging, the Commission may make proposals to the 
parties for the peaceful resolution of any further grievances or disputes. 
  
5.  In the event of issues remaining unresolved after the cooling-off period, the Labour 
Relations Commission shall make a written report to the Labour Court on the situation. The 
Labour Court shall consider the position of the employer and the union and shall issue 
recommendations on outstanding matters. 
  
 
Given under my Official Seal, this 26th day of May, 2000 
 
Mary Harney 
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Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
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Appendix C 
LRC Guidelines for [processing cases under S. I. 76 
 
 
" To Promote the development and improvement of Irish industrial relations policies, procedures and 
practices through the provision of appropriate, timely and effective services to employers, trade 
unions and employees" 
 
How do I prepare for an SI 76? 
 
SI 76 is also known as ‘Enhanced Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution (SI 76 of 2004)’ 
provides a recognised framework for the processing of disputes arising in situations where 
negotiating arrangements are not in place and where collective bargaining fails to take place. This 
Code was drafted to enhance the effectiveness of existing procedures and to this end a number of 
new measures were introduced. These measures include:  
1. Referrals, under the new code, must adhere to the prescribed format (detailed in the 
appendix of code). Referrals must include contact names, addresses and numbers for the 
union and company, category of worker/s involved, descriptions of issues in dispute and 
details of previous communications. Our experience has been that the more detail initially 
given in respect of the issues in dispute, the more productive the process has been.  
2. The new code also imposes a 6 week timeframe for completion of the LRC stage of the 
process. On receipt of an invitation to participate in the process, respondents have 2 weeks 
to accept. If the invitation is accepted, there are then a further 4 weeks for substantial 
engagement on the issues in dispute. This timeframe can only be extended by agreement 
and where progress is being made.  
3. The new code is complemented by ‘S.I. No. 139 of 2004, Code of Practice on Victimisation’. 
SI 139 provides guidelines for participants to the Enhanced Code in respect of behaviour, 
which might be considered ‘victimisation’ and also provides a mechanism for complaint and 
redress. 
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In summary, when preparing for an SI 76: 
1. Parties referring issues should ensure that as much detail as possible is supplied to the LRC in the 
first instance.  
2. Respondents should ensure that they comply with the timeframes when replying.  
3. In light of the 6 week timeframe, parties to the process are requested to be flexible in respect of 
their availability. 
4. All parties to the process should be aware of the provisions of ‘S.I. No. 139 of 2004,Code of 
Practice on Victimisation’.  
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Appendix D 
 
All Labour Court Recommendations, Decisions and Determinations 
issued under the 2001/2004 Acts 
Database 
Number 
Labour 
Court No. 
Employer Subject Year 
2 
LCR20080 
GLOBAL TELE SALES 
LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2011 
3 
LCR20079 DELL 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2011 
4 
LCR19750 BORD GAIS EIREANN LRC REFERRAL 2010 
5 
LCR19721 
CRIBBIN FAMILY 
BUTCHERS 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2010 
6 
LCR19188 BELL SECURITY LRC REFERRAL 2008 
7 
LCR19154 COLSO ENTERPRISES LRC REFERRAL 2008 
8 
LCR19092 A-TRUSS LTD LRC REFERRAL 2007 
9 
LCR19002 
CASTLE T FURNITURE 
LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2007 
10 LCR18968 Q PARK IRELAND LTD LRC REFERRAL 2007 
11 
LCR18897 
KARDEX SYSTEMS 
IRELAND LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2007 
12 
LCR18845 
FERNLEY AIRPORT 
SERVICES 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2007 
13 
LCR18825 
JIGSAW DAY NURSERY 
LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2007 
14 
LCR18820 ASHFORD CASTLE LRC REFERRAL 2007 
15 
LCR18815 GALWAY CLINIC LRC REFERRAL 2007 
16 
LCR18807 SWORDS PACKAGING LRC REFERRAL 2007 
17 
LCR18772 SERCOM SOLUTIONS LRC REFERRAL 2006 
18 
LCR18692 
IRISH GUIDE DOGS FOR 
THE BLIND 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
19 LCR18682 Q PARK IRELAND LTD LRC REFERRAL 2006 
20 
LCR18675 DOYLE CONCRETE 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
21 
LCR18672 
THE KILDARE HOTEL 
AND GOLF CLUB 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
22 
LCR18671 
FREEFOAM PLASTICS 
LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
23 
LCR18666 
BAYFIELD SUPPLIES 
LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
24 
LCR18648 
LITTLE RASCAL 
CRECHE 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
25 
LCR18621 FEDERAL SECURITY 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
26 
LCR18601 THE OVAL CRECHE 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
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27 
LCR18589 
O'DONOVAN OFF 
LICENCES LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
28 
LCR18582 
FOURNIER 
LABORATORIES LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
29 
LCR18583 O'CONNOR MEATS LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
30 
LCR18579 
CAROLAN'S LONDIS 
SUPERMARKET 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
31 
LCR18575 
GERARD 
LABORATORIES 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
32 
LCR18556 QK COLD STORES LTD LRC REFERRAL 2006 
33 
LCR18542 
WEXFORD VIKING 
GLASS LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
34 
LCR18535 
BRACKERNAGH 
CROUGHAN'S 
SUPERVALU 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
35 
LCR18532 
ROCHFORD BRADY 
LEGAL SERVICES 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
36 
LCR18529 MEDENTECH LRC REFERRAL 2006 
37 
DECP062 FINLAY BRETON PRELIMINARY 2006 
38 
LCR18489 METROPLEX LRC REFERRAL 2006 
39 
LCR18480 MCI WORLD COM LRC REFERRAL 2006 
40 
LCR18469 DUNNES STORES 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
41 
LCR18468 
TARA SERVICE 
STATION LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
42 
LCR18461 
SHOW JUMPING 
ASSOCIATION 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
43 
LCR18454 
JOHNSTON, MOONEY & 
O'BRIEN 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
44 
LCR18455 SANIRISH LTD LRC REFERRAL 2006 
45 
DECP061 
GREEN ISLE FOODS 
(BOYLE) 
PRELIMINARY 
2006 
46 
LCR18442 WEST WOOD CLUB LTD LRC REFERRAL 2006 
47 
LCR18446 
BANTA GLOBAL 
TURNKEY LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2006 
48 
LCR18440 
HILLVIEW NURSING 
HOME  
UNION 
APPLICATION 2006 
49 
LCR18438 
GEORGE BREW & CO 
LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
50 LCR18404 M1 NORTH-LINK LTD LRC REFERRAL 2005 
51 
LCR18387 JOHNSON MATTHEY LRC REFERRAL 2005 
52 LCR18346 MURPHY'S SUPERVALU LRC REFERRAL 2005 
53 
LCR18344 UNITED AIRLINES LRC REFERRAL 2005 
54 
LCR18307 M1 NORTH-LINK LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2005 
55 
LCR18303 
DAVIS CENTRA 
QUICKSTOP 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
56 
LCR18280 DATA ELECTRONICS LRC REFERRAL 2005 
57 
LCR18271 
CLEARSTREAM 
TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
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58 
LCR18274 
EXEL TECHNOLOGY 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
59 
LCR18269 GENESIS GROUP 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2005 
60 
LCR18265 TOTS & CO LRC REFERRAL 2005 
61 LCR18242 AMCOR FLEXIBLES LRC REFERRAL 2005 
62 
LCR18234 
WATERFORD CREDIT 
UNION 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
63 
LCR18226 
SCHERING PLOUGH - 
BRINNY CO 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
64 
LCR18206 MCM SECURITY LRC REFERRAL 2005 
65 
LCR18207 
DEERHAVEN LTD T/A 
THE CARD CO 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2005 
66 
LCR18190 
GERARD 
LABORATORIES 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
67 
LCR18188 
CLEARSTREAM 
TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
68 
LCR18184 ORMONDE WASTE LTD LRC REFERRAL 2005 
69 
LCR18151 QUINN CEMENT 
ARISING FROM 
DEC 2005 
70 
LCR18137 ANALOG DEVICES LRC REFERRAL 2005 
71 
LCR18136 
BOSTON BRACE 
EUROPE LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
72 
DECP052 QUINN CEMENT PRELIMINARY 2005 
73 
LCR18117 
WESTERN HEALTH 
BOARD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
74 
LCR18109 
ARKOPHARMA 
IRELAND LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
75 
LCR18111 
WRIGHT WINDOW 
SYSTEMS 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
76 
LCR18087 
GREYHOUND WASTE 
DISPOSAL CO 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2005 
77 
DECP051 RYANAIR PRELIMINARY 2005 
78 
LCR18072 
GERARD 
LABORATORIES 
LRC REFERRAL 
2005 
79 
LCR18040 
FIRST CITIZEN 
NURSING HOME 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
80 
LCR18037 GOODE CONCRETE 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
81 
LCR18019 RPS GROUP LTD LRC REFERRAL 2004 
82 
LCR18016 BANC TEC LRC REFERRAL 2004 
83 
LCR18013 GE HEALTHCARE LRC REFERRAL 2004 
84 
LCR17972 ALL WATER SYSTEMS LRC REFERRAL 2004 
85 
LCR17968 SIFCO TURBINE GROUP LRC REFERRAL 2004 
86 
LCR17939 
BUCKLEY'S 
SUPERVALU 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
87 
LCR17933 
CREAGH TRANSPORT 
LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
88 
LCR17932 
CARLINGFORD 
NURSING HOME 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
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89 
LCR17925 
NN EUROBALL 
IRELAND LTD 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
90 
LCR17919 RADIO KERRY 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
91 
LCR17914 ASHFORD CASTLE 
ARISING FROM 
DECP 032 2004 
92 
LCR17908 
COOLEY DISTILLERY 
PLC 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
93 
LCR17906 
STERILE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
IRELAND LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 
2004 
94 
LCR17897 
CLEARSTREAM 
TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
95 
LCR17891 
METEOR MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
LRC REFERRAL 
2004 
96 
LCR17760 ASHFORD CASTLE 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
97 
LCR17745 BANK OF IRELAND 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2004 
98 
LCR17699 
MARBLE & GRANITE 
SUPPLIES LTD 
SECTION 2(1) 
2003 
99 
LCR17685 AGTEC IRELAND LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2003 
100 
LCR17679 MILLERPAK LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2003 
101 
LCR17607 
MOQUETTE LTD T/A 
DOYLES SUPERVALU 
SECTION 2(1) 
2003 
102 
LCR17472 SAM HIRE 
ARISING FROM 
DECP 031 2003 
103 
LCR17469 IRISH EXPRESS CARGO 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2003 
104 
LCR17398 
NOBLE WASTE 
DISPOSAL LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2003 
105 
LCR17236 
BANTRY BAY 
SEAFOODS 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2002 
106 
LCR17098 JETWASH LTD 
UNION 
APPLICATION 2002 
107 
DECP032 ASHFORD CASTLE PRELIMINARY 2003 
109 
DECP041 
BANTA GLOBAL 
TURNKEY (apt) 
PRELIMINARY 
2004 
110 
LCR17797 IRISH EXPRESS CARGO 
ARISING FROM LCR 
17469 2004 
111 
DECP031 SAM HIRE PRELIMINARY 2003 
112 
DIR051 ASHFORD CASTLE DETERMINATION 2005 
113 
DIR0513 ANALOG DEVICES DETERMINATION 2005 
114 
DIR071 
BAYFIELD SUPPLIES 
LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2007 
115 
DIR054 
CARLINGFORD 
NURSING HOME 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
116 
DIR082 
CASTLE T FURNITURE 
LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2008 
117 
DIR042 
CLEARSTREAM 
TECHNOLOGIES LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2004 
118 
DIR061 DATA ELECTRONICS DETERMINATION 2006 
119 
DIR064 DUNNES STORES DETERMINATION 2006 
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120 
DIR072 
FOURNIER 
LABORATORIES LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2007 
121 
DIR0511 GENESIS GROUP DETERMINATION 2005 
122 
DIR056 
GERARD 
LABORATORIES 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
123 DIR052 GOODE CONCRETE DETERMINATION 2005 
124 
DIR055 
GREYHOUND WASTE 
DISPOSAL CO 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
125 
DIR057 JETWASH LTD DETERMINATION 2005 
126 
DIR074 
KARDEX SYSTEMS 
IRELAND LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2007 
127 
DIR063 M1 NORTH-LINK LTD DETERMINATION 2006 
128 
DIR041 
METEOR MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
DETERMINATION 
2004 
129 
DIR053 
NN EUROBALL 
IRELAND LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
130 
DIR031 
NOBLE WASTE 
DISPOSAL LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2003 
131 
DIR073 O'CONNOR MEATS LTD DETERMINATION 2007 
132 
DIR0510 ORMONDE WASTE LTD DETERMINATION 2005 
133 
DIR065 QK COLD STORES LTD DETERMINATION 2006 
134 
DIR059 QUINN CEMENT DETERMINATION 2005 
135 
DIR032 SAM HIRE DETERMINATION 2003 
136 
DIR0512 
STERILE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
IRELAND LTD 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
137 
DIR081 SWORDS PACKAGING DETERMINATION 2008 
138 
DIR062 WEST WOOD CLUB LTD DETERMINATION 2006 
139 
DIR058 
WRIGHT WINDOW 
SYSTEMS 
DETERMINATION 
2005 
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Appendix E 
E-mail to SIPTU Staff 
 
Organiser:- 
Re: 
Date as per e-mail (21 issued on the 11th April 2012; 22 issued on the 12th April 2012) 
Dear Colleague, 
Previous correspondence from the Divisional Organiser refers.  As he explained, I am investigating 
the aftermath of participation in the procedures provided for in the Code or Enhanced Code of 
Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution (SI145 of 2000 and SI 76 of 2004; the 2001 and 2004 IR 
Acts).  I am interested in the nature of the membership currently at those workplaces and the kinds 
of issues which have since arisen.   
To that end I understand you are responsible for ______________________ which was the subject 
of Labour Court Recommendation No. _________________  .  I have prepared a brief questionnaire 
regarding the current situation there – just 8 questions – which should take no longer than 3 
minutes to complete on your I-phone or laptop, just by clicking on the survey link below.  Even if you 
have had no contact with these members go ahead as the questionnaire provides for that option – 
and you will finish in less than 1 minute! 
 If you are responsible for more than one relevant employment, you will receive this message for 
each of those workplaces.  Please complete the questionnaire separately for each one.  To take the 
questionnaire now, click on the link below. 
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SIPTU_SURVEY_Code_of_Practice_on_Voluntary_Dispute_Resol
ution  
Thanks for your help. 
Tish Gibbons 
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Appendix F 
E-mail to all union contacts – except SIPTU 
 
From: Tish Gibbons  
Sent: 24 June 2013 15:50 
To:  
Subject: Survey on Dispute Resolution Procedures under 2001 / 2004 Acts 
 
Dear 
Our telephone conversation of even date refers. 
For a college dissertation, I am investigating the aftermath of participation in the procedures 
provided for in the Code or Enhanced Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution (SI145 of 
2000 and SI 76 of 2004; the 2001 and 2004 IR Acts).  I am interested in the nature of the 
membership currently at those workplaces (but not exact numbers)  and the kinds of issues which 
have since arisen.  SIPTU has already participated and I would like also to include the cases taken by 
other unions such as yours.  Please be assured that the results will be anonymised and no reference 
will be made in the final thesis or elsewhere which could identify the workplace, staff or member 
involved. 
To that end, from the Labour Court website I understand your Union took x number of cases, listed 
below with a link to the Recommendations, in case you need them to help jog memories. 
LCR No. Company Date Link 
    
I have prepared a brief questionnaire regarding the current situation in each location – just 8 
questions – which should take no longer than 3 minutes to complete on your I-phone or laptop, just 
by clicking on the survey link below.  Even if the union has had no contact with these members since 
the case was taken or if the relevant grade is no longer represented there, go ahead as the 
questionnaire provides for that option – and you will finish each in less than 1 minute. 
If you need any help or clarification / assurance before completing the survey, you can get me at 087 
6776819.  If you are happy to complete the questionnaire now, the survey link is here:- 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2001-2004ActsSurvey-XUnion 
Yours fraternally, 
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Tish Gibbons 
Tish Gibbons 
Researcher 
Strategic Organising Department 
SIPTU,  Forster Court, Galway, Republic of Ireland 
Telephone:    01 8588272 Mobile:        087 6776819E-mail:        tgibbons@siptu.ie 
www.siptu.ie  
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Appendix G 
Interview Schedule – Union Officials 
Opening 
1. Purpose of interview – project work for a research qualification – 
interviewing officials, shop stewards and members about their experiences of 
the procedures under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001/2004 (SI76) – want 
to talk about the events that led up to the taking of the case and about the 
situation since the Labour Court Recommendation was issued. 
2. Recording – make sure agreeable before switching on 
3. Anonymity – explain all company and individuals are anonymised. 
4. Consent Form – Explain its purpose and ask for signature. 
Referring Officials –  
Talk to me about such a place – do you remember when they joined first? Prompt 
as necessary for: - what triggered them? How many? Density? Issues? Employer? 
Did you consider options other than 2001 Act? Prompt for ballot on industrial 
action? Sanction? Other Court procedures? Section 20? Member reaction? 
Who were the workplace leaders, tell me about them. 
The ‘voluntary leg’ – how did that go? Any progress there?  How did members/ 
activists deal with it? 
Going to the Labour Court – how did you feel about that? How did the members 
feel?  Tell me about the hearing itself, employer behaviour on the day, worker 
reaction. 
The Labour Court Recommendation – when it issued – what did you think? What 
did the members think?  Was it implemented?  If not, why not?  Did you apply for a 
Determination (where appropriate)?   
Talk to me about the membership there since the Recommendation – density, 
attitudes, activism. 
Was it worth it? 
Are the files, submissions, available? 
 
 
 
 
Servicing Officials 
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Opening 
1. Purpose of interview – project work for a research qualification – 
interviewing officials, shop stewards and members about their experiences of 
the procedures under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001/2004 (SI76) – want 
to talk about the events that led up to the taking of the case and about the 
situation since the Labour Court Recommendation was issued. 
2. Recording – make sure agreeable before switching on 
3. Anonymity – explain all company and individuals are anonymised. 
4. Consent Form – Explain its purpose and ask for signature. 
 
You know the background to such a place – 2001 Act – Labour Court 
Recommendation – was/was not implemented (as appropriate) – x number of 
members there now.   
When did you take them over?  Talk to me about those members – On the survey 
you coded them as A, B, C, D, E, (as appropriate) – tell me a bit more about them, 
their issues, activism, participation in the Branch.   
Tell me about the shop steward – any members still there from the start? 
Membership levels – they have fluctuated/remained static/up or down (as 
appropriate) since the Recommendation was issued.  How would you account for 
that? 
Do you think there is any possibility of re-organising that workplace? 
Will you introduce me to the shop steward/former activists/ members? 
Are the files/submissions etc available? 
 
Officials with more than one case i.e,  
Referring Official for Deltrans also referring official for Led-Pack 
Referring Official for Garry’s also referring official for Rosses 
Servicing Official for Garry’s also servicing official for Rosses 
 
Very different outcomes – how would you account for that? 
Did the experience of one inform your actions in the other? 
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Appendix H 
Interview Schedule – Union Members 
 
Opening 
1. Purpose of interview – project work for a research qualification – 
interviewing officials, shop stewards and members about their experiences of 
the procedures under the Industrial Relations Acts 2001/2004 (SI76) – want 
to talk about the events that led up to the taking of the case and about the 
situation since the Labour Court Recommendation was issued. 
2. Recording – make sure agreeable before switching on 
3. Anonymity – explain all company and individuals are anonymised. 
4. Consent Form – Explain its purpose and ask for signature. 
 
When did you start working there? Occupation? When did you join the union? What started the 
union there x number of years after it opened (as appropriate).? 
Talk to me about the campaign – tell me the story from your point of view? 
Had you any prior union experience?  Were you a leader/activist? 
Describe the run-up to going to the LRC and the Court?  Did you discuss options with the official? Did 
you agree with the decisions taken?  If leader, how did the others feel?  How did you keep them on-
side during all of this? 
Did you attend at the LRC / Labour Court hearing?  What was that like?  How did you describe it to 
the others when you came back? 
What did you think of the Recommendation when it first came out? And now? Was it implemented? 
Talk to me about working here since – what’s it like?  There are x members – what does that mean in 
terms of density – can you see it growing – how does the employer treat you? 
How active are you in the union?  On the branch/Sector/ Divisional committee (as appropriate)?  Did 
you attend the anti-austerity demonstrations in such a place on such a date?  Why or why not (as 
appropriate)? 
You played a significant role – what motivated you?  Would you do it again?  Was it worth it? 
Any opportunity to talk to some of the others? 
Anything else you want to tell me? 
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Page 1
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
1. Select from the list below the relevant employment as per the cover letter:­
 
2. Please indicate the length of time, to the nearest year, for which you have been 
responsible for this workplace:­
 
The Employment
6
Yes
Up to 1 year gfedc
2 years gfedc
3 years gfedc
4 years gfedc
Over 5 years gfedc
 
Other (please specify) 
Page 2
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
3. Please select ONE of the options below which best describes the current status of 
the members at that employment.
 
The Members
 
I have had no contact with and/or was unaware of this workplace (If you select this option, you may skip to Question 7)
 
nmlkj
This union has some individual/confidential members who seldom contact the union
 
nmlkj
This union represents members there on an individual basis only
 
nmlkj
This union has an active core of members here but no bargaining rights
 
nmlkj
This union has full bargaining rights at this workplace
 
nmlkj
Page 3
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
4. At this workplace ...
 
Yes No Don't know
Is there one or more 
elected shop stewards or 
workplace 
representatives?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
Is there an elected 
representative 
committee?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
Is there an elected safety 
representative?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
Are any members from 
this workplace active 
outside the workplace at 
Sector; Division or 
National levels within the 
Union?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
Are any members from 
this workplace active in 
the wider trade union 
movement, i.e, Trades 
Councils, ICTU 
committees, etc?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
Have elected 
representatives been 
released with pay to 
attend union meetings or 
union organised training?
gfedc gfedc gfedc
 
Page 4
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
5. In relation to the last or most recent COMPLETED issue dealt with at this 
employment, select ONE of the following which best describes the issue.
 
The Issues and how they were resolved
Averting a pay cut
 
nmlkj
Pay increase
 
nmlkj
Application of National Wage Agreement
 
nmlkj
Increments
 
nmlkj
Service Pay
 
nmlkj
Christmas or other Bonus
 
nmlkj
Overtime rates including Sunday or anti­social premia
 
nmlkj
Travel/subsistence rates
 
nmlkj
Recognition of educational awards for pay or promotion
 
nmlkj
Hours of work, including shifts, rosters.
 
nmlkj
Sick leave or pay for same
 
nmlkj
Annual leave or pay for same
 
nmlkj
Pension
 
nmlkj
Access to education or training
 
nmlkj
Redundancy
 
nmlkj
Outsourcing or use of contractors
 
nmlkj
Disciplinary case
 
nmlkj
Bullying/harassment
 
nmlkj
Equality / parity
 
nmlkj
Health & Safety
 
nmlkj
Jury Service
 
nmlkj
Canteen or other Services i.e, cleaning/toilets/car park
 
nmlkj
Grievance & disciplinary procedures
 
nmlkj
Negotiation of full Collective Agreement
 
nmlkj
Union recognition
 
nmlkj
Organising other workers in their grade
 
nmlkj
Organising other grades at the workplace
 
nmlkj
Support for striking workers elsewhere
 
nmlkj
Agitation regarding Government spending cuts or other political issue
 
nmlkj
If some other issue raised, please explain here. 
Page 5
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
6. In relation to the SAME issue selected above, please select ONE of the options below 
which best describes how the issue was dealt with. 
 
5
6
It was an individual matter referred to MISC and dealt with entirely by them
 
nmlkj
It was an individual matter dealt with by a shop steward or elected committee
 
nmlkj
It was an individual matter I processed locally or at third party
 
nmlkj
It was a collective issue resolved in­house by the shop steward or an elected committee
 
nmlkj
It was a collective issue resolved by negotiations with the employer involving myself or other full­time union officer
 
nmlkj
It was a collective issue resolved by the threatening or taking of industrial action
 
nmlkj
It was a collective issue resolved by recourse to a 3rd party, ie., LRC, LC, EAT
 
nmlkj
It was a collective issue not requiring negotiations
 
nmlkj
It was a political or social issue not requiring negotiations with the employer
 
nmlkj
Page 6
SIPTU Survey - Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution
7. Insert your own name in the box below
 
8. Are you also the Official who referred the initial case for these members under the 
2001/2004 legislation?
 
You
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
If you are not the Official who took the initial case, please insert the name of the Official who took the case:­ 
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Appendix K 
Interviews 
 
Name Official / 
Member 
Relevant 
Workplace 
Date Face-to-
Face / 
Telephone 
Recorded 
Yes or No 
Todd SS (F&C) ArdnaGaoithe 8th February 2013 F Y 
Frank SO ArdnaGaoithe 30th April 2013 T N 
Kevin RO ArdnaGaoithe 7th August 2013 T N 
Frank SO (F) Blackwater 30th April 2013 T N 
Kevin RO Blackwater 2nd May 2013 T N 
Harry SO Blackwater 3rd September F Y 
Caroline SS Blackwater 4th September F N 
Oran RO Canalcon 24th July 2013 T N 
William SS © Canalcon 5th September 2013 F Y 
Peter SS (F) Canalcon 5th September 2013 F Y 
Martin SS (F) Deltrans 18th January 2013 F Y 
John OM (F) Deltrans 18th January 2013 F Y 
Conleth RO Deltrans 18th January 2013 F Y 
Rory OM (F) Deltrans 4th July 2013 F Y 
Lesley SO Deltrans 6th July 2013 T N 
Tim SS (F) Deltrans 7th August 2013 F Y 
Morgan RO Garry's 18th July 2013 T N 
Eric SS (F&C) Garry's 23rd July 2013 F Y 
Fred SO Garry's 23rd July 2013 T N 
Ross RO / SO Knockrada 22nd July 2013 T N 
Conleth RO Led-Pack 4th July 2013 F Y 
Rory OM (F) Led-Pack 4th July 2013 F Y 
Majella SO Led-Pack 12th Sept. 2013 T N 
Lesley SO (F) Led-Pack 12th Sept. 2013 T N 
Owen RO/SO Oakchurch 3rd September 2013 T N 
Eamon SS © Pegasus 13th March 2013 F Y 
Liam OM (F) Pegasus 13th March 2013 F Y 
Marius OM © Pegasus 13th March 2013 F Y 
Karl SS (F) Pegasus 7th July 2013 F Y 
Eileen RO Pegasus 3rd August 2013 T N 
Kelly SO Pegasus 3rd August 2013 T N 
Morgan RO Rosses 1st August 2013 T N 
Kenneth SS (© Rosses 2nd August 2013 F Y 
Fred SO Rosses 2nd August 2013 F Y 
Corina SS © Rosses 9th August 2013 F N 
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Appendix L 
 
Information Sheet and Consent Form – Tish Gibbons 
I am a research student at the Working Lives Research Institute at London 
Metropolitan University, working towards a professional doctorate in Researching 
Work.  For my thesis I am examining the aftermath of Labour Court 
Recommendations issued under the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001.  I 
am interviewing union officials, shop stewards, activist and members regarding their 
experiences of taking cases under the Act and the subsequent nature of union 
activity. 
As a participant you have a right to withdraw from the process at any time during the 
interview without prejudice and/or without providing a reason.  Should you do so, all 
data gathered to that point will be destroyed if you so request.  Your identity and that 
of any individual mentioned will not be revealed. 
If you have a complaint about the conduct of the interview or the use of data 
gathered, please contact the Working Lives Research Institute at  
Working Lives Research Institute  
London Metropolitan University  
31 Jewry St  
London EC3N 2EY  
Telephone 00 44 20 7320 3042 
E-mail workinglives@londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Consent Form 
I have read and understood the information sheet regarding Tish Gibbons’ research 
project. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the assignment and 
have had any such answered satisfactorily. 
I agree to participate voluntarily in an interview. 
I agree / I do not agree to the recording and transcribing of the interview (Delete as 
appropriate) 
 
Signature of Participant 
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 ___________________________________________________ 
Signature of Interviewer 
   
 ___________________________________________________ 
Date 
 
 
